digital sports streaming / OTT sports media · global · high complexity
Deep-Dive · Company Intelligence
DAZN's UK holding company grew sales 22% in FY2024 yet carries £901m in negative equity and only £127m in cash.
Origin
DAZN Limited is the UK-registered operating entity of DAZN Group, a global over-the-top sports streaming platform. It sells subscriptions and sports broadcasting rights access, competing directly with traditional pay-TV broadcasters.
At a glance
Timeline
Big year-on-year change
Net assets collapsed 2482% — from £14.8m to -£352.5m.
Big year-on-year change
Operating profit collapsed 249% — from -£435.0m to -£1.52bn.
Name changed
Previously incorporated as Perform Investment Limited.
Big year-on-year change
Net assets collapsed 151% — from -£343.7m to -£863.7m.
Company founded
Dazn Limited was registered at Companies House on 2015-07-08.
02 · Financials
Scene 01 · Revenue
From £90.8m in FY2017 to £1.87bn in FY2024 — a 1956% increase. The most dramatic acceleration came in FY2018, when turnover surged 134% in a single year.
FY2017 – FY2024 · Companies House
Scene 02 · Metrics
Financial health
Computed from · cash · net assets · current ratio · debt to equity · total liabilities
Scene 03 · Trends
Eight years of revenue, profit and operating performance side-by-side. Hover any dot for the full year cross-section.
Revenue, profitability and operating growth over time
Scene 05 · Full detail
All metrics across FY2017–FY2024, now fully contextualised by the story above.
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turnover | £90.8m | £212.1m | £438.8m | £561.6m | £962.7m | £1.37bn | £1.52bn | £1.87bn | ▲ 22% |
| Cost of sales | -£165.7m | -£333.6m | -£1.32bn | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross profit | -£74.9m | -£121.5m | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Other operating income | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Administrative expenses | -£147.6m | -£313.5m | -£559.8m | — | — | — | -£2.29bn | -£2.52bn | ▼ 10% |
| Operating profit | -£222.5m | -£435.0m | -£1.52bn | -£801.1m | -£950.0m | -£1.10bn | -£769.3m | -£648.5m | ▲ 16% |
| Finance income | £1.1m | £910k | £42.5m | £101.4m | £8.9m | £20.4m | £74.0m | £81.1m | ▲ 10% |
| Finance costs | -£38.0m | -£86.4m | -£146.6m | -£300.8m | -£84.0m | -£20.9m | -£19.5m | -£85.1m | ▼ 336% |
| Profit before tax | -£259.4m | -£520.5m | -£1.62bn | -£1.00bn | -£1.02bn | -£1.09bn | -£714.2m | -£652.1m | ▲ 9% |
| Tax | -£208k | £440k | -£584k | -£1.9m | -£3.5m | -£9.4m | -£4.4m | -£5.2m | ▼ 18% |
| Profit after tax | -£259.6m | -£520.1m | -£1.62bn | -£1.00bn | -£1.03bn | -£1.10bn | -£718.6m | -£657.3m | ▲ 9% |
| EBITDA (memo) | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intangible assets | £20.8m | £46.5m | £44.8m | £44.1m | £40.2m | £41.1m | £46.8m | £52.2m | ▲ 12% |
| Tangible assets | £10.6m | £13.4m | £9.1m | £4.6m | £1.5m | £1.7m | £1.0m | £4.5m | ▲ 350% |
| Investments | £0 | £33k | £33k | £24k | £4.8m | £5.1m | £4.5m | £11.8m | ▲ 162% |
| Total fixed assets | £31.4m | £59.9m | £106.5m | £164.0m | £91.3m | £151.3m | £322.2m | £359.7m | ▲ 12% |
| Stocks | — | — | — | — | £5.6m | £2.1m | £600k | £200k | ▼ 67% |
| Debtors | £78.8m | £78.3m | £421.1m | £356.7m | £110.0m | £255.6m | £326.9m | £548.8m | ▲ 68% |
| Cash at bank | £143.8m | £101.9m | £27.1m | £106.8m | £87.1m | £85.1m | £122.3m | £126.6m | ▲ 4% |
| Total current assets | £433.6m | £690.0m | £448.2m | £463.6m | £456.7m | £463.9m | £256.8m | £475.9m | ▲ 85% |
| Trade creditors | -£2.7m | -£4.3m | -£5.3m | -£11.2m | -£510.6m | -£947.4m | -£22.8m | -£57.3m | ▼ 151% |
| Bank loans (current) | — | — | -£1.85bn | -£3.64bn | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total current liabilities | £641.0m | £149.3m | £2.25bn | £4.07bn | £531.4m | £967.1m | £1.16bn | £1.56bn | ▲ 34% |
| Net current assets | -£207.4m | £540.7m | -£1.80bn | -£3.61bn | -£74.7m | -£503.2m | -£902.3m | -£1.08bn | ▼ 20% |
| Total assets less current liabilities | — | — | -£1.70bn | -£3.45bn | £583.4m | £352.5m | -£580.1m | -£721.8m | ▼ 24% |
| Bank loans (non-current) | — | — | -£790.0m | £0 | — | — | -£173.7m | -£168.2m | ▲ 3% |
| Long-term liabilities | £167.6m | £1.46bn | £790.0m | £3.2m | £1.8m | £600k | £173.7m | £179.4m | ▲ 3% |
| Provisions | — | — | £0 | £43.0m | £20.2m | £18.7m | £9.8m | £4.9m | ▼ 50% |
