Bp P.L.C.: a $189.3bn business, growing — and getting more profitable as it grows.

Where's the money from?
Revenue $189.3bn (FY2025), up 0% YoY
No segmental split disclosed in the filed accounts — this is the total trading revenue line.
Is it growing?
$105.9bn → $189.3bn
Revenue up about 79% across 6 filed years.
Is it solid?
-20.5% → 6.7%
Operating margin widened as it grew.
Who's behind it?
9 active directors
Full board and backgrounds in the People tab.

integrated oil and gas major · global · high complexity

Deep-Dive · Company Intelligence

Inside BP P.l.c.

Report overview

BP generated $189bn in turnover yet sent $15.9bn out through financing — up 118% — while net assets shrank by $4.3bn.

$36.56bn Cash at bank vs $39.20bn FY2024
$189.34bn Turnover vs $189.19bn FY2024
$7.75bn Pre-tax profit vs $6.78bn FY2024
$74.00bn Net assets vs $78.32bn FY2024
BP P. L. C. turned over $189,335,000,000 in FY2025, almost exactly what it turned over in FY2024. The top line went nowhere. But beneath that stillness, operating profit rose 12%, financing cash outflows surged 118% to $15,880,000,000, net assets fell 6% to $74,000,000,000, and cash on the balance sheet dropped $2.6bn. A company that looks flat from the outside is moving fast on the inside — and most of that movement is money leaving the building.
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Company No.00102498
Statusactive
Latest accountsFY2025 audited accounts
Filed 20 May 2026 2 months ago
AuditorDeloitte LLP

The story

What happened, in chapters

The year, beat by beat — each one a signal from the filing, source cited. Open “the full working” on any beat for the analyst detail.

The Flat Line That Isn't

Turnover barely moved, but that's the least interesting number in this filing.

Operating profit

FY2024 $11.3bn
FY2025 $12.6bn
The full working

Revenue rose by $150m on a $189bn base — effectively zero. Yet operating profit jumped 12% and profit before tax climbed 14%. The business is squeezing more out of the same sales volume, which is a different story to the one the top line tells.

Source · Profit & Loss Account FY2024–FY2025

Profit Eaten by Tax

A 14% rise in pre-tax profit translated into only a 5% rise in profit after tax.

$7.7bn Profit before tax
vs
$1.3bn Profit after tax
The full working

BP paid $6.45bn in tax in FY2025, up 16% on the prior year. That absorbed most of the operating gains. Profit after tax landed at $1.29bn — a thin margin on a $189bn revenue base of roughly 0.7%.

Source · Profit & Loss Account FY2025

Cash Is Leaving Fast

Operating cash fell 10% while financing outflows more than doubled.

-118%
Financing cash outflow FY2024 $7.3bn FY2025 $15.9bn
The full working

Operating cash dropped from $27.30bn to $24.49bn. At the same time, financing cash outflows hit $15.88bn — a 118% increase year-on-year. Cash on the balance sheet fell to $36.56bn from $39.20bn. The gap between cash generated and cash deployed through financing is the dominant movement this filing shows.

Source · Cash Flow Statement FY2024–FY2025

The Balance Sheet Contracts

Net assets fell $4.3bn in a single year as long-term liabilities crept up.

-6%
Net assets / Total equity FY2024 $78.3bn FY2025 $74.0bn
The full working

Fixed assets dipped 1% to $176.74bn, current assets fell 1%, but long-term liabilities grew 2% to $123.94bn. Net assets — and total equity — contracted from $78.32bn to $74bn. The asset base is shrinking while the long-term debt stack is expanding, however modestly.

Source · Balance Sheet FY2024–FY2025

Who Controls BP?

No person or entity holds a declared controlling stake.

  • Controlling shareholder None on record (fragmented / <25%)
  • Listed entity (this company) BP P.L.C. — Co. No. 00102498
  • Operating subsidiaries (below this entity, not detailed in filing brief)

Source · PSC Register, Companies House

A Company With Deep Roots

Incorporated in 1909, BP has traded under three names in 116 years.

  • 31 Dec 1998 Renamed BP Amoco P.L.C. following Amoco merger
  • 26 May 2026 Resolution filing lodged
  • 20 May 2026 Most recent accounts filed
  • 14 Apr 1909 Incorporated as The British Petroleum Company P.L.C.
  • 1 May 2001 Renamed BP P.L.C. (current name)

Source · Companies House filing history; Name history register

The brief

Five questions, answered

The questions you'd ask a credit analyst over coffee — answered from this company's filings, with the source for every figure.

Q1 Can they pay their bills next year?

Current assets of $101.79bn comfortably exceed current liabilities of $80.58bn, giving a current ratio above 1.2x.

Cash on the balance sheet stands at $36.56bn. Operating cash generation was $24.49bn in FY2025, down 10% but still substantial. Short-term liquidity looks solid on the numbers available, though the 10% drop in operating cash and the $15.9bn financing outflow are worth watching.

Source · Balance Sheet FY2025; Cash Flow Statement FY2025

Q2 Are they actually making money, or just turning it over?

BP is making money, but the margins are thin relative to scale.

On $189.34bn of turnover, operating profit was $12.64bn (roughly 6.7% margin). After a $6.45bn tax bill, profit after tax was $1.29bn — a net margin of under 1%. The business is profitable, but the gap between headline revenue and take-home profit is very wide.

Source · Profit & Loss Account FY2025

Q3 Who owns and controls the business, really?

No Person of Significant Control is registered at Companies House, which is consistent with BP being a major publicly listed group where no single shareholder holds 25% or more.

Nine directors are on record, with nationalities spanning British, American, Indian, Irish, and German. The board is international; ownership is publicly fragmented with no declared controlling party.

Source · PSC Register; Director Register, Companies House

Q4 Is the filing history clean, or are accounts late / amended?

The most recent accounts were filed on 20 May 2026, with a resolution filing six days later on 26 May 2026.

The filing brief records no late accounts or amended/replacement filings. The company has been continuously active since incorporation in 1909 and has filed three name changes over its history, all properly registered. No compliance irregularities appear in the data available.

Source · Companies House filing history; Filing signals FY2026

Q5 Where are the red flags hiding in the notes?

No going-concern wording, negative equity, or secured-charge detail is disclosed in the filing brief.

The standout structural signal is the $15.88bn financing cash outflow — more than double the prior year — alongside a $2.6bn fall in cash and a $4.3bn contraction in net assets. Long-term liabilities also grew $2.3bn to $123.94bn while the asset base shrank. The Verif-AI Compliance score of 50/100 is the lowest dimension recorded.

Source · Cash Flow Statement FY2025; Balance Sheet FY2025; Verif-AI TrustScore

Honest limits

What the filings can't tell you

We surface gaps plainly rather than guess. Use the chapters and tabs below to dig into what is on record.

Data quality note

No agent data gaps were flagged; all findings carry high confidence scores, though the gas and low-carbon segment comparison is complicated by the mid-year reclassification of Archaea Energy, so year-on-year figures should be read against restated 2024 numbers only.

Origin

BP P.l.c.

BP p.l.c. is one of the world's largest integrated energy companies, headquartered in London. It explores for, produces, refines, and sells oil, gas, and increasingly low-carbon energy products globally.

Where the money comes from

Revenue $189.3bn (FY2025), up 0% YoY No segmental split disclosed in the filed accounts — this is the total trading revenue line.

At a glance

Key data

Founded 1909 6 years on file
Turnover $189.34bn ◆ 0.1% YoY
Pre-tax profit $7.75bn ▲ +14.2% YoY
Auditor Deloitte LLP Unqualified

Timeline

How we got here

2023 01 of 20

Big year-on-year change

Profit after tax surge

Profit after tax more than doubled — from -$1.36bn to $15.88bn in a single year (+1270%).

2023 02 of 20

Joined the board

Hina Nagarajan joins the board

Hina Nagarajan was first appointed as a director on 1 March 2023.

2022 03 of 20

Big year-on-year change

Profit after tax collapse

Profit after tax collapsed 116% — from $8.49bn to -$1.36bn.

2022 04 of 20

Joined the board

Amanda Jayne Blanc joins the board

Amanda Jayne Blanc was first appointed as a director on 1 September 2022.

2022 05 of 20

Crisis

Divested Rosneft Stake

In response to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, BP announced it would divest its 19.75% stake in Rosneft, which at the time accounted for around half of BP's oil and gas reserves, marking a major strategic retreat from Russia.

2021 06 of 20

Big year-on-year change

Operating profit surge

Operating profit more than doubled — from -$21.74bn to $18.08bn in a single year (+183%).

2021 07 of 20

Joined the board

Johannes Antonius Teyssen joins the board

Johannes Antonius Teyssen was first appointed as a director on 1 January 2021.

2020 08 of 20

Joined the board

Tushar Morzaria joins the board

Tushar Morzaria was first appointed as a director on 1 September 2020.

2020 09 of 20

Where our data starts

Financial deep-dive begins

Earliest analysed accounts: FY2020. 19 years of earlier trading history are not in scope — this report pulls the most recent filed accounts from Companies House.

