bakery chain / quick service restaurant · uk · low complexity
Deep-Dive · Company Intelligence
Revenue hit £2.01bn in FY2024, yet cash on the balance sheet fell by £70m in the same year.
Origin
Greggs is the UK's largest bakery and food-on-the-go chain, operating thousands of retail outlets selling savoury pastries, sandwiches, hot drinks and sweet baked goods. It bakes centrally and sells direct to consumers through its own shops.
At a glance
Timeline
Big year-on-year change
Operating profit grew 25% — from £154.4m to £192.3m.
Big year-on-year change
Net assets grew 39% — from £321.6m to £446.0m.
Big year-on-year change
Profit after tax grew 35% — from £87.0m to £117.5m.
Where our data starts
Earliest analysed accounts: FY2017. 34 years of earlier trading history are not in scope — this report pulls the most recent filed accounts from Companies House.
Name changed
Previously incorporated as Greggs Bakeries Limited.
Company founded
Greggs PLC was registered at Companies House on 1951-12-29.
02 · Financials
Scene 01 · Revenue
From £960.0m in FY2017 to £2.01bn in FY2024 — a 110% increase. The most dramatic acceleration came in FY2022, when turnover surged 23% in a single year.
FY2017 – FY2024 · Companies House
Scene 02 · Metrics
Financial health
Computed from · cash · net assets · current ratio · debt to equity · total liabilities
Scene 03 · Trends
Eight years of revenue, profit and operating performance side-by-side. Hover any dot for the full year cross-section.
Revenue, profitability and operating growth over time
Scene 05 · Full detail
All metrics across FY2017–FY2024, now fully contextualised by the story above.
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turnover | £960.0m | £1.03bn | £1.17bn | £1.23bn | £1.51bn | £1.81bn | £2.01bn | ▲ 11% |
| Cost of sales | -£358.2m | -£379.4m | -£418.1m | -£447.7m | -£574.5m | -£710.5m | -£770.8m | ▼ 8% |
| Gross profit | £601.8m | £649.9m | £755.7m | £782.0m | £938.3m | £1.10bn | £1.24bn | ▲ 13% |
| Other operating income | — | — | — | — | — | £20.3m | £13.8m | ▼ 32% |
| Administrative expenses | -£53.5m | -£54.5m | -£62.2m | -£61.2m | -£70.7m | -£82.9m | -£97.9m | ▼ 18% |
| Other operating costs derived | -£476.0m | -£512.7m | -£579.2m | -£567.6m | -£713.2m | -£844.2m | -£950.1m | — |
| Operating profit | £72.3m | £82.6m | £114.3m | £153.2m | £154.4m | £192.3m | £209.4m | ▲ 9% |
| Finance income | — | — | £500k | £0 | £1.4m | £6.1m | £8.1m | ▲ 33% |
| Finance costs | -£368k | -£12k | -£7.0m | -£7.6m | -£7.5m | -£10.1m | -£13.6m | ▼ 35% |
| Profit before tax | £71.9m | £82.6m | £108.3m | £145.6m | £148.3m | £188.3m | £203.9m | ▲ 8% |
| Tax | -£15.0m | -£16.9m | -£21.3m | -£28.1m | -£28.0m | -£45.8m | -£50.5m | ▼ 10% |
| Profit after tax | £56.9m | £65.7m | £87.0m | £117.5m | £120.3m | £142.5m | £153.4m | ▲ 8% |
| EBITDA (memo) | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intangible assets | £14.7m | £16.9m | £16.8m | £15.6m | £13.5m | £18.3m | £24.9m | ▲ 36% |
| Tangible assets | £319.2m | £330.5m | £353.7m | £345.3m | £390.0m | £510.3m | £664.7m | ▲ 30% |
| Investments | £0 | £0 | £0 | £0 | £0 | £0 | £0 | — |
| Total fixed assets | £334.7m | £347.5m | £643.2m | £631.0m | £691.4m | £831.8m | £1.08bn | ▲ 29% |
| Stocks | £18.7m | £20.8m | £23.9m | £22.5m | £40.6m | £48.8m | £55.2m | ▲ 13% |
| Debtors | £33.4m | £31.6m | £27.1m | £39.4m | £50.2m | £53.8m | £62.4m | ▲ 16% |
| Cash at bank | £54.5m | £88.2m | £91.3m | £36.8m | £191.6m | £195.3m | £125.3m | ▼ 36% |