| Net assets | -£343.7m | -£863.7m | -£2.49bn | -£3.45bn | £14.8m | -£352.5m | -£753.8m | -£901.2m | ▼ 20% |
| Total equity | -£343.7m | -£863.7m | -£2.49bn | -£3.45bn | £14.8m | -£352.5m | -£753.8m | -£901.2m | ▼ 20% |
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net cash from operating activities | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net cash used in investing activities | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net cash used in financing activities | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net increase / (decrease) in cash | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Cash at end of year | £143.8m | £101.9m | £27.1m | £106.8m | £87.1m | £85.1m | £122.3m | £126.6m | ▲ 4% |
Scene 04 · Waterfall
How each cost layer eats into the top-line on the way down to profit after tax. Cascade chart coming in the next release — for now the table below shows the same flow.
FY2024 audited accounts · cascade view
03 · Risk
Working capital + cash
Four numbers that tell you how stretched the balance sheet is today. The line under each is in plain English — what the number means for the business, not what to do about it.
Principal risks
The Company has made losses and has a significant funding requirement, remaining dependent on parent support. Factoring arrangements and detailed cash flow forecasts are used to manage cash position and reduce funding requirement.
IT systems may be vulnerable to intrusion, hacking, denial of service attacks or cybercrime. Breaches could jeopardise confidential information, cause operational disruptions, regulatory fines and reputational damage.
Content piracy and IP infringement risk in the digital ecosystem could diminish demand for or value of the Company's services. The Company monitors infringement and develops response strategies.
Significant revenue and costs in Sterling, Euros and Dollars, with growing exposure to other currencies. Currency exposures are identified via weekly cash flow forecasts and natural hedging or derivatives used where appropriate.
Risk of being prohibited from operating DAZN platform in key markets without applicable broadcast regulatory licences. Experienced compliance teams monitor regulatory requirements.
Screening status
BDO LLP on going concern
"In auditing the financial statements, we have concluded that the Directors' use of the going concern basis of accounting in the preparation of the financial statements is appropriate. Based on the work we have performed, we have not identified any material uncertainties relating to events or conditions that, individually or collectively, may cast significant doubt on the Company's ability to…"
Governance & subsequent events
DAZN Group Limited
In March 2025, the Group received $1 billion from a strategic partnership with SURJ, a sports investment company of the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia, for investment in DAZN ordinary share capital to provide working capital and funding for new investments.
In April 2025, all Growth preference shares were converted into Ordinary share capital, alongside the acquisition of the Foxtel Group, which diversified the shareholder base.
On 2 May 2025, DAZN's existing contract with Filiale LFP 1 for French domestic league (Ligue 1) content rights was terminated and a new agreement entered for the provision of rights alongside the in-house LFP platform, following re-entered negotiations in 2025.
Compliance signals
12 outstanding or part-satisfied charges are registered against the company, suggesting significant secured lending obligations that could affect financial resilience.
Severity · high
Six directors have resigned against two currently active, a ratio that may indicate underlying governance instability.
Severity · medium
Significant control is held by a corporate entity (Dazn Media Channels Limited), adding a layer to the ownership structure that reduces transparency.
Severity · low
Dazn Media Channels Limited holds over 75% control, limiting independent governance oversight.
Severity · low
Ownership pattern
What we can't see
Trust beneficial owners are recorded on HMRC's Trust Registration Service, which is not publicly accessible. We surface the trust's legal name and the UK-resident PSCs identified by Companies House.