2013 10 of 20

Acquisition

Sold TNK-BP Stake to Rosneft

BP completed the sale of its stake in TNK-BP to Rosneft on 21 March 2013 for $12.3 billion in cash and 18.5% of Rosneft's stock, exiting its Russian joint venture and becoming a significant Rosneft shareholder.

2010 11 of 20

Crisis

Deepwater Horizon Catastrophe

The Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion on 20 April 2010 caused the largest accidental marine oil spill in history, releasing approximately 4.9 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico and ultimately costing BP more than $65 billion in fines, penalties, and claims.

2005 12 of 20

Crisis

Texas City Refinery Explosion

An explosion at BP's Texas City refinery on 23 March 2005 killed 15 workers and injured more than 170, resulting in a record-setting OSHA fine and severely damaging BP's safety reputation.

2001 13 of 20

Name changed

Rebrand

Previously incorporated as BP Amoco P.l.c..

2000 14 of 20

Acquisition

Acquired ARCO and Burmah Castrol

BP Amoco acquired Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO) and Burmah Castrol in 2000, further consolidating its position as a global supermajor and adding significant upstream assets and the Castrol lubricants brand to its portfolio.

1998 15 of 20

Name changed

Rebrand

Previously incorporated as THE British Petroleum Company P.l.c..

1998 16 of 20

Merger

Merged with Amoco

British Petroleum merged with Amoco (formerly Standard Oil of Indiana) in December 1998, forming BP Amoco plc and becoming the third-largest oil company in the world, transforming the company's scale and US presence.

1979 17 of 20

Stock-exchange listing

UK Government Privatisation Begins

The British government sold 80 million BP shares in 1979 under Thatcher-era privatisation, reducing state ownership to 46%, with full privatisation completed by October 1987 when the remaining 31% stake was sold for $7.5 billion.

1967 18 of 20

Crisis

Torrey Canyon Oil Spill Crisis

A giant oil tanker chartered by British Petroleum, the Torrey Canyon, foundered off the English coast in 1967, spilling over 32 million US gallons of crude oil onto Cornwall and Brittany beaches in Britain's worst-ever oil spill at that time.

1954 19 of 20

Notable event

Becomes British Petroleum Company

After the 1953 CIA/MI6-backed Iranian coup restored Western access to Iranian oil, the AIOC was renamed the British Petroleum Company in 1954, adopting the brand that would define the company globally.

1935 20 of 20

Notable event

Renamed Anglo-Iranian Oil Company

Following Reza Shah's request that the international community refer to Persia as Iran, APOC was renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1935, reflecting the geopolitical shift in the region.

02 · Financials

The numbers, year by year

FY2025 audited accounts · Companies House (PDF accounts)

Scene 01 · Revenue

Turnover up 79% in 5 years

From $105.94bn in FY2020 to $189.34bn in FY2025 — a 79% increase. The most dramatic acceleration came in FY2022, when turnover surged 53% in a single year.

Annual Turnover vs Cost of Sales

FY2020 – FY2025 · Companies House (PDF accounts) · hover any point for the full year

Turnover Cost of Sales Gross Profit (shaded gap)
Latest turnover · FY2025 $189.34bn +0.1% vs prior year
Cost of sales · FY2025 $110.64bn Gross margin 41.6% of turnover
Gross profit (implied) $78.69bn Turnover minus cost of sales
Across 5 years +79% $105.94bn → $189.34bn
PEAK · $241.39bn FY2025 · $189.34bn
FY2020 FY2021 FY2022 FY2023 FY2024 FY2025

Scene 02 · Metrics

The headline numbers

All figures in USD ($) · as filed, not converted

Cash at bank $36.56bn ▼ 6.8% vs $39.20bn FY2024 A modest dip — single-digit decline.
Turnover $189.34bn ◆ 0.1% vs $189.19bn FY2024
Pre-tax profit $7.75bn ▲ +14.2% vs $6.78bn FY2024 Double-digit growth — comfortably ahead of typical year-on-year movement.
Net assets $74.00bn ▼ 5.5% vs $78.32bn FY2024 A modest dip — single-digit decline.

Financial health

Good · 3 signals

High leverage Net assets slightly down Profitable
+ Why this rating
  • High leverage — Debt-to-equity of 2.76 — the company is heavily indebted relative to its equity
  • Net assets slightly down — Net assets declined 5.5% year-on-year
  • Profitable — PBT of $7,746,000,000 on turnover of $189,335,000,000

Computed from · cash · net assets · current ratio · debt to equity · total liabilities

Financial performance trends

Revenue, profitability and operating growth over time

Turnover Gross profit Operating profit
FY2020 FY2021 FY2022 FY2023 FY2024 FY2025
Financial year

Scene 05 · Full detail

Complete P&L statement

All metrics across FY2020–FY2025, now fully contextualised by the story above.

Profit and loss
USD
Metric FY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024FY2025 Δ YoY
Turnover $105.94bn $157.74bn $241.39bn $210.13bn $189.19bn $189.34bn — 0%
Cost of sales -$57.68bn -$92.92bn -$141.04bn -$119.31bn -$113.94bn -$110.64bn ▲ 3%
Gross profit $48.26bn* $64.82bn* $100.35bn $90.82bn $75.24bn* $78.69bn* ▲ 5%
Other operating income $3.13bn $6.46bn $5.44bn $3.21bn ▼ 41%
Administrative expenses -$10.40bn -$11.93bn -$134.49bn -$167.72bn -$16.42bn -$17.49bn ▼ 7%
Other operating costs derived -$62.74bn -$41.26bn $52.18bn $104.25bn -$52.97bn -$51.77bn
Operating profit -$21.74bn $18.08bn $18.04bn $27.35bn $11.30bn $12.64bn ▲ 12%
Finance income $663.0m $581.0m $1.10bn $16.35bn $168.0m $210.0m ▲ 25%
Finance costs -$3.12bn -$2.86bn -$2.70bn -$3.84bn -$4.68bn -$5.11bn ▼ 9%
Profit before tax -$24.89bn $15.23bn $15.40bn $23.75bn $6.78bn $7.75bn ▲ 14%
Tax -$4.16bn -$6.74bn -$16.76bn -$7.87bn -$5.55bn -$6.45bn ▼ 16%
Profit after tax -$20.73bn $8.49bn -$1.36bn $15.88bn $1.23bn $1.29bn ▲ 5%
EBITDA (memo) -$6.85bn* $32.89bn* $60.75bn $43.71bn $27.92bn* $30.46bn* ▲ 9%
Balance sheet
USD
Metric FY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024FY2025 Δ YoY
Intangible assets $6.09bn $6.45bn $10.20bn $9.99bn $9.65bn $8.20bn ▼ 15%
Tangible assets $114.84bn $112.90bn $106.04bn $104.72bn $100.24bn $98.63bn ▼ 2%
Investments $29.08bn $33.53bn $23.27bn $22.44bn $21.32bn $21.58bn ▲ 1%
Total fixed assets $194.67bn $194.68bn $181.67bn $176.30bn $179.39bn $176.74bn ▼ 1%
Stocks $28.08bn $22.82bn
Debtors $17.95bn $27.14bn $34.01bn $31.12bn $27.13bn $26.01bn ▼ 4%
Cash at bank $31.11bn $30.68bn $29.20bn $33.03bn $39.20bn $36.56bn ▼ 7%
Total current assets $72.98bn $92.59bn $106.45bn $104.00bn $102.83bn $101.79bn ▼ 1%
Trade creditors -$36.01bn -$52.61bn -$47.21bn -$42.41bn -$58.41bn -$56.84bn ▲ 3%
Bank loans (current) -$9.36bn -$5.56bn -$315.0m -$240.0m -$4.47bn -$3.36bn ▲ 25%
Total current liabilities $59.80bn $80.29bn $98.70bn $86.02bn $82.24bn $80.58bn ▼ 2%
Net current assets $7.75bn $17.98bn $20.59bn $21.20bn ▲ 3%
Total assets less current liabilities $189.42bn $194.28bn
Bank loans (non-current) -$63.30bn -$55.62bn -$1.27bn -$1.94bn -$55.07bn -$54.60bn ▲ 1%
Long-term liabilities $122.29bn $116.55bn $106.11bn $108.72bn $121.67bn $123.94bn ▲ 2%
Provisions $20.96bn $24.83bn $6.33bn $4.42bn $3.60bn $4.71bn ▲ 31%
Net assets $85.57bn $90.44bn $82.99bn $85.49bn $78.32bn $74.00bn ▼ 6%
Total equity $85.57bn $90.44bn $82.99bn $85.49bn $78.32bn $74.00bn ▼ 6%
Cash flow
USD
Metric FY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024FY2025 Δ YoY
Net cash from operating activities $12.16bn $23.61bn $40.93bn $32.04bn $27.30bn $24.49bn ▼ 10%
Net cash used in investing activities -$7.86bn -$5.69bn -$13.71bn -$14.87bn -$13.25bn -$11.50bn ▲ 13%
Net cash used in financing activities $3.96bn -$18.08bn -$28.02bn -$13.36bn -$7.30bn -$15.88bn ▼ 118%
Net increase / (decrease) in cash $8.64bn -$430.0m -$1.49bn $3.83bn $6.24bn -$2.65bn swung −
Cash at end of year $31.11bn $30.68bn $29.20bn $33.03bn $39.27bn $36.62bn ▼ 7%

Scene 04 · Waterfall

From revenue to profit

How each cost layer eats into the top-line on the way down to profit after tax. Cascade chart coming in the next release — for now the table below shows the same flow.