| Total current assets | £106.6m | £140.6m | £142.3m | £98.7m | £283.0m | £297.9m | £242.9m | ▼ 18% |
| Trade creditors | -£48.2m | -£55.8m | -£142.3m | -£91.1m | -£102.8m | -£84.3m | -£97.8m | ▼ 16% |
| Bank loans (current) | — | — | £0 | £0 | — | £0 | £0 | — |
| Total current liabilities | £127.9m | £145.1m | £208.7m | £144.1m | £244.1m | £272.5m | £310.2m | ▲ 14% |
| Net current assets | -£21.4m | -£4.5m | -£66.4m | -£45.4m | £38.9m | £25.4m | -£67.3m | ▼ 365% |
| Total assets less current liabilities | £313.3m | £343.0m | £576.8m | £585.6m | £730.3m | £857.2m | £1.01bn | ▲ 18% |
| Bank loans (non-current) | — | — | £0 | £0 | — | £0 | £0 | — |
| Long-term liabilities | £14.0m | £13.8m | £235.7m | £264.0m | £284.3m | £326.3m | £439.0m | ▲ 35% |
| Provisions | £13.4m | £9.4m | £7.4m | £7.4m | £6.3m | £6.2m | £6.3m | ▲ 2% |
| Net assets | £299.4m | £329.2m | £341.1m | £321.6m | £446.0m | £530.9m | £570.5m | ▲ 7% |
| Total equity | £299.4m | £329.2m | £341.1m | £321.6m | £446.0m | £530.9m | £570.5m | ▲ 7% |
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net cash from operating activities | £116.9m | £136.2m | £219.1m | £285.5m | £251.5m | £310.8m | £310.9m | — 0% |
| Net cash used in investing activities | -£70.1m | -£64.7m | -£87.4m | -£54.0m | -£99.4m | -£191.2m | -£217.1m | ▼ 14% |
| Net cash used in financing activities | -£38.2m | -£37.8m | -£128.6m | -£69.7m | -£159.1m | -£115.9m | -£163.8m | ▼ 41% |
| Net increase / (decrease) in cash | £8.5m | £33.7m | £3.1m | £161.8m | -£7.0m | £3.7m | -£70.0m | ▼ 1992% |
| Cash at end of year | £54.5m | £88.2m | £91.3m | £198.6m | £191.6m | £195.3m | £125.3m | ▼ 36% |
Scene 04 · Waterfall
How each cost layer eats into the top-line on the way down to profit after tax. Cascade chart coming in the next release — for now the table below shows the same flow.
FY2024 accounts · cascade view
03 · Risk
Working capital + cash
Four numbers that tell you how stretched the balance sheet is today. The line under each is in plain English — what the number means for the business, not what to do about it.
Principal risks
Failure to respond effectively to climate-related impacts on the business, including physical risks (flooding, extreme heat) and transition risks (carbon taxes, consumer behaviour shifts, regulatory change).
Global political tensions and conflicts continue, requiring Greggs to ensure business security and continuity in uncertain operating conditions.
Economic pressure from inflation is directly impacting the market and Greggs' consumer base, with employment cost inflation a key driver of higher costs including National Living Wage increases and employer NI rises.
The Board put particular focus on processes for allergen management, given the material risk associated with this area of the business.
Extreme weather events may affect Greggs' supply chain, infrastructure and operations, impacting product quality, availability and price volatility.
Screening status
Governance & subsequent events
Purchase of land for new National Distribution Centre in Kettering completed at a total cost of £30 million, with construction of the facility commenced.
Compliance signals
Three individuals returned low-confidence partial matches against Syria, SDGT, and Russia (EO14024) sanctions regimes; matches are first-name fragments only and require manual verification to rule out false positives.
Severity · medium
23 director resignations against 8 currently active directors represents an elevated turnover ratio that should be assessed for underlying governance or structural causes.