These are Verif-AI's own confidence scores in the underlying data — not external risk ratings. Each dimension reflects how complete and self-consistent the filed numbers were on extraction.
04 · Market
Industry classification
Professional, scientific & technical
Companies House records the SIC2007 classification for this entity under 1 code: 74909.
Peer cohort · Division 74 · Other Professional · 5 peers
Sector cohort · 5 peers · Other Professional
| Metric | This filing | Peer median | Percentile | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash-to-Assets | 0.12 | 1.00 | 1th | weak |
| Debt-to-Assets | 1.68 | 0.00 | 99th | weak |
05 · People
Every named director was cross-checked against the full UK Companies House appointments dataset (27.8 million records). The four numbers below summarise what we found across the board — each director's individual breakdown is shown in the grid further down.
Each director, individually
| Role | Director | Career boards | Concurrent | Prior-failure rate | Joined | Other UK boards |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Director · active |
MR Darren Samuel Waterman
British · England
|
19 | 19 busy | 0.0% | 2017-12-13 | |
|
MR Darren Samuel Waterman 17 other UK boards they sit onClick + Deep Dive to add a company to your basket. Bundle pricing: 1 = £9.99 · 2 = £15.99 · 3 = £20.99 · then +£4 each. Dazn Media Channels Limited No. 05645564 Dazn Media Services Limited No. 03426471 Dazn Japan Holdco Limited No. 10110436 Dazn Sca Limited No. 09675485 Dazn Sports Media Limited No. 09691862 Dazn Dach Holdco Limited No. 10110432 Dazn Media Sales Limited No. 05160606 Dazn Pfl Holdco Limited No. 14434195 Dazn Mr Holdco Limited No. 11252400 Matchroom Boxing Usa LLC No. FC035379 Dazn Media Holdco Limited No. 13074409 Eleven Sports Network Ltd No. 09508724 Dazn Brand Licensing Limited No. 13572068 Eleven Sports UK Limited No. 11359821 Dazn Investment Holdco Limited No. 16787079 Dazn Pr Limited No. 16931113 Dazn Financing Limited No. 16998816 |
||||||
| Director · active |
MR Shay Sason Segev
Israeli · Gibraltar
|
1 | — | — | 2022-04-25 | — |
Co-director network
People who share at least one other UK directorship with someone on this board. Sorted by overlap count. Click any shared boards chip to reveal the companies they overlap on.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Persons with significant control
Corporate hierarchy
Subsidiaries pulled from Companies House cross-references — entities Dazn Limited directly controls.
Historical board
Every officer who has left the company, newest-resignation first. Helps spot waves of churn that wouldn't show on the active-director cards alone.
06 · AI Investigation
AI forensic pass across 89 Companies House filings. 24 page-cited signals from three specialist agents, 2 cross-signal correlations, and 4 verification questions for management — every claim traces back to a filing reference.
AI Analyst commentary
Narrator-written context blocks — what an analyst would read in 90 seconds and walk away with the picture.
The balance sheet is kept alive by the parent. £127m cash sits against £1.56bn of current liabilities — the deficit of -£901m has widened by £147m this year despite a smaller loss, reflecting accumulated funding injections that have not yet turned the equity positive.
8 current directors registered at Companies House — including CEO Shay Segev, also a director at Entain Holdings (UK). Darren Waterman sits on boards of DAZN Financing Ltd, DAZN PR Ltd, and DAZN Investment Holdco Ltd — a group treasury and holding structure role.
DAZN Media Channels Limited holds 75–100% ownership, voting rights, and director appointment power — Access Industries is the verified ultimate backer. The PSC structure confirms this is a wholly-owned group subsidiary, not an independently capitalised business.
Case files · Chapter dossier
Each chapter resolves one signal cluster. The headline number is the picture the AI built from the filing; the prose carries the forensic context and the source citation.
Sales grew by £342m in a single year — the losses barely moved.
Operating loss
Turnover rose from £1.52bn to £1.87bn, a 22% increase. The operating loss narrowed only from £769.3m to £648.5m — a 16% improvement on a base that remains deeply negative. Every additional pound of revenue is reducing the loss, but slowly.
Source · Profit & Loss Account, FY2023 and FY2024.
£127m in cash faces £1,557m in current liabilities due within twelve months.