  1. Revenue$189.34bn
  2. Operating profit$12.64bn
  3. Tax−$11.35bn
  4. Profit after tax$1.29bn

FY2025 audited accounts · cascade view

03 · Risk

What the filings reveal

Concrete signals · descriptive only

Working capital + cash

Where the money sits

Four numbers that tell you how stretched the balance sheet is today. The line under each is in plain English — what the number means for the business, not what to do about it.

Short-term cover Current ratio · liquidity 1.26× For every $1 of short-term bills they hold $1.26 of cash and quickly-sellable assets. Covered, but no real buffer.
Profit-to-cash Cash conversion · earnings quality 194% Every $1 of reported operating profit turned into $1.94 of actual cash. Strong sign — profits are backed by real money in, not accounting estimates.
Customer payment speed Debtor days · working capital 50 Customers take roughly two months to pay. Standard for most B2B businesses.
Cash vs debt Net debt · solvency -$21.44bn Across all borrowings minus the cash they hold, they're $21.44bn in net debt. Real obligation — but they generated $24.49bn of operating cash this year, so it's being serviced from earnings, not new borrowing.

Screening status

Independent checks completed

No critical risk flagsNo kill switches fired Sanctions check · ClearFCDO + OFAC + EU screen Potential sanctions · 2 reviewsLow-confidence name overlap Politically-exposed persons · 1 foundPEP screen · 1 hit Disqualified directors · NoneCH disqualified register · clear Auditor · Deloitte LLP Audit opinion · UnqualifiedUnqualified ISA-700 opinion Will it keep trading? · YesGoing concern · Unqualified Status · Active

Compliance signals

What the compliance pass surfaced

Weak sanctions name overlap

Severity · Medium

Screening returned a partial name overlap: 'ASHDOWN, Hannah' against 'HANNAH' on the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 list (85% name similarity). No identifier corroboration — an unconfirmed overlap, not a confirmed hit.

Weak sanctions name overlap

Severity · Medium

Screening returned a partial name overlap: 'ASHDOWN, Hannah' against 'HANNAH' on the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 list (85% name similarity). No identifier corroboration — an unconfirmed overlap, not a confirmed hit.

PEP identification — INGLIS, Andrew George

Severity · High

INGLIS, Andrew George is matched at 0.9 confidence to a Member of Parliament (House of Commons, Liberal Democrat), designating him a Politically Exposed Person subject to enhanced due diligence obligations.

Elevated board turnover

Severity · Medium

Eleven director resignations in the past three years against a current board of nine represents a turnover rate that may indicate governance instability or structural leadership issues.

Multiple short-tenure directorships

Severity · Medium

Four directors — including HENRY, Simon Peter and HOWLE, Carol-Lee — served less than 12 months, a pattern consistent with nominee arrangements or underlying board instability.

Key audit matters

What the auditor flagged independently

01

Potential impact of climate change and the energy transition on PP&E, goodwill, intangible assets and provisions

Identified by Deloitte LLP as a key audit matter — an area requiring significant judgement or specialist attention during the FY2025 audit.

02

Impairment of upstream oil and gas property, plant and equipment assets

Identified by Deloitte LLP as a key audit matter — an area requiring significant judgement or specialist attention during the FY2025 audit.

03

Decommissioning provisions

Identified by Deloitte LLP as a key audit matter — an area requiring significant judgement or specialist attention during the FY2025 audit.

04

Valuation of commodity financial derivatives, where fraud risks may arise in revenue recognition

Identified by Deloitte LLP as a key audit matter — an area requiring significant judgement or specialist attention during the FY2025 audit.

05

Management override of controls

Identified by Deloitte LLP as a key audit matter — an area requiring significant judgement or specialist attention during the FY2025 audit.

Contingent liabilities

Off-balance-sheet exposures

Climate change-related litigation brought against bp; management assessed that no provision should currently be made and that contingent liability disclosures are appropriate... Not quantified
Decommissioning obligations that could revert back to bp in respect of assets transferred to third parties through historical divestments, with risk of reversion potentially... Not quantified
Decommissioning provisions for refining assets not generally recognised given indeterminate settlement dates; obligations would only be recognised when sufficient information... Not quantified
Gulf of America oil spill residual settlement liabilities; included as part of the broader net debt and obligations measure of $57.8 billion at year-end 2025. Not quantified

Principal risks

As disclosed in the filed accounts

01

Commodity prices and market environment

A sustained significant decline in oil prices over three years was modelled as one of the most severe but plausible scenarios that could threaten the viability of the company.

02

Process safety, personal safety and environmental risks

A significant process safety incident when operating facilities, drilling wells or transporting hydrocarbons was identified as a key viability scenario; four fatalities occurred in US retail operations in 2025.

03

Digital, cyber security and data risk

A significant cyber security incident was included in the viability stress scenarios as one of the most severe but plausible threats to the company.

04

Legal, regulatory and ethical compliance

Loss of a significant market or producing asset, including climate change-related litigation brought against bp, was identified as a principal risk and viability scenario.

05

Climate change and energy transition

The energy transition may significantly impact future commodity prices, recoverable values of oil and gas assets, goodwill and decommissioning obligations, and could result in stranded assets or increased provisions.

Notes to the accounts

Related-party transactions disclosed

UK accounts must disclose dealings with connected parties — usually the parent company, subsidiaries, or other group entities. These lines show how money and charges move inside the corporate family; they are filed for transparency, not because every entry signals a problem.

Related party

Transactions In The Ordinary Course Of Business; Summarised In Notes 16 And 17 Of The Consolidated Financial Statements

What this means: “Transactions in the ordinary course of business; summarised in Notes 16 and 17 of the consolidated financial statements” is a related-party item disclosed in the accounts notes — dealings with a connected company that must be reported separately from normal external trade.

Internal data-quality signals · expand

These are Verif-AI's own confidence scores in the underlying data — not external risk ratings. Each dimension reflects how complete and self-consistent the filed numbers were on extraction.

Financial completeness 60
Compliance signals 50
Operational disclosure 72
Data confidence 70

04 · Market

Sector and benchmarks

SIC2007 · cohort metrics

Industry classification

Professional, scientific & technical

Companies House records the SIC2007 classification for this entity under 1 code: 70100.

Peer cohort · Division 70 · Head Offices & Consultancy · 46 peers

Division revenue split

Where the $1 comes from

Revenue split by segment as the company itself reports it in the filed accounts.

Gas & low carbon energy
Oil production & operations
Customers & products
Other businesses & corporate

Concentration + dependency

Where revenue could be most exposed

01

Geographic concentration

A large part of upstream production is concentrated in the US (including the Gulf of America and onshore shale), UK North Sea, Middle East and Brazil — these regions account for the majority of the group's hydrocarbon output.

02

Customer concentration

bp sells oil, gas, refined products and retail fuel to a very large and diverse set of customers globally — no single customer concentration is disclosed or flagged as a risk.

03

Supplier concentration

bp paid $142.5 billion to suppliers for goods and services in 2025, spread across a global supply chain — no single supplier concentration is flagged, but the report notes that supply chain disruption and third-party risk are principal risks.

04

Single-site concentration

No single site dependency is explicitly flagged, but the report notes that offshore facilities in the North Sea and Gulf of America face heightened severe weather risk, and that a significant proportion of assets being shut in simultaneously would jeopardise financial resilience.

05

Currency concentration

bp earns most revenue in US dollars (oil and gas are globally priced in dollars) but has costs in many currencies; currency movements are flagged as a principal risk affecting project economics and reported earnings.

Strategic priorities

What the directors say they're focused on

Directly from the management commentary in the filed accounts — descriptive of stated intent, not a forecast.

01

Priority 1

Grow oil and gas production and cash flow through disciplined investment, targeting 2.3–2.5 million barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2030

02

Priority 2

Cut costs by $5.5–6.5 billion cumulatively by end 2027 compared to 2023 levels

03

Priority 3

Reduce total debt (net of cash) to $14–18 billion by end 2027 by selling assets and suspending share buybacks

04

Priority 4

Focus the downstream business on markets where bp has an advantaged position, including shrinking the retail network and divesting the Castrol lubricants majority stake

05

Priority 5

Invest selectively in lower-carbon energy — biogas, biofuels and electric vehicle charging — while pulling back from offshore wind and hydrogen projects that don't meet return thresholds

Sector cohort · 46 peers · Head Offices & Consultancy

How this filing compares

Metric This filing Peer median Percentile Assessment
Cash Ratio 0.45 0.25 74th above median
Profit Margin (%) 4.1% 7.3% 38th below median
Quick Ratio 0.78 0.55 76th strong
Current Ratio 1.06 0.87 66th above median
Cash-to-Assets 0.14 0.06 68th above median
Debt-to-Assets 0.78 0.71 61th below median
Debt-to-Equity 2.76 1.35 76th weak
Net Assets Growth (%) -5.5% -0.3% 36th below median

05 · People

The people behind the company

14 directors · 0 PSCs · 27.8m UK appointments cross-referenced

Every named director was cross-checked against the full UK Companies House appointments dataset (27.8 million records). The four numbers below summarise what we found across the board — each director's individual breakdown is shown in the grid further down.