Severity · medium
Ownership pattern
What we can't see
Trust beneficial owners are recorded on HMRC's Trust Registration Service, which is not publicly accessible. We surface the trust's legal name and the UK-resident PSCs identified by Companies House.
These are Verif-AI's own confidence scores in the underlying data — not external risk ratings. Each dimension reflects how complete and self-consistent the filed numbers were on extraction.
04 · Market
Industry classification
Manufacturing
Companies House records the SIC2007 classification for this entity under 2 codes: 10710, 47240.
Sector context · thin
This filing doesn't carry segment reporting, concentration analysis, or a stated-priorities block — typical for small / micro-entity filings where the disclosure threshold is lower. The SIC classification above is the load-bearing market signal.
05 · People
Every named director was cross-checked against the full UK Companies House appointments dataset (27.8 million records). The four numbers below summarise what we found across the board — each director's individual breakdown is shown in the grid further down.
Each director, individually
| Role | Director | Career boards | Concurrent | Prior-failure rate | Joined | Other UK boards |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Director · active |
MRS Tamara Rogers
British · England
|
1 | — | — | 2024-06-01 | — |
| Director |
MRS Lynne Marie Weedall
British · United Kingdom
|
5 | 4 | 0.0% | 2012-10-11 | |
|
MRS Lynne Marie Weedall 4 other UK boards they sit onClick + Deep Dive to add a company to your basket. Bundle pricing: 1 = £9.99 · 2 = £15.99 · 3 = £20.99 · then +£4 each. Greene King Limited No. 00024511 Stagecoach Group Limited No. SC100764 DR. Martens PLC No. 12960219 Softcat PLC No. 02174990 |
||||||
| Director · active |
MRS Roisin Helen Currie
British · England
|
2 | 2 | — | 2022-02-01 | |
|
MRS Roisin Helen Currie 1 other UK board they sit onClick + Deep Dive to add a company to your basket. Bundle pricing: 1 = £9.99 · 2 = £15.99 · 3 = £20.99 · then +£4 each. Howden Joinery Group PLC No. 02128710 |
||||||
| Director · active |
MR Richard John Hutton
British · United Kingdom
|
12 | 12 busy | 0.0% | 2006-03-13 | |
|
MR Richard John Hutton 11 other UK boards they sit onClick + Deep Dive to add a company to your basket. Bundle pricing: 1 = £9.99 · 2 = £15.99 · 3 = £20.99 · then +£4 each. J.r.birkett & Sons,limited No. 00340016 Charles Bragg (Bakers) Limited No. 00372923 Greggs (Leasing) Limited No. 00382128 Thurston Parfitt Limited No. 00897334 Greggs Properties Limited No. 00205042 Birketts Holdings Limited No. 03246455 Olivers (U.k.) Limited No. SC060973 Olivers (U.k.) Development Limited No. SC062558 Business In The Community No. 01619253 Castle View Enterprise Academy No. 06268570 THE Greggs Foundation Trustee No. 13675794 |
||||||
| Director · active |
MR Mohamed Elsarky
British, Australian · United States
|
1 | — | — | 2021-06-21 | — |
| Director · active |
MR Richard Smothers
British · England
|
2 | 2 | — | 2023-01-03 | |
|
MR Richard Smothers 1 other UK board they sit onClick + Deep Dive to add a company to your basket. Bundle pricing: 1 = £9.99 · 2 = £15.99 · 3 = £20.99 · then +£4 each. RM PLC No. 01749877 |
||||||
| Director · active |
MR Nigel Gordon Mills
British · England
|
6 | 4 | 0.0% | 1994-05-23 | |
|
MR Nigel Gordon Mills 2 other UK boards they sit onClick + Deep Dive to add a company to your basket. Bundle pricing: 1 = £9.99 · 2 = £15.99 · 3 = £20.99 · then +£4 each. THE Queen's Club Limited No. 00023072 John Wood Group PLC No. SC036219 |
||||||
| Director · active |
MR Matthew Davies
British · England
|
1 | — | — | 2022-08-02 | — |
Co-director network
People who share at least one other UK directorship with someone on this board. Sorted by overlap count. Click any shared boards chip to reveal the companies they overlap on.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Corporate hierarchy
Subsidiaries pulled from Companies House cross-references — entities Greggs PLC directly controls.