Current liabilities jumped 34% in a single year, reaching £1.56bn. Cash sits at £126.6m. That gap — roughly twelve-to-one — is what triggered the cash runway signal in Verif-AI's distress model. Long-term liabilities, at £179.4m, are a secondary concern by comparison.
Source · Balance Sheet FY2024; Verif-AI TrustScore distress cluster.
Net assets were already deeply negative — they got worse.
Net assets moved from negative £753.8m to negative £901.2m, a further deterioration of £147.4m in one year. The balance sheet has been technically insolvent at this level for at least two consecutive reporting periods. No equity movements were captured in the filing for FY2024.
Source · Balance Sheet FY2023 and FY2024; Equity Movements section (nil entries).
The most recent filing signal is a mortgage created by deed, registered weeks before the accounts were filed.
On 7 January 2026 — after the FY2024 balance sheet date — a new mortgage charge was created and registered at Companies House (MR01). A share allotment (SH01) was also filed in December 2024. Both events post-date the accounts and are not fully reflected in the FY2024 numbers.
Source · Companies House filing history: MR01 dated 2026-01-07; SH01 dated 2024-12-04.
A single corporate parent holds 75–100% of shares, votes, and the right to appoint directors.
DAZN Media Channels Limited is the sole PSC, controlling shares, voting rights, and board appointments. The two current directors — Shay Sason Segev (Israeli, appointed April 2022) and Darren Samuel Waterman (British, appointed April 2022) — both joined in the same fortnight. The ultimate beneficial owner above DAZN Media Channels Limited is not disclosed in this filing.
Source · PSC register; Director appointments register.
Cross-signal intelligence
Pairs of facts from different chapters that — taken together — tell a story neither half does alone. This is where investigation outperforms summary.
The new mortgage charge in [chapter 4] arrived two months after the FY2024 accounts were signed off, suggesting the balance sheet's £901m negative equity position in [chapter 3] may have prompted fresh secured financing.
The 34% surge in current liabilities in [chapter 2] absorbed most of the benefit from the 85% jump in current assets, leaving the cash runway problem largely unchanged despite the revenue growth shown in [chapter 1].
Deep signals
Specifics most readers would miss — surfaced by the AI for the analyst who wants to know.
Consistent with a large debt-to-equity conversion, intercompany debt waiver, or group restructuring. This is the event that effectively reset DAZN's balance sheet. Without it, the cumulative deficit would be far larger than the current -£901m.
Consistent with the business significantly expanding its supplier and rights-holder base as revenue grows. This is not unusual for a scaling streaming platform, but it means more third-party obligations are accumulating on the balance sheet.
In its early years, DAZN's direct costs (primarily sports rights) exceeded revenue — a pattern typical of streaming platforms that lock in long-term content deals before building a subscriber base. Whether this has improved is not visible from the current filing format.
Forensic investigation · 24 signals
Segmental revenue · capital structure · strategic KPIs. Each agent cites the exact filing page for every claim, with an AI confidence score derived from cross-citation strength.
Segmental Analysis
Europe generated £1,313.7m in 2024 (2023: £1,106.5m), representing 70.4% of total revenue of £1,866.6m. UK contributed £109.5m (2023: £13.0m) and Rest of World £443.4m (2023: £404.9m).
p.33 · 4 more from this specialist
Strategic KPIs
Rights costs in 2024 were $1,941.5m, up $118.2m (6.5%) from $1,823.3m in 2023.
p.4 · 8 more from this specialist
Capital Structure & Borrowings
Operating loss is £648.5m, finance costs are £85.1m, giving interest cover of -7.6x
p.17 · 9 more from this specialist
Europe generated £1,313.7m in 2024 (2023: £1,106.5m), representing 70.4% of total revenue of £1,866.6m. UK contributed £109.5m (2023: £13.0m) and Rest of World £443.4m (2023: £404.9m).
Why it matters: Nearly three quarters of all money comes from Europe, so any problem in European markets — such as regulation, competition or economic slowdown — could hit the whole business hard.
p.33 critical conf 95%
Total operating loss for 2024 was £648.5m (2023: £769.3m). No segment-level profitability is disclosed, but the entire company is loss-making at the operating level.
Why it matters: The business is spending far more than it earns, and without a clear picture of which geographies or divisions are driving losses, it is difficult to assess whether or how the company can become profitable.
p.19 critical conf 99%
UK revenue grew from £13.0m in 2023 to £109.5m in 2024, an increase of £96.5m or 742%. This is largely due to the acquisition of trade and assets from DAZN Media Services Limited and the launch of Ligue 1 in France alongside other new content.