Directors analysed 11 3 corporate · cross-checked against 27.8m records
Avg failure rate 6.0% share of prior companies that went into liquidation / dissolution
Max concurrent boards 5 most active director sits on 5 boards · 1.3 avg
Phoenix signals 0 no director linked to dissolved-and-restarted companies

Each director, individually

Career history + cross-references

Role Director Career boards Concurrent Prior-failure rate Joined Other UK boards
Director
Amanda Jayne Blanc British · England
24 1 failed 5 busy 4.2% 14 February 2011
Director
Katherine Anne Thomson British · England
26 2 failed 7.7% 19 November 2012
Director · active
Tushar Morzaria British · England
1 1 September 2020
Director · active
Johannes Antonius Teyssen German · Germany
1 1 January 2021
Director · active
Satish Pai Indian · India
1 1 March 2023
Director · active
Hina Nagarajan Indian · India
1 1 March 2023
Director · active
Ian Paul Tyler British · England
1 1 April 2025
Director · active
David Alan Hager American · United States
1 2 June 2025
Director · active
Albert Jude Manifold Irish · Ireland
1 1 September 2025

Co-director network

Who sits on other UK boards alongside these directors

People who share at least one other UK directorship with someone on this board. Sorted by overlap count. Click any shared boards chip to reveal the companies they overlap on.

Francis William Michael Starkie 331 career appointments · 12 failed · 3.6% failure rate 17 shared boards
  • BP Australia Swaps Management Limited No. 08298838 · Director · Active
  • BP Russian Investments Limited No. 02565511 · Director · Active
  • BP Holdings Canada Limited No. 08274009 · Director · Active
  • Viceroy Investments Limited No. 00432981 · Director · Active
  • BP America Limited No. 08842913 · Director · Active
  • BP New Ventures Middle East Limited No. 10202089 · Director · Active
  • BP Continental Holdings Limited No. 00517403 · Director · Active
  • BP Global Investments Limited No. 00263889 · Director · Active
  • BP Holdings North America Limited No. 06034588 · Director · Active
  • BP Car Fleet Limited No. 00651878 · Director · Liquidation
  • BP Properties Limited No. 00699446 · Director · Active
  • BP Asia Pacific Holdings Limited No. 01094398 · Director · Active
  • BP Capital Markets P.l.c. No. 01290444 · Director · Active
  • THE BP Share Plans Trustees Limited No. 01454944 · Director · Active
  • Atlantic 2/3 UK Holdings Limited No. 04075308 · Director · Active
  • BP Corporate Holdings Limited No. 04116177 · Director · Active
  • BP Finance P.l.c No. 04145621 · Director · Active
MR David James Bucknall 31 career appointments · 2 failed · 6.5% failure rate 16 shared boards
  • BP Australia Swaps Management Limited No. 08298838 · Director · Active
  • BP Russian Investments Limited No. 02565511 · Director · Active
  • BP Holdings Canada Limited No. 08274009 · Director · Active
  • Viceroy Investments Limited No. 00432981 · Director · Active
  • BP America Limited No. 08842913 · Director · Active
  • BP New Ventures Middle East Limited No. 10202089 · Director · Active
  • BP Continental Holdings Limited No. 00517403 · Director · Active
  • BP Global Investments Limited No. 00263889 · Director · Active
  • BP Holdings North America Limited No. 06034588 · Director · Active
  • BP Car Fleet Limited No. 00651878 · Director · Liquidation
  • BP Properties Limited No. 00699446 · Director · Active
  • BP Asia Pacific Holdings Limited No. 01094398 · Director · Active
  • BP Capital Markets P.l.c. No. 01290444 · Director · Active
  • THE BP Share Plans Trustees Limited No. 01454944 · Director · Active
  • Atlantic 2/3 UK Holdings Limited No. 04075308 · Director · Active
  • BP Corporate Holdings Limited No. 04116177 · Director · Active
Douglas Patrick Chapman 283 career appointments · 9 failed · 3.2% failure rate 16 shared boards
  • BP Australia Swaps Management Limited No. 08298838 · Director · Active
  • BP Russian Investments Limited No. 02565511 · Director · Active
  • BP Holdings Canada Limited No. 08274009 · Director · Active
  • Viceroy Investments Limited No. 00432981 · Director · Active
  • BP America Limited No. 08842913 · Director · Active
  • BP New Ventures Middle East Limited No. 10202089 · Director · Active
  • BP Continental Holdings Limited No. 00517403 · Director · Active
  • BP Global Investments Limited No. 00263889 · Director · Active
  • BP Holdings North America Limited No. 06034588 · Director · Active
  • BP Car Fleet Limited No. 00651878 · Director · Liquidation
  • BP Properties Limited No. 00699446 · Director · Active
  • BP Asia Pacific Holdings Limited No. 01094398 · Director · Active
  • BP Capital Markets P.l.c. No. 01290444 · Director · Active
  • THE BP Share Plans Trustees Limited No. 01454944 · Director · Active
  • Atlantic 2/3 UK Holdings Limited No. 04075308 · Director · Active
  • BP Corporate Holdings Limited No. 04116177 · Director · Active
Philippe Louis Herbert Maso Y Guell Rivet 43 career appointments · 2 failed · 4.7% failure rate 10 shared boards
  • Ignition New Business Solutions Limited No. 04857208 · Director · Active
  • AXA Services Limited No. 00446043 · Director · Active
  • AXA Insurance UK PLC No. 00078950 · Director · Active
  • AXA Insurance PLC No. 00932111 · Director · Active
  • AXA UK PLC No. 02937724 · Director · Active
  • Bluefin Insurance Group Limited No. 03251684 · Director · Liquidation
  • AXA Insurance Dac No. NF004201 · Director · Active
  • Swiftcover Insurance Services Ltd No. 05298352 · Director · Active
  • Insurance Fraud Bureau No. 08203205 · Director · Active
  • AXA Ppp Healthcare Limited No. 03148119 · Director · Active
Jean Paul Dominique Louis Drouffe 32 career appointments · 3 failed · 9.4% failure rate 9 shared boards
  • Ignition New Business Solutions Limited No. 04857208 · Director · Active
  • AXA Services Limited No. 00446043 · Director · Active
  • AXA Insurance UK PLC No. 00078950 · Director · Active
  • AXA Insurance PLC No. 00932111 · Director · Active
  • AXA UK PLC No. 02937724 · Director · Active
  • Bluefin Insurance Group Limited No. 03251684 · Director · Liquidation
  • AXA Insurance Dac No. NF004201 · Director · Active
  • Swiftcover Insurance Services Ltd No. 05298352 · Director · Active
  • Insurance Fraud Bureau No. 08203205 · Director · Active
MR Peter John Hubbard 70 career appointments · 1 failed · 1.4% failure rate 9 shared boards
  • Ignition New Business Solutions Limited No. 04857208 · Director · Active
  • AXA Services Limited No. 00446043 · Director · Active
  • AXA Insurance UK PLC No. 00078950 · Director · Active
  • AXA Insurance PLC No. 00932111 · Director · Active
  • AXA UK PLC No. 02937724 · Director · Active
  • Bluefin Insurance Group Limited No. 03251684 · Director · Liquidation
  • AXA Insurance Dac No. NF004201 · Director · Active
  • Swiftcover Insurance Services Ltd No. 05298352 · Director · Active
  • Insurance Fraud Bureau No. 08203205 · Director · Active
MR Jeremy Peter Small 414 career appointments · 6 failed · 1.4% failure rate 9 shared boards
  • Ignition New Business Solutions Limited No. 04857208 · Director · Active
  • AXA Services Limited No. 00446043 · Director · Active
  • AXA Insurance UK PLC No. 00078950 · Director · Active
  • AXA Insurance PLC No. 00932111 · Director · Active
  • AXA UK PLC No. 02937724 · Director · Active
  • Bluefin Insurance Group Limited No. 03251684 · Director · Liquidation
  • AXA Insurance Dac No. NF004201 · Director · Active
  • Swiftcover Insurance Services Ltd No. 05298352 · Director · Active
  • Insurance Fraud Bureau No. 08203205 · Director · Active
MR Bertrand Poupart-Lafarge 24 career appointments · 1 failed · 4.2% failure rate 8 shared boards
  • Ignition New Business Solutions Limited No. 04857208 · Director · Active
  • AXA Services Limited No. 00446043 · Director · Active
  • AXA Insurance UK PLC No. 00078950 · Director · Active
  • AXA Insurance PLC No. 00932111 · Director · Active
  • AXA UK PLC No. 02937724 · Director · Active
  • Bluefin Insurance Group Limited No. 03251684 · Director · Liquidation
  • AXA Insurance Dac No. NF004201 · Director · Active
  • Swiftcover Insurance Services Ltd No. 05298352 · Director · Active
MR Karl Russell Seal 9 career appointments · 1 failed · 11.1% failure rate 1 shared board

Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.