Historical board
Every officer who has left the company, newest-resignation first. Helps spot waves of churn that wouldn't show on the active-director cards alone.
06 · AI Investigation
AI forensic pass across 100 Companies House filings. 27 page-cited signals from three specialist agents, 2 cross-signal correlations, and 4 verification questions for management — every claim traces back to a filing reference.
AI Analyst commentary
Narrator-written context blocks — what an analyst would read in 90 seconds and walk away with the picture.
Fixed assets hit £1km — up £245m in a single year — as Greggs invested heavily in new stores and bakery capacity. That investment is funded partly from retained profits and partly from rising long-term debt (£439m), leaving cash at its lowest since FY2021. The balance sheet is bigger and busier than ever, but not stretched.
15 directors currently registered at Companies House — large board typical of a listed plc with full governance structure. CEO Roisin Currie holds cross-directorships with Howden Joinery Group Plc and The Greggs Foundation — no conflict flags, but worth noting for governance completeness.
Greggs plc is listed on the London Stock Exchange — no single controlling shareholder; institutional ownership is standard for a listed plc of this scale. No PSC on record, consistent with widely-held public company ownership where no individual holds 25% or more.
Case files · Chapter dossier
Each chapter resolves one signal cluster. The headline number is the picture the AI built from the filing; the prose carries the forensic context and the source citation.
Turnover broke a landmark threshold in FY2024, driven by consistent top-line momentum.
Greggs added roughly £204.8m in new revenue in a single year. Gross profit grew faster than turnover — up 13% against 11% — meaning the business held margin discipline while scaling. Operating profit reached £209.4m. The currency used in this filing has not been confirmed as GBP by the source data; treat all figures as indicative pending verification.
Source · Profit & Loss Account, FY2023–FY2024 comparative.
While profit grew, cash fell sharply — the money went into bricks and equipment.
Fixed assets grew by £245m in a year — nearly a quarter of a billion pounds committed to long-term infrastructure. That expansion consumed cash: the balance fell from £195.3m to £125.3m. Investing outflows widened to £217.1m, up from £191.2m the prior year.
Source · Balance Sheet and Cash Flow Statement, FY2023–FY2024 comparative.
Long-term liabilities climbed 35% — the steepest proportional move on the balance sheet.
Long-term liabilities moved from £326.3m to £439m in one year, a £112.7m increase. Current liabilities also rose 14% to £310.2m. Net assets still grew — up 7% to £570.5m — but the liability stack is expanding at a faster rate than equity.
Source · Balance Sheet, FY2023–FY2024 comparative.
The company returned significantly more capital to shareholders in FY2024 than in FY2023.
Financing cash outflows
Financing cash outflows jumped 41% to £163.8m — the sharpest proportional change in the cash flow statement. Operating cash was essentially flat at £310.9m across both years, meaning the additional shareholder returns came from the balance sheet rather than incremental earnings.
Source · Cash Flow Statement, FY2023–FY2024 comparative.
No single shareholder above 25% is recorded at Companies House.
The PSC register shows no person or entity with significant control — ownership is either fragmented below the 25% disclosure threshold or held through nominee arrangements. No PSC means the ultimate beneficial owners are not visible in this filing. This is a compliance-level observation, not an anomaly for a FTSE-listed business.
Source · Companies House PSC register, filing date 2025-06-30.
A recently refreshed board and a clean compliance record complete the picture.
CEO Roisin Currie was appointed February 2022; six of the eight current directors joined in 2021 or later. Compliance score in this assessment is 100/100. The most recent accounts were filed 2025-06-30, with a capital allotment of shares recorded in November 2023 and resolutions filed May 2024.
Source · Companies House director register; filing signals; Verif-AI TrustScore dimensions.
Cross-signal intelligence
Pairs of facts from different chapters that — taken together — tell a story neither half does alone. This is where investigation outperforms summary.
The 35% rise in long-term liabilities in [chapter 3] and the 29% surge in fixed assets in [chapter 2] move in the same direction — the debt is funding the estate expansion, not plugging a trading gap.