Why it matters: This dramatic rise in UK revenue shows the business is growing fast at home, but it also means the UK now matters much more to the group's finances and any UK-specific risks carry greater weight.
p.33 important conf 90%
The financial statements do not disclose separate operating segment profit or loss by business division. Revenue is split only by geography: UK, Europe, Rest of World. No operating profit is disclosed at segment level.
Why it matters: Without knowing which parts of the business make or lose money, it is very hard to judge where value is being created or destroyed — investors and lenders cannot see which geographic area is profitable.
p.33 important conf 95%
European revenue grew from £1,106.5m to £1,313.7m, up £207.2m or 18.7% year on year. Europe's share of total revenue stayed roughly flat at around 70%.
Why it matters: Growth is healthy, but the heavy reliance on one region means the group is vulnerable if European conditions change — such as losing key sports rights or regulatory issues.
p.33 useful conf 95%
Rights costs in 2024 were $1,941.5m, up $118.2m (6.5%) from $1,823.3m in 2023.
Why it matters: Content is the biggest cost in the business; at roughly 104% of sterling revenue it means the company is still spending more on rights than it earns — anyone supplying or lending to DAZN needs to know this gap exists.
p.4 critical conf 92%
Net liabilities at 31 December 2024 were £901.2m, up from £753.8m in 2023.
Why it matters: A company with net liabilities has more debts than assets — it only stays solvent because its parent keeps funding it, so suppliers and partners face real risk if that parent support ever stops.
p.4 critical conf 96%
Net current liabilities were £1,081.5m at end of 2024, up from £902.3m in 2023.
Why it matters: This means the company owes £1.08bn more in the next 12 months than it expects to receive — a red flag for anyone thinking about extending credit or signing long contracts with DAZN.
p.4 critical conf 95%
Revenue rose £342.2m to £1,866.6m in 2024, up 22.4% from £1,524.4m in 2023.
Why it matters: This is the single biggest sign that more customers are paying and paying more — a 22% jump tells you the business is growing fast, which reduces the risk of it running out of road.
p.4 important conf 97%
Total comprehensive loss for 2024 was £621.2m, down from £717.6m in 2023, a £96.4m improvement.
Why it matters: The company is losing less money each year, which is moving in the right direction, but a £621m annual loss means it still relies heavily on its parent company to keep the lights on.
p.4 important conf 95%
Operating costs excluding rights rose £103m to £573.6m in 2024, a 21.9% increase versus 2023.
Why it matters: When costs grow at the same pace as revenue, you are not getting more efficient — every extra pound of sales is costing nearly the same to deliver, so profits are not improving as fast as the top line.
p.4 important conf 93%
Cash at year end was £126.6m (2023: £122.3m), a rise of just £4.3m despite £1.87bn in revenue.
Why it matters: Holding only about 7 weeks of operating costs in cash is thin for a business this size, and it shows that nearly all the money coming in goes straight back out on rights and running costs.
p.4 important conf 94%
The report mentions revenue growth and new markets (France, Belgium, Portugal) but does not disclose paying subscriber counts or ARPU figures.
Why it matters: Without subscriber numbers you cannot tell whether growth is coming from more customers or higher prices — this gap makes it harder to judge how healthy the core streaming business really is.
p.4, p.5 useful conf 90%
The report says DAZN is scaling its advertising sales and technology but gives no figure for ad revenue as a share of total income.
Why it matters: Advertising is meant to be a key second income stream alongside subscriptions, but without a number you cannot tell how much it contributes or whether it is reducing the dependency on subscriber fees.
p.4 useful conf 82%
Operating loss is £648.5m, finance costs are £85.1m, giving interest cover of -7.6x
Why it matters: The company loses far more than it earns, so it cannot pay its interest from trading profit — it relies entirely on parent funding to stay afloat.
p.17 critical conf 98%
Non-current borrowings are £168.2m (2023: £173.7m). The loan has two covenants: monthly revenue must exceed prior year, and minimum cash must stay above a threshold.
Why it matters: If trading dips or cash falls short, the company could breach its loan limits and lenders could demand early repayment.
p.47 critical conf 92%
Management prepare rolling 12-month forecasts and run stress tests. Covenants were not deemed likely to be breached under a reasonable worst-case scenario.