DR Rolf Wilhelm Heinrich Stomberg 13 career appointments · 1 failed · 7.7% failure rate 1 shared board

Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.

+ Show the 84 resigned officers

Historical board

Resigned network

Every officer who has left the company, newest-resignation first. Helps spot waves of churn that wouldn't show on the active-director cards alone.

2020

Hannah Ashdown

Secretary Served 2012 → 2020
2019

Jens Bertelsen

Secretary Served 2018 → 2019
2017

Jens Bertelsen

Secretary Served 2012 → 2017
2021

Nicholas Bucksey

Secretary Served 2020 → 2021
2018

Emily Carey

Secretary Served 2017 → 2018
2001

Paula Jean Clayton

Secretary Served 1999 → 2001
2020

Denise Dillon

Secretary Served 2017 → 2020
1994

Richard Charles Grayson

Secretary Resigned 1 October 1994
2003

Judith Christine Hanratty

Secretary Served 1994 → 2003
2018

David John Jackson

Secretary Served 2003 → 2018
2022

John-Green Odada

Secretary Served 2020 → 2022
2012

David John Pearl

Secretary Served 2001 → 2012
1996

Stephen James Ahearne

Director Resigned 30 September 1996
2008

David Christopher, Dr Allen

Director Served 2003 → 2008
2020

Nils Smedegaard Andersen

Director Served 2016 → 2020
2018

Paul Milton Anderson

Director Served 2010 → 2018
1995

John Francis Harcourt Ashburton

Director Resigned 30 June 1995
2025

Murray Michael Auchincloss

Director Served 2020 → 2025
2001

Ruth Block

Director Served 1998 → 2001
2019

Alan Boeckmann

Director Served 2014 → 2019
2019

Frank Lee ("skip"), Admiral, Us Navy (Retired) Bowman

Director Served 2010 → 2019
2007

Edmund John Phillip, Lord Browne

Director Resigned 1 May 2007
2007

John Henry Bryan

Director Served 1998 → 2007
2002

John Gordon Sinclair, Sir Buchanan

Director Served 1996 → 2002
2016

Antony Burgmans

Director Served 2004 → 2016
2021

Alison Jane, Dame Carnwath

Director Served 2018 → 2021
2017

Cynthia Blum Carroll

Director Served 2007 → 2017
2012

William Martin, Sir Castell

Director Served 2006 → 2012
2003

Rodney Frank Chase

Director Resigned 23 April 2003
2014

Iain Cameron Conn

Director Served 2004 → 2014
2025

Pamela Daley

Director Served 2018 → 2025
2015

George Alfred Lawrence David

Director Served 2008 → 2015
2020

Ian Edward Lamert, Sir Davis

Director Served 2010 → 2020
2010

Erroll Brown Davis Jr

Director Served 1998 → 2010
2021

Ann Patricia, Professor Dame Dowling

Director Served 2012 → 2021
2020

Robert Warren Dudley

Director Served 2009 → 2020
2001

Richard Ferris

Director Served 1998 → 2001
2011

Douglas Jardine Flint

Director Served 2005 → 2011
2002

William Douglas Ford

Director Served 2000 → 2002
2000

Harry Laurence Fuller

Director Served 1998 → 2000
2001

Christopher Shaw, Dr Gibson Smith

Director Served 1997 → 2001
2020

Brian, Dr Gilvary

Director Served 2012 → 2020
1998

James Malcolm, Sir Glover

Director Resigned 31 December 1998
2013

Byron Elmer, Dr Grote

Director Served 2000 → 2013
1996

Carl Horst, Dr Hahn

Director Resigned 30 September 1996
2010

Anthony Bryan, Dr Hayward

Director Served 2003 → 2010
2026

Simon Peter Henry

Director Served 2025 → 2026
1998

Karen Nicholson, Dr Horn

Director Resigned 31 December 1998
1992

Robert Baynes, Sir Horton

Director Resigned 25 June 1992
2026

Carol-Lee Howle

Director Served 2025 → 2026
2010

Andrew George Inglis

Director Served 2007 → 2010
2011

Deanne Shirley, Dame Julius

Director Served 2001 → 2011
2005

Charles Field Knight

Director Resigned 14 April 2005
2023

Bernard Looney

Director Served 2020 → 2023
1999

William Lowrie

Director Served 1998 → 1999
2025

Helge Lund

Director Served 2018 → 2025
2004

Floris Anton Maljers

Director Served 1998 → 2004
2026

Albert Jude Manifold

Director Served 2025 → 2026
2007

John Alexander Manzoni

Director Served 2003 → 2007
2008

Walter Eugene, Dr Massey

Director Served 1998 → 2008
2009

Thomas Fulton Wilson, Sir Mckillop

Director Served 2004 → 2009
2026

Melody Boone Meyer

Director Served 2017 → 2026
2006

Henry Michael Pearson Miles

Director Served 1994 → 2006
2021

Brendan Robert Nelson

Director Served 2010 → 2021
2016

Freedom Phuthuma Nhleko

Director Served 2011 → 2016
2005

Robin Buchanan, Sir Nicholson

Director Resigned 14 April 2005
1995

Hugh Edward Norton

Director Resigned 30 June 1995
2004

Richard Lake, Sir Olver

Director Served 1998 → 2004
2010

Ian Maurice Gray, Sir Prosser

Director Served 1997 → 2010
2024

Paula Rosput Reynolds

Director Served 2015 → 2024
2026

Karen Ann Richardson

Director Served 2021 → 2026
2000

Bryan Kaye, Mr. Sanderson

Director Resigned 30 September 2000
2024

Robert John, Sir Sawers

Director Served 2015 → 2024
1997

Karl Russell Seal

Director Resigned 1 September 1997
1998

Patrick, Sir Sheehy

Director Resigned 31 December 1998
2017

Andrew Barkley Shilston

Director Served 2012 → 2017
1997

David, Lord Simon

Director Resigned 7 May 1997
1997

Rolf Wilhelm Heinrich, Dr Stomberg

Director Served 1995 → 1997
2009

Peter Denis Sutherland

Director Served 1995 → 2009
1993

Peter Denis Sutherland

Director Resigned 1 July 1993
2018

Carl-Henric Svanberg

Director Served 2009 → 2018
2006

Michael Holcombe Wilson

Director Served 1998 → 2006
2002

Robert Peter, Sir Wilson

Director Served 1998 → 2002
2001

Patrick Richard Henry, Lord Wright Of Richmond Wright

Director Resigned 30 April 2001

06 · AI Investigation

Case file open · File no. 00102498 · 28 July 2026 · Trust signal · 59/100 · AI confidence · 94%

BP is a classic oil major running a two-speed machine: the upstream engine that earns most of the money saw profit drop 21%, and the gas and low-carbon arm — the flag-bearer of the energy transition — more than halved its profit in a single year.

AI forensic pass across 100 Companies House filings. 31 page-cited signals from three specialist agents, 3 cross-signal correlations, and 4 verification questions for management — every claim traces back to a filing reference.

Critical
4
Load-bearing signals
Warning
12
Context to the summary
Structural
15
Supporting facts
Evidence
15
Distinct pages cited

AI Analyst commentary

What the numbers, the board, and the ownership say

Narrator-written context blocks — what an analyst would read in 90 seconds and walk away with the picture.

Balance sheet

Fixed assets have drifted down from $194.7bn (FY2020) to $176.7bn (FY2025), while long-term liabilities have climbed back to $123.9bn after a brief dip — squeezing net assets to $74bn, their lowest point in the six-year data set. Cash at $36.6bn is healthy in absolute terms but down 6.8% on the prior year.

Board

15 director entries listed at Companies House, including one duplicate (Jens Bertelsen appears twice) — actual board likely 14 individuals. Amanda Blanc holds concurrent directorships at Aviva Group Holdings and Aviva Plc — a notable cross-appointment between major FTSE companies.

Ownership

BP p.l.c. is a major listed PLC — no single controlling shareholder; institutional ownership is typical for a company of this type. OSINT confirms global institutional and mutual fund ownership, consistent with a NYSE- and LSE-listed energy major with no dominant PSC.

Case files · Chapter dossier

The investigation, chapter by chapter

The investigation as one running thread — each beat resolves a signal cluster, page-cited. Open “the full working” on any beat for the forensic detail.

The Flat Line That Isn't

Turnover barely moved, but that's the least interesting number in this filing.