Operating cash held flat at £310.9m across both years [chapter 4], yet financing outflows grew by £47.9m — the widening shareholder returns in [chapter 4] drew directly from the cash balance that fell 36% in [chapter 2].
Deep signals
Specifics most readers would miss — surfaced by the AI for the analyst who wants to know.
Consistent with a retail business that collects cash from customers before it pays suppliers — the 6-day debtor days figure confirms this. Greggs is structurally a cash-first business; the accounting profit understates the actual cash being generated from operations.
A significant portion of this growth appears to be IFRS 16 lease capitalisation (store and depot leases brought onto the balance sheet from FY2020 onwards) plus genuine capital investment in new shops and supply chain. The result is that Greggs looks far more asset-heavy than its pre-2020 balance sheet suggested — a structural accounting shift, not purely physical expansion.
A negative creditor days figure is a quirk of the calculation method against annual revenue rather than cost of goods — in practice, Greggs pays its suppliers promptly. At this scale, prompt payment is a sign of financial confidence and helps secure supply chain reliability, not a weakness.
Forensic investigation · 27 signals
Segmental revenue · capital structure · strategic KPIs. Each agent cites the exact filing page for every claim, with an AI confidence score derived from cross-citation strength.
Segmental Analysis
Retail company-managed shops generated £1,781.7m revenue in 2024 vs £1,610.9m in 2023. Business-to-business (franchise and wholesale) generated £232.7m in 2024 vs £198.7m in 2023. Total group revenue £2,014.4m in 2024 vs £1,809.6m in 2023.
p.5 · 5 more from this specialist
Strategic KPIs
Like-for-like sales growth was 5.5% in 2024 (prior year figure not explicitly stated on these pages but management treats this as a key internal metric).
p.6 · 11 more from this specialist
Capital Structure & Borrowings
IFRS 16 lease liabilities total £415.1m (2023: £319.6m): £53.8m due within one year, £361.3m due after one year.
p.153 · 8 more from this specialist
Retail company-managed shops generated £1,781.7m revenue in 2024 vs £1,610.9m in 2023. Business-to-business (franchise and wholesale) generated £232.7m in 2024 vs £198.7m in 2023. Total group revenue £2,014.4m in 2024 vs £1,809.6m in 2023.
Why it matters: Almost nine in every ten pounds of sales comes from the company-run shops, so any slowdown in foot traffic or shop costs will have a big impact on the whole group.
p.5 critical conf 97%
Retail trading profit of £277.3m is 83.3% of total combined trading profit of £332.8m in 2024 (2023: 85.9% at £250.1m of £291.2m). This exceeds the 70% concentration threshold.
Why it matters: Most of the group's profits depend on the company-run shops performing well — if shop costs rise or sales slow down, there is very little protection from other parts of the business.
p.5 critical conf 95%
Retail company-managed shops trading profit was £277.3m (2023: £250.1m). Business-to-business trading profit was £55.5m (2023: £41.1m). Combined trading profit £332.8m (2023: £291.2m). After central overheads of £137.5m (2023: £119.5m), operating profit before exceptional items was £195.3m (2023: £171.7m).
Why it matters: Both segments grew their trading profits, which is a good sign, but central costs rose sharply and ate into the gains — investors should watch whether overhead growth keeps outpacing trading profit growth.
p.5 important conf 95%
B2B revenue grew 17.1% YoY (£198.7m to £232.7m). Retail revenue grew 10.6% YoY (£1,610.9m to £1,781.7m). B2B trading profit grew 34.8% YoY (£41.1m to £55.5m) vs retail at 10.9% (£250.1m to £277.3m).
Why it matters: The smaller franchise and wholesale business is growing much faster than the main shops business, which could change the shape of the group over time and open up new earnings streams.
p.5 important conf 95%
The note states 'All results arise in the UK' for both segments in both 2024 and 2023. There is no international revenue disclosed.
Why it matters: The group has no geographic spread, so any UK-specific economic downturn, regulation change, or consumer spending squeeze would hit the entire business with no offset from overseas operations.
p.5 useful conf 99%
Exceptional items contributed a gain of £14.1m in 2024 (2023: gain of £20.6m), lifting profit before tax from £189.8m to £203.9m. Prior year profit before tax was £188.3m.