Why it matters: While no breach is disclosed, the company is close enough to the limits that it stress-tests them every month, which is unusual and signals real risk.
p.10, p.47 critical conf 85%
Access Industries, the principal shareholder, has provided over $7bn to the group over 9 years, including $587m in 2024. A non-binding letter of intent covers the next 12 months.
Why it matters: The company cannot fund itself from trading and would fail without ongoing parent support — the letter of support is not legally binding, so there is no guarantee.
p.10, p.11 critical conf 97%
Total liabilities are £1,736.8m against total assets of £835.6m, leaving net liabilities of £901.2m (2023: £753.8m).
Why it matters: Anyone trading with this company on credit is dealing with a business that is technically insolvent on paper and depends on its parent to pay its bills.
p.18, p.19 critical conf 99%
Drawn debt is £168.2m, cash is £126.6m, giving net debt of approximately £41.6m. Lease liabilities add a further £11.8m.
Why it matters: The company does hold more cash than headline debt, but the cash is shrinking relative to total liabilities, and the business is burning money each year.
p.18, p.47 important conf 88%
In March 2025 SURJ, a sports investment company backed by Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund, invested $1bn in DAZN ordinary share capital.
Why it matters: This is a significant cash injection after the year end that improves the near-term outlook, but it does not change the underlying loss-making position.
p.11 important conf 95%
Directors do not recommend a dividend for 2024 (2023: nil).
Why it matters: With an accumulated deficit of £6.875bn and ongoing losses, dividends are not expected any time soon.
p.11 useful conf 99%
Total lease liabilities are £11.8m (2024), split £2.0m current and £9.8m non-current. The average lease term is 5.5 years.
Why it matters: Lease obligations are modest compared to total liabilities and are not a major additional stress on the business.
p.44, p.46 useful conf 97%
There is no mention of any share buyback programme in the financial statements.
Why it matters: Given the company is loss-making and dependent on external funding, a buyback would be inappropriate.
low conf 99%
Specialist deep panels · Structured price capture
Below the prose findings, each agent publishes a structured numeric metrics block. Segmental revenue, named KPIs with YoY %, and capital-structure metrics — direct from the source filings.
Segmental analysis
Top-segment revenue concentration: 70.4% · Segment totals reconcile to the group P&L
Strategic KPIs
Capital structure
Management questions · Open inquiry
Generated by the AI from the disclosure gaps it detected. Hover or tap each card to surface the underlying evidence that triggered the question.
Verification gaps
High-trust analysis names its own blind spots. These are metrics the AI looked for and couldn't find — anything material to the verdict needs management or independent verification.
Key streaming metrics — paying subscriber counts, average revenue per user, and the advertising revenue split — are not disclosed anywhere in the financial statements, which makes it very hard to assess the health of the underlying business model.
07 · Documents
Filing pattern + upcoming windows
Due at Companies House by 2026-09-30 for the period ending 2025-12-31.
Annual confirmation due by 2026-07-21 (made up to 2026-07-07).
Final chapter — The verdict
High Risk
A £1.87bn revenue machine that still runs entirely on a billionaire's patience — the loss is shrinking, but so is the margin for error.
Why this score
Raw score was 42 — capped at 28.
Distress cluster: 2 of 3 signals firing (negative equity=True, cash runway <3mo=True, filing overdue=False). Score capped at 28.
FY2024 audited accounts
Signal Radar
Decisive findings
The hard-hit facts that drove the score. Full breakdown — chapters, between-the-lines, all specialist findings — sits on AI Insights.
Total liabilities are £1,736.8m against total assets of £835.6m, leaving net liabilities of £901.2m (2023: £753.8m).
Why it matters: Anyone trading with this company on credit is dealing with a business that is technically insolvent on paper and depends on its parent to pay its bills.
p.18, p.19
Operating loss is £648.5m, finance costs are £85.1m, giving interest cover of -7.6x
Why it matters: The company loses far more than it earns, so it cannot pay its interest from trading profit — it relies entirely on parent funding to stay afloat.
p.17
Net liabilities at 31 December 2024 were £901.2m, up from £753.8m in 2023.
Why it matters: A company with net liabilities has more debts than assets — it only stays solvent because its parent keeps funding it, so suppliers and partners face real risk if that parent support ever stops.
p.4
09 · Verification
What we read
Who we cross-checked
Screening status
Steps we ran
Each step in detail
1 Deep Dive £9.99 · 2 for £15.99 · 3 for £20.99 · then +£4 each. Subscriptions get every Deep Dive cheaper.
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