Operating profit

FY2024 $11.3bn
FY2025 $12.6bn
The full working

Revenue rose by $150m on a $189bn base — effectively zero. Yet operating profit jumped 12% and profit before tax climbed 14%. The business is squeezing more out of the same sales volume, which is a different story to the one the top line tells.

Source · Profit & Loss Account FY2024–FY2025

Profit Eaten by Tax

A 14% rise in pre-tax profit translated into only a 5% rise in profit after tax.

$7.7bn Profit before tax
vs
$1.3bn Profit after tax
The full working

BP paid $6.45bn in tax in FY2025, up 16% on the prior year. That absorbed most of the operating gains. Profit after tax landed at $1.29bn — a thin margin on a $189bn revenue base of roughly 0.7%.

Source · Profit & Loss Account FY2025

Cash Is Leaving Fast

Operating cash fell 10% while financing outflows more than doubled.

-118%
Financing cash outflow FY2024 $7.3bn FY2025 $15.9bn
The full working

Operating cash dropped from $27.30bn to $24.49bn. At the same time, financing cash outflows hit $15.88bn — a 118% increase year-on-year. Cash on the balance sheet fell to $36.56bn from $39.20bn. The gap between cash generated and cash deployed through financing is the dominant movement this filing shows.

Source · Cash Flow Statement FY2024–FY2025

The Balance Sheet Contracts

Net assets fell $4.3bn in a single year as long-term liabilities crept up.

-6%
Net assets / Total equity FY2024 $78.3bn FY2025 $74.0bn
The full working

Fixed assets dipped 1% to $176.74bn, current assets fell 1%, but long-term liabilities grew 2% to $123.94bn. Net assets — and total equity — contracted from $78.32bn to $74bn. The asset base is shrinking while the long-term debt stack is expanding, however modestly.

Source · Balance Sheet FY2024–FY2025

Who Controls BP?

No person or entity holds a declared controlling stake.

  • Controlling shareholder None on record (fragmented / <25%)
  • Listed entity (this company) BP P.L.C. — Co. No. 00102498
  • Operating subsidiaries (below this entity, not detailed in filing brief)

Source · PSC Register, Companies House

A Company With Deep Roots

Incorporated in 1909, BP has traded under three names in 116 years.

  • 31 Dec 1998 Renamed BP Amoco P.L.C. following Amoco merger
  • 26 May 2026 Resolution filing lodged
  • 20 May 2026 Most recent accounts filed
  • 14 Apr 1909 Incorporated as The British Petroleum Company P.L.C.
  • 1 May 2001 Renamed BP P.L.C. (current name)

Source · Companies House filing history; Name history register

Cross-signal intelligence

AI correlations across the filing

Pairs of facts from different chapters that — taken together — tell a story neither half does alone. This is where investigation outperforms summary.

The 118% surge in financing outflows in [chapter 3] is the most likely driver of the $4.3bn equity erosion visible in [chapter 4] — money leaving via financing exceeds the profit retained in the business.

Operating cash fell 10% in [chapter 3] even as operating profit rose 12% in [chapter 1], suggesting working capital or timing differences are absorbing gains that the P&L records but cash flow does not yet see.

The tax charge of $6.45bn in [chapter 2] is five times larger than profit after tax, which means the effective cash drain from taxation alone dwarfs the reported bottom-line earnings — a dynamic that compounds the cash pressure shown in [chapter 3].

Deep signals

Buried in the filing

Specifics most readers would miss — surfaced by the AI for the analyst who wants to know.

01

SIC code 70100 — this is a holding company, not a trading entity

Consistent with a large group structure where the parent entity holds the shares and consolidates results, while actual trading, refining and retail operations sit in subsidiary companies. The balance sheet figures here represent the consolidated group view — individual subsidiary obligations are not visible in this filing.

02

Trade creditors exceed $56.8bn — larger than reported current liabilities net figure suggests

Trade payables alone represent 70% of all current liabilities. This appears consistent with a large commodity trading and integrated energy business where short-term supplier obligations are the dominant current liability — not debt facilities. The creditor days figure (-110 days) is a derived metric and should be interpreted in the context of complex commodity settlement cycles rather than as straightforward late payment.

03

PAT dramatically below PBT — large tax and other charges each year

The gap between pre- and post-tax profit is very large and volatile, consistent with windfall taxes, deferred tax movements, and large one-off charges typical of integrated oil and gas majors. Readers should focus on PBT and operating cash generation rather than PAT when assessing underlying trading performance.

Forensic investigation · 31 signals

Three specialist agents, working in parallel

Segmental revenue · capital structure · strategic KPIs. Each agent cites the exact filing page for every claim, with an AI confidence score derived from cross-citation strength.

01

Segmental Analysis

Customers & products lost money in 2024 but recovered in 2025

Customers & products segment reported a replacement cost profit of $4,100m in 2025, recovering from a loss of $1,043m in 2024. Profit before interest and tax was $2,747m in 2025 vs a loss of $1,522m in 2024.

p.186, p.187 · 8 more from this specialist

02

Strategic KPIs

Upstream plant reliability hit a record high of 96.1%

Upstream plant reliability rose to 96.1% in 2025, up from 95.2% in 2024 — the best ever recorded by bp.

p.15 · 9 more from this specialist

03

Capital Structure & Borrowings

Total finance debt is $58bn, net debt $22.2bn after cash

Finance debt (borrowings) stands at $57,958m at 31 Dec 2025. Cash and cash equivalents are $36,556m, giving net debt of $22,182m.

p.211, p.212 · 11 more from this specialist

+ Show all 31 specialist findings

Segmental Analysis (9)

01

Customers & products lost money in 2024 but recovered in 2025

Customers & products segment reported a replacement cost profit of $4,100m in 2025, recovering from a loss of $1,043m in 2024. Profit before interest and tax was $2,747m in 2025 vs a loss of $1,522m in 2024.

Why it matters: A segment that was dragging the group down by over $1bn last year is now contributing positively, which is a big improvement in overall group health.

p.186, p.187 critical conf 97%

02

Oil production & operations is by far the most profitable segment

Oil production & operations generated replacement cost profit of $8,558m in 2025 (2024: $10,789m), representing roughly 61% of total group replacement cost profit of $13,993m.

Why it matters: More than half the group's profit comes from one segment, so a drop in oil prices or production problems would hit the whole group very hard.

p.186 critical conf 97%

03

Oil production & operations profit fell by about $2.2bn year on year

Replacement cost profit in oil production & operations fell from $10,789m in 2024 to $8,558m in 2025, a drop of $2,231m or about 21%.

Why it matters: This is a big drop in the group's most important profit source, suggesting lower oil prices or higher costs are squeezing returns.

p.186, p.187 critical conf 97%

04

Gas & low carbon energy profit fell sharply from 2024 to 2025

Replacement cost profit in gas & low carbon energy fell from $3,052m in 2024 to $1,330m in 2025, a drop of $1,722m or about 56%.

Why it matters: This segment's profit more than halved in one year, which is a big warning sign for bp's energy transition strategy.

p.186, p.187 critical conf 97%

05

Customers & products is the largest revenue segment by a big margin

Customers & products had third-party revenues of $148,740m in 2025 out of a total group $189,335m, representing about 78.6% of total third-party revenues.

Why it matters: Almost four in every five dollars of group revenue comes from this segment, showing how dominant it is for top-line income even though it is not the profit driver.

p.186 important conf 97%

06

Non-current assets declined from $145bn to $138bn year on year

Total non-current assets were $138,463m in 2025 vs $145,352m in 2024, a fall of $6,889m, with Non-US assets at $77,194m and US at $61,269m.

Why it matters: The group's asset base is shrinking, partly due to disposals and impairments, which could reduce future earnings capacity.

p.188 important conf 95%

07

Total group revenue was essentially flat year on year

Group third-party revenues were $189,335m in 2025 vs $189,185m in 2024, a rise of just $150m or less than 0.1%.

Why it matters: Revenue barely moved, so any profit changes are being driven by costs, impairments and mix rather than more sales.

p.186, p.187 useful conf 97%

08

Non-US geography generates about 70% of revenues

In 2025, US revenues were $56,703m and Non-US revenues were $132,632m out of total $189,335m. Non-US share is about 70%.

Why it matters: bp's revenue is heavily weighted outside the US, so currency moves and international market conditions have a big impact on reported results.

p.188 useful conf 95%

09

Archaea Energy moved segment, making 2024 comparisons less straightforward

Archaea Energy business moved from customers & products to gas & low carbon energy for 2025. Prior year 2024 and 2023 figures have been restated.

Why it matters: When a business moves between reporting segments, year-on-year comparisons can look better or worse than they really are, so readers need to use the restated numbers.

p.185, p.187 useful conf 95%

Strategic KPIs (10)

01

Upstream plant reliability hit a record high of 96.1%

Upstream plant reliability rose to 96.1% in 2025, up from 95.2% in 2024 — the best ever recorded by bp.