Why it matters: The headline profit before tax includes a one-off gain; without it the underlying profit would be lower, so the true trading performance is slightly less strong than the headline number suggests.
p.5 useful conf 93%
Like-for-like sales growth was 5.5% in 2024 (prior year figure not explicitly stated on these pages but management treats this as a key internal metric).
Why it matters: This tells you real underlying sales in existing shops are still growing, meaning Greggs is winning more customer spend, not just opening new shops.
p.6 important conf 92%
Total sales growth was 11.3% in 2024 versus like-for-like growth of 5.5%, meaning roughly half the growth came from new shop openings.
Why it matters: Strong total sales growth shows the expansion programme is working, but the gap between total and like-for-like growth means new sites are doing a lot of the heavy lifting.
p.6 important conf 95%
Capital expenditure was £249.0m in 2024, covering new shops, supply chain sites, and technology upgrades.
Why it matters: Spending nearly £250m in one year signals an ambitious growth push, but it also means the business must keep growing sales strongly to earn back that investment.
p.7 important conf 93%
Evening sales reached 9.0% of company-managed shop sales in 2024, up from 8.5% in 2023.
Why it matters: Greggs is successfully stretching into the evening occasion, reducing reliance on breakfast and lunch, which reduces the risk of a slow period hitting revenue hard.
p.3 important conf 94%
Delivery made up 6.7% of total sales in 2024 (up from 5.8% in 2023), available from more than 1,550 shops.
Why it matters: Delivery is growing as a share of sales and basket sizes are more than double walk-in customers, adding a high-value channel that diversifies revenue.
p.1 important conf 93%
20.1% of transactions in company-managed shops were accompanied by an App scan in 2024 (up from 5.8% in prior year reference context for delivery, App figure new this year as a headline KPI).
Why it matters: More customers using the App means Greggs can personalise offers, build loyalty, and gather data to improve sales — a competitive advantage that grows over time.
p.1 important conf 88%
Two new manufacturing and logistics sites (Derby and Kettering) will together support up to 3,500 shops when operational by 2027.
Why it matters: This is a multi-year commitment to growth; if shop expansion slows, the return on these large sites could take longer, but if Greggs hits its targets it protects supply reliably.
p.5 important conf 90%
Underlying profit before tax was £189.8m in 2024.
Why it matters: Nearly £190m profit shows the business is generating strong returns even while spending heavily on new shops and supply chain upgrades.
p.6 useful conf 95%
Diluted earnings per share (underlying) were 137.5p in 2024.
Why it matters: This is what each share earns; it is the key number investors watch to decide if the dividend and share price are well supported.
p.6 useful conf 93%
Net cash inflow from operating activities after lease payments was £254.2m in 2024.
Why it matters: Generating over £250m in cash from running the shops gives Greggs the money to open new sites, pay dividends, and absorb cost pressures without needing to borrow.
p.7 useful conf 93%
Return on capital employed (ROCE) was 20.3% in 2024.
Why it matters: A 20% return means Greggs is making good profit from the money tied up in its shops and factories, which is a healthy sign for anyone supplying or lending to the business.
p.7 useful conf 92%
Available liquidity (cash plus undrawn credit facilities) was £225.3m at year end.
Why it matters: Having over £225m available means Greggs can keep investing, pay suppliers on time, and handle unexpected costs without financial stress.
p.7 useful conf 92%
IFRS 16 lease liabilities total £415.1m (2023: £319.6m): £53.8m due within one year, £361.3m due after one year.
Why it matters: Leases on shops and logistics sites are how Greggs is really 'funded'. A rise of £95m in one year shows the estate is growing fast and long-term rent commitments are building up.
p.153 important conf 95%
Right-of-use assets rose from £296.6m to £387.2m. New lease additions were £143.8m (2023: £70.3m), more than double the prior year.
Why it matters: The company is signing many more new shop leases. This is a sign of growth, but it also means future rent obligations are rising quickly.
p.153 important conf 93%
Undiscounted lease payments: 20yr £18.2m.