Why it matters: Higher reliability means fewer unplanned shutdowns, so bp is squeezing more production out of the assets it already owns — a sign of good operational health.

p.15 important conf 95%

02

Proved reserves replacement ratio was 90% — below the 100% break-even level

bp reported a proved reserves replacement ratio of 90% in 2025, up from an average of around 50% in the prior two years.

Why it matters: A ratio below 100% means bp is using up its oil and gas reserves faster than it is finding new ones — though the sharp jump from ~50% shows real progress, and 12 new discoveries were announced.

p.9 important conf 85%

03

Refining availability reached a record 96.3% in 2025

Refining availability improved from 94.3% in 2024 to 96.3% in 2025 — the best on record for bp.

Why it matters: More refining uptime means more fuel processed and sold, directly boosting the downstream business that serves millions of customers and retail sites.

p.15 important conf 95%

04

Methane intensity dropped sharply to 0.04% — a big improvement

Methane intensity fell from 0.07% in 2024 to 0.04% in 2025, using a new measurement approach.

Why it matters: Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas — cutting it signals bp is tightening control of emissions leaks, which matters to regulators and investors focused on climate risk.

p.17 important conf 80%

05

Safety incidents fell for the 12th year running — 27 events in 2025

Total tier 1 and 2 process safety events dropped from 38 in 2024 to 27 in 2025.

Why it matters: Fewer serious safety incidents reduce the risk of costly shutdowns, fines and reputational damage — a consistent downward trend over 12 years is a strong signal of operational discipline.

p.16 important conf 95%

06

Seven major projects started on time or early in 2025

bp delivered seven major project start-ups in 2025, five of which were ahead of schedule.

Why it matters: Starting big projects on time — or early — locks in revenue sooner and shows that bp can execute its growth plan, which underpins future production targets.

p.9 important conf 90%

07

Oil and gas output slipped 2% — divestments the main cause

Production fell from 2,358 mboe/d in 2024 to 2,312 mboe/d in 2025, a drop of 46 mboe/d.

Why it matters: Lower output means less oil and gas to sell, which directly reduces bp's ability to generate cash — though here the fall was driven by planned asset sales rather than operational failure.

p.14 useful conf 95%

08

Lifting cost crept up slightly to $6.28 per barrel

Upstream unit production cost rose from $6.17/boe in 2024 to $6.28/boe in 2025, a 1.8% increase.

Why it matters: This is the cost of getting each barrel out of the ground — a small rise driven by the mix of assets rather than runaway spending, so no alarm bells yet.

p.14 useful conf 92%

09

GHG emissions rose slightly as new projects came online

Combined Scope 1 and 2 operational emissions rose from 33.6 MtCO2e in 2024 to 34.3 MtCO2e in 2025.

Why it matters: Rising emissions could face tougher regulatory scrutiny and increase bp's carbon costs, though the increase is linked to new project start-ups rather than a loss of efficiency.

p.17 useful conf 90%

10

Employee engagement score fell to 66% — a meaningful dip

Employee engagement dropped from 70% in 2024 to 66% in 2025, with bp citing major organisational changes as the cause.

Why it matters: Lower staff engagement can slow delivery of the big restructuring programme bp is running — if it continues it could affect how quickly cost savings and new projects are delivered.

p.16 useful conf 85%

Capital Structure & Borrowings (12)

01

Total finance debt is $58bn, net debt $22.2bn after cash

Finance debt (borrowings) stands at $57,958m at 31 Dec 2025. Cash and cash equivalents are $36,556m, giving net debt of $22,182m.

Why it matters: The company owes a lot of money but holds enough cash to cover more than half of it, so short-term repayment pressure is limited.

p.211, p.212 important conf 98%

02

Interest cover is 2.5x — enough buffer, but not generous

Operating profit is $12,642m and finance costs are $5,106m, giving interest cover of approximately 2.5x.

Why it matters: The company earns about $2.50 for every $1 of interest it owes, which is a comfortable but not large safety margin — a big drop in profits would put pressure on this.

p.211, p.212 important conf 85%

03

The company bought back $4.5bn of its own shares in 2025

836 million ordinary shares were repurchased in 2025 for a total of $4,486m (including transaction costs of $24m). 176m shares were cancelled; 659m transferred to treasury.

Why it matters: Spending $4.5bn on buybacks while carrying $22bn of net debt shows confidence in cash generation, but it also means cash is leaving the business.

p.228 important conf 97%

04

Committed credit facilities of $8bn plus $4bn standby are undrawn

At 31 Dec 2025 bp had a committed $8.0bn credit facility and $4.0bn of standby facilities, all undrawn, held with 33 international banks, available for five years.

Why it matters: Having $12bn of backup borrowing capacity means the company has a large cushion if cash flows drop suddenly or it needs to refinance quickly.

p.218 important conf 95%

05

Gearing rose slightly to 23.1% from 22.7% last year

Gearing (net debt as a share of net debt plus total equity) was 23.1% at end 2025 vs 22.7% at end 2024.

Why it matters: The company is borrowing a slightly bigger share of its total value, but the change is small and the level is not alarming.

p.212 useful conf 97%

06

Debt repayment in the next 12 months is $3.3bn

Current borrowings (due within one year) total $3,356m at 31 Dec 2025, down from $4,474m a year earlier.

Why it matters: Near-term debt repayments have fallen, and the company's $36.6bn cash pile easily covers what is due, so there is no immediate refinancing risk.

p.211 useful conf 97%

07

Long-term debt (over 1 year) is $54.6bn non-current

Non-current borrowings are $54,602m at 31 Dec 2025 (2024: $55,073m). Fixed rate debt is $41.3bn at an average 5% interest rate; floating rate debt is $16.7bn at 4% average.

Why it matters: Most of the debt is long-dated and at fixed rates, which protects against rising interest costs and means there is no rush to refinance.

p.211 useful conf 97%

08

IFRS 16 lease liabilities total $14.6bn, up from $12bn

Lease liabilities at 31 Dec 2025 are $14,571m (current $2,832m, non-current $11,739m), up from $12,000m at end 2024. Undiscounted cash flows total $19,336m.

Why it matters: Lease obligations have risen by $2.6bn in a year, adding to the overall debt load, though the annual cash outflow of $3.7bn is manageable relative to cash holdings.

p.213 useful conf 98%

09

Credit ratings are high-quality: A- (S&P), A1 (Moody's), A+ (Fitch)

Standard & Poor's rates bp A- (stable); Moody's rates it A1 (stable); Fitch rates it A+ (stable).

Why it matters: Strong high-quality ratings mean bp can borrow cheaply and lenders and suppliers are very unlikely to demand early repayment or tougher terms.

p.218 useful conf 97%

10

No covenant details or loan limits disclosed in these pages

The annual report pages provided make no mention of specific loan covenants, financial ratio tests, or any covenant breaches or waivers.

Why it matters: Without knowing the loan limits bp must stay within, readers cannot check how much room it has before a potential breach — though the strong credit ratings suggest limits are not close to being hit.

p.211, p.212, p.213, p.218 useful conf 85%

11

Floating rate debt exposure: a 1% rate rise costs ~$167m extra per year

Floating rate instruments total $16,694m. A 1 percentage point increase in interest rates from 1 January 2026 would raise 2026 finance costs by approximately $167m.

Why it matters: The company's exposure to rising interest rates is limited because most of its debt is fixed rate, and the estimated extra cost is small relative to its $12.6bn operating profit.

p.215 useful conf 95%

12

$2bn of finance debt bought back during the year

During 2025 the group bought back $2.0bn of US dollar bonds (2024: nil), reducing gross finance debt.

Why it matters: Actively reducing debt while running a buyback programme shows financial flexibility, but it also means cash is being used for two purposes at once.

p.211 useful conf 95%

Specialist deep panels · Structured price capture

Every figure the specialists extracted

Below the prose findings, each agent publishes a structured numeric metrics block. Segmental revenue, named KPIs with YoY %, and capital-structure metrics — direct from the source filings.

Segmental analysis

Revenue & operating profit by business division

Segment Revenue (latest) Operating profit Rev YoY
Gas & low carbon energy €38501 €1330 +24.0%
Oil production & operations €1651 €8558 -31.2%
Customers & products €148740 €4100 -4.1%
Other businesses & corporate €443 €-40 -32.7%
US €56703 -3.6%
Non-US €132632 +1.7%

Top-segment revenue concentration: 78.6% · Segment totals reconcile to the group P&L

Strategic KPIs

5 flagship metrics · 9 supporting

Oil and gas production
$2k
-1.9% YoY
Upstream unit production cost (lifting cost)
$6
+1.8% YoY
Proved reserves replacement ratio
90%
+80.0% YoY
Upstream plant reliability
96.1%
+0.9% YoY
Total shareholder return (ordinary share basis)
16.7%
+ Show 9 supporting KPIs
Refining availability
96.3%
+2.1% YoY
Refining throughputs
$1k
+3.3% YoY
GHG emissions (operational control)
$34
+2.1% YoY
Methane intensity
0.04%
-42.9% YoY
Tier 1 and 2 process safety events
$27
-28.9% YoY
Reported recordable injury frequency
$234
-21.2% YoY
Employee engagement
66%
-5.7% YoY
Women in group leadership
37%
+5.7% YoY
Capital expenditure
$14.5bn

Capital structure

Debt, cover, and dividend posture

Net debt
$22.2bn
Interest cover
2.47×
Drawn debt
$58.0bn
Undrawn facilities
$12.0bn

Management questions · Open inquiry

What management would need to answer next

Generated by the AI from the disclosure gaps it detected. Hover or tap each card to surface the underlying evidence that triggered the question.

Verification gaps

What the filings don't disclose

High-trust analysis names its own blind spots. These are metrics the AI looked for and couldn't find — anything material to the summary needs management or independent verification.

No agent data gaps were flagged; all findings carry high confidence scores, though the gas and low-carbon segment comparison is complicated by the mid-year reclassification of Archaea Energy, so year-on-year figures should be read against restated 2024 numbers only.

08 · Documents

The filing trail

100 filings · Companies House

Filing distribution

SH03
48%
48
SH04
21%
21
TM01
8%
8
AP01
6
SH06
5
CH01
3
AA
2
ANNOTATION
2
CS01
2
RESOLUTIONS
2

Latest filings

29 Jun 2026 SH04 Capital sale or transfer treasury shares with date currency capital figure
5 Jun 2026 SH04 Capital sale or transfer treasury shares with date currency capital figure
30 May 2026 TM01 Termination director company with name termination date
26 May 2026 RESOLUTIONS Resolution
20 May 2026 AA Accounts with accounts type group
16 May 2026 CS01 Confirmation statement with no updates
14 May 2026 SH04 Capital sale or transfer treasury shares with date currency capital figure
27 Apr 2026 TM01 Termination director company with name termination date
27 Apr 2026 TM01 Termination director company with name termination date
27 Apr 2026 TM01 Termination director company with name termination date
14 Apr 2026 AP01 Appoint person director company with name date
14 Apr 2026 TM01 Termination director company with name termination date

Catalyst timeline

Filing pattern + upcoming windows

100 filings · 2025 → 2027
Accounts Officers Capital Resolutions Other
2025 2026 2027 2028 Accounts due Confirmation due
2027Annual accounts

Next annual accounts due

Due at Companies House by 30 June 2027 for the period ending 31 December 2026.

2027Confirmation

Next confirmation statement due

Annual confirmation due by 19 May 2027 (made up to 5 May 2027).

Final chapter — What we found

What we found

59 MIXED SIGNALS
Verif-AI Synthesis

Mixed signals

The cash machine is working; the balance sheet is the slow leak that needs sealing.

FY2025 audited accounts

The five plain-English briefing questions are on Origin — read the story first, then return here for the TrustScore scorecard.

Signal Radar

How the score breaks down

Financial completeness 60/100
Operational disclosure 72/100
Compliance signals 50/100
Data confidence 70/100

Decisive findings

What decided this summary

The hard-hit facts that drove the score. Full breakdown — chapters, between-the-lines, all specialist findings — sits on AI Insights.

01

Oil production & operations profit fell by about $2.2bn year on year

Replacement cost profit in oil production & operations fell from $10,789m in 2024 to $8,558m in 2025, a drop of $2,231m or about 21%.

Why it matters: This is a big drop in the group's most important profit source, suggesting lower oil prices or higher costs are squeezing returns.

p.186, p.187

02

Gas & low carbon energy profit fell sharply from 2024 to 2025

Replacement cost profit in gas & low carbon energy fell from $3,052m in 2024 to $1,330m in 2025, a drop of $1,722m or about 56%.

Why it matters: This segment's profit more than halved in one year, which is a big warning sign for bp's energy transition strategy.

p.186, p.187

10 · Verification

How we know

100 filings · 11 directors · 395 pages

This report reads the full filing package — digital iXBRL where available, the filed PDF (including notes), and the Companies House register — not a single uploaded document.

Figures are as filed by the company — Companies House does not verify the accuracy of information filed. Verif-AI checks internal consistency and flags anomalies, but cannot confirm the underlying figures are correct.

Reconciliation

All 28 reconciled lines tie exactly to the audited iXBRL filing

Every balance-sheet and profit & loss line traced to where we read it in the filing. iXBRL — read straight from the company's audited machine-readable tags, so it ties exactly. PDF — read from the filed accounts document, with the supporting note cited so you can check it. Flagged — our consistency check marked it for a closer look.

Line Our figure Source in filing Reconciliation
Profit & loss · p.155
Turnover $189.3bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Cost of sales −$110.6bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Administrative expenses −$17.5bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Operating profit $12.6bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Finance income $210m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Finance costs −$5.1bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Profit before tax $7.7bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Tax −$6.5bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Profit after tax $1.3bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Depreciation & amortisation −$17.8bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Balance sheet · p.158
Intangible assets $8.2bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Tangible assets $98.6bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Fixed assets $176.7bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Stock $22.5bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Debtors $26bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Cash $36.6bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Current assets $101.8bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Trade creditors −$56.8bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Current liabilities $80.6bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Net current assets $21.2bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Bank loans (current) −$3.4bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Bank loans (non-current) −$54.6bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Lease liabilities (current) −$2.8bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Lease liabilities (non-current) −$11.7bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Deferred tax −$7.6bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Long-term liabilities $123.9bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Provisions $4.7bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing
Net assets $74bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

28 read from audited iXBRL tags · 0 from the filed PDF.

What we read

Companies House filings

Total filings 100 2025 → 2026
Accounts filings 2 audited financial statements
Officer events 17 appointments + terminations
Capital events 74 share allotments + buybacks

Who we cross-checked

UK director appointment network

Directors verified 11 incl. 3 corporate officers
Records cross-referenced 27.8m UK appointments dataset
Avg failure rate 6.0% across prior appointments
Phoenix scan 0 directors flagged

Screening status

Independent checks completed

No critical risk flagsNo kill switches fired Sanctions check · ClearFCDO + OFAC + EU screen Potential sanctions · 2 reviewsLow-confidence name overlap Politically-exposed persons · 1 foundPEP screen · 1 hit Audit opinion · UnqualifiedUnqualified ISA-700 opinion Auditor · Deloitte LLP Status · Active

Screened 95 names (registered company + officers/PSCs) against live lists: FCDO Consolidated UK Sanctions List — 57503 entries, refreshed 04 July 2026 · OFAC SDN (US Treasury) + akaName aliases + relationship graph — 39437 entries, refreshed 04 July 2026 · EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions — 29880 entries, refreshed 04 July 2026 · UK Parliament — current Members of Commons & Lords — 1441 entries, refreshed 04 July 2026 · Companies House — Disqualified Directors register, checked 04 July 2026.

Steps we ran

How the report was assembled

Pages read 395 PDF pages analysed
Steps run 9 0 skipped · 9 completed
AI checks 3 independent reviews
Years analysed 6 audited filings trended

Pipeline — what ran on this report

Read PDF accounts 395 pages Classify filing Extract audit notes Compliance screening Cross-check directors Build company timeline Plain-English analysis Capital structure review Processing filing

Limits and caveats

What this report doesn't claim

01

Persons with significant control

No PSCs are recorded against this entity — typical for listed PLCs (widely held by institutional investors) and for dormant / micro-entity filings.

Plain-English glossary · 8 terms
Net Assets
What the company is worth on paper — everything it owns minus everything it owes.
In this filing: BP's net assets fell from $78.3bn to $74.0bn this year, meaning the gap between what it owns and what it owes has shrunk by $4.3bn.
PBT (Profit Before Tax)
How much money the company made before paying its tax bill.
In this filing: BP's PBT rose 14.2% to $7.7bn in FY2025 — a genuine improvement, though modest relative to its $189bn revenue scale.
Current Liabilities
Bills and debts the company must pay within the next 12 months.
In this filing: BP has $80.6bn due within a year — a vast sum, but one that eased slightly from $82.2bn the prior year.
Cash Conversion
How well the company turns its stated profit into actual cash in the bank.
In this filing: At 1,891%, BP is generating nearly 19 times its profit figure in operating cash — a very strong signal that the business is genuinely cash-generative.
Debtor Days
The average number of days customers take to pay their invoices.
In this filing: BP's customers take 50 days to pay on average — reasonable for a company of this size and sector.
Long-Term Liabilities
Debts and obligations not due for more than 12 months — think bonds, long-term loans, pension commitments.
In this filing: BP's long-term liabilities rose to $123.9bn in FY2025, up from $121.7bn the prior year, and are the main weight on the balance sheet.
Fixed Assets
Long-lived physical things the company owns — oil fields, refineries, pipelines, equipment.
In this filing: BP holds $176.7bn of fixed assets, the core of its business value, though this has been drifting down from $194.7bn in 2020.
Working Capital Gap
The cash a company needs to keep running day-to-day — because it often pays suppliers before customers pay it.
In this filing: BP's working capital gap is 160 days, meaning it needs around $83bn to bridge the time between paying out and getting paid — normal at this scale, but enormous in absolute terms.