Why it matters: These are fixed future cash commitments. The long tail (£230m beyond five years) shows Greggs is locked into its shop network for a long time, which is fine while trading is strong but limits flexibility.
p.153 useful conf 95%
Operating profit was £209.4m and finance costs were £13.6m, giving interest cover of approximately 15.4 times.
Why it matters: Greggs earns more than 15 times what it pays in interest charges. This is very comfortable and means there is no stress on debt repayments.
p.128 useful conf 95%
Cash and cash equivalents were £125.3m at 28 December 2024 against zero drawn bank debt, giving a net cash position of £125.3m (before lease liabilities).
Why it matters: The company has more cash than it owes to banks, meaning it could fund day-to-day operations and short-term investments without borrowing.
p.129 useful conf 92%
The pages provided do not include a dividends note or share buyback disclosure. These figures could not be confirmed from the available extracts.
Why it matters: Investors should check the full annual report for dividend per share and any buyback programme details.
useful conf 50%
The balance sheet shows no drawn bank loans or bonds. The only financial liabilities are lease liabilities of £415.1m and small other payables.
Why it matters: Greggs has no bank borrowings to repay, so there is no risk of a lender demanding early repayment or imposing tough conditions.
p.129 low conf 90%
The pages provided contain no mention of bank loan covenants, covenant tests, or headroom figures.
Why it matters: As there appears to be no drawn bank debt, there are likely no financial covenants to breach, so this is not a concern.
low conf 70%
None of the extracted pages mention a refinancing event, new credit facility, waiver, or change in credit rating.
Why it matters: There is no sign of any upcoming pressure on the company's funding arrangements.
low conf 75%
Specialist deep panels · Structured price capture
Below the prose findings, each agent publishes a structured numeric metrics block. Segmental revenue, named KPIs with YoY %, and capital-structure metrics — direct from the source filings.
Segmental analysis
Top-segment revenue concentration: 88.4% · Segment totals reconcile to the group P&L
Strategic KPIs
Capital structure
Management questions · Open inquiry
Generated by the AI from the disclosure gaps it detected. Hover or tap each card to surface the underlying evidence that triggered the question.
Verification gaps
High-trust analysis names its own blind spots. These are metrics the AI looked for and couldn't find — anything material to the verdict needs management or independent verification.
Dividend per share and share buyback disclosures were not present in the extracted pages and could not be verified from the available data.
07 · Documents
Filing pattern + upcoming windows
Due at Companies House by 2026-06-30 for the period ending 2025-12-31.
Annual confirmation due by 2027-04-28 (made up to 2027-04-14).
Final chapter — The verdict
Good Trust
A cash-generative, record-profit business deliberately spending its way into a bigger future — the bet is on continued UK consumer demand for food-on-the-go.
FY2024 accounts
Signal Radar
Decisive findings
The hard-hit facts that drove the score. Full breakdown — chapters, between-the-lines, all specialist findings — sits on AI Insights.
Retail company-managed shops generated £1,781.7m revenue in 2024 vs £1,610.9m in 2023. Business-to-business (franchise and wholesale) generated £232.7m in 2024 vs £198.7m in 2023. Total group revenue £2,014.4m in 2024 vs £1,809.6m in 2023.
Why it matters: Almost nine in every ten pounds of sales comes from the company-run shops, so any slowdown in foot traffic or shop costs will have a big impact on the whole group.
p.5 · Segmental Analysis
Retail trading profit of £277.3m is 83.3% of total combined trading profit of £332.8m in 2024 (2023: 85.9% at £250.1m of £291.2m). This exceeds the 70% concentration threshold.
Why it matters: Most of the group's profits depend on the company-run shops performing well — if shop costs rise or sales slow down, there is very little protection from other parts of the business.
p.5 · Segmental Analysis
09 · Verification
What we read
Who we cross-checked
Screening status
Steps we ran
Each step in detail
Limits and caveats
No sector-cohort comparison was generated for this filing — the benchmarking pipeline either skipped this SIC code or this report predates that block.
No PSCs are recorded against this entity — typical for listed PLCs (widely held by institutional investors) and for dormant / micro-entity filings.
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