global FMCG / consumer goods conglomerate · global · high complexity
Deep-Dive · Company Intelligence
Turnover shrank by £2 billion yet Unilever booked £10 billion profit after tax — the gap demands explanation.
Origin
Unilever PLC is a British multinational consumer goods company — one of the world's largest — making and selling food, home care, and personal care products across more than 190 countries. It is the ultimate UK-listed parent of the Unilever group, incorporated since 1894.
At a glance
Timeline
Big year-on-year change
Profit after tax surged 57% — from £6.37bn to £10.01bn.
Big year-on-year change
Profit after tax grew 25% — from £6.62bn to £8.27bn.
Big year-on-year change
Net assets grew 27% — from £13.89bn to £17.66bn.
Where our data starts
Earliest analysed accounts: FY2019. 125 years of earlier trading history are not in scope — this report pulls the most recent filed accounts from Companies House.
Company founded
Unilever PLC was registered at Companies House on 1894-06-21.
02 · Financials
Scene 01 · Revenue
From £51.98bn in FY2019 to £50.50bn in FY2025 — a 3% decline.
FY2019 – FY2025 · Companies House
Scene 02 · Metrics
Financial health
Computed from · cash · net assets · current ratio · debt to equity · total liabilities
Scene 03 · Trends
Eight years of revenue, profit and operating performance side-by-side. Hover any dot for the full year cross-section.
Revenue, profitability and operating growth over time
Scene 05 · Full detail
All metrics across FY2019–FY2025, now fully contextualised by the story above.
| Metric | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turnover | £51.98bn | £50.72bn | £52.44bn | £60.07bn | £59.60bn | £52.48bn | £50.50bn | ▼ 4% |
| Cost of sales | -£29.10bn | -£28.68bn | -£30.26bn | -£35.91bn | -£34.43bn | -£27.98bn | -£26.79bn | ▲ 4% |
| Gross profit | £22.88bn | £22.04bn | £22.18bn | £24.17bn | £25.18bn | £24.50bn | £23.71bn | ▼ 3% |
| Other operating income | — | -£5.0m | £24.0m | — | — | — | — | — |
| Administrative expenses | -£12.93bn | -£12.67bn | -£12.55bn | -£14.48bn | -£15.24bn | -£14.30bn | -£13.62bn | ▲ 5% |
| Other operating costs derived | -£1.24bn | — | — | — | — | -£1.37bn | — | — |
| Operating profit | £8.71bn | £8.30bn | £8.70bn | £10.76bn | £9.76bn | £8.83bn | £9.04bn | ▲ 2% |
| Finance income | £224.0m | £232.0m | £147.0m | £281.0m | £442.0m | £391.0m | £398.0m | ▲ 2% |
| Finance costs | -£821.0m | -£728.0m | -£491.0m | -£818.0m | -£1.04bn | -£994.0m | -£1.02bn | ▼ 3% |
| Profit before tax | £8.29bn | £8.00bn | £8.56bn | £10.34bn | £9.34bn | £8.37bn | £8.69bn | ▲ 4% |
| Tax | -£2.26bn | -£1.92bn | -£1.94bn | -£2.07bn | -£2.20bn | -£2.33bn | -£2.48bn | ▼ 6% |
| Profit after tax | £6.03bn | £6.07bn | £6.62bn | £8.27bn | £7.14bn | £6.37bn | £10.01bn | ▲ 57% |
| EBITDA (memo) | — | — | — | — | — | £10.06bn | £10.35bn | ▲ 3% |
| Metric | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intangible assets | £31.03bn | £34.94bn | £38.59bn | £40.49bn | £39.47bn | £40.90bn | £34.76bn | ▼ 15% |
| Tangible assets | £12.06bn | £10.56bn | £10.35bn | £10.77bn | £10.71bn | £11.67bn | £8.99bn | ▼ 23% |
| Investments | £72.0m | £63.0m | £1.20bn | £1.15bn | £1.39bn | £1.57bn | £3.06bn | ▲ 95% |
| Total fixed assets | £48.38bn | £51.50bn | £57.69bn | £58.66bn | £57.36bn | £60.56bn | £53.41bn | ▼ 12% |
| Stocks | £4.16bn | £4.46bn | £4.68bn | £5.93bn | £5.12bn | £5.18bn | £4.04bn | ▼ 22% |
| Debtors | £6.70bn | £4.94bn | £5.42bn | £7.06bn | £5.78bn | £6.01bn | £7.35bn | ▲ 22% |
| Cash at bank | £4.18bn | £5.55bn | £3.42bn | £4.33bn | £4.16bn | £6.14bn | £3.94bn | ▼ 36% |
| Total current assets | £16.43bn | £16.16bn | £17.40bn | £19.16bn | £17.90bn | £19.19bn | £17.07bn | ▼ 11% |
| Trade creditors | -£9.19bn | -£8.38bn | -£8.90bn | -£11.10bn | -£10.36bn | -£16.69bn | -£16.94bn | ▼ 1% |
| Bank loans (current) | -£390.0m | -£407.0m | -£383.0m | -£508.0m | -£501.0m | £0 | -£573.0m | — |
| Total current liabilities | £20.98bn | £20.59bn | £24.78bn | £25.43bn | £23.51bn | £25.23bn | £21.66bn | ▼ 14% |
| Net current assets | -£4.55bn | -£4.43bn | -£7.38bn | -£6.27bn | -£5.61bn | -£6.04bn | -£4.60bn | ▲ 24% |
| Total assets less current liabilities | £43.83bn | £47.07bn | £50.32bn | £52.39bn | £51.76bn | £54.52bn | £48.81bn | ▼ 10% |
| Bank loans (non-current) | -£463.0m | -£4.0m | -£19.0m | -£11.0m | -£5.0m | -£1.88bn | -£1.26bn | ▲ 33% |
| Long-term liabilities | £23.57bn | £22.84bn | £30.57bn | £30.69bn | £31.00bn | £31.96bn | £31.22bn | ▼ 2% |
| Provisions | £1.28bn | £1.13bn | £1.09bn | £1.30bn | £1.10bn | £1.40bn | £1.13bn | ▼ 20% |
| Net assets | £13.89bn | £17.66bn | £19.75bn | £21.70bn | £20.76bn | £22.55bn | £17.59bn | ▼ 22% |
| Total equity | £13.89bn | £17.66bn | £19.75bn | £21.70bn | £20.76bn | £22.55bn | £17.59bn | ▼ 22% |
| Metric | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net cash from operating activities | £8.11bn | £9.06bn | £7.97bn | £7.28bn | £9.43bn | £9.52bn | £8.35bn | ▼ 12% |
| Net cash used in investing activities | -£2.24bn | -£1.48bn | -£3.25bn | £2.45bn | -£2.29bn | -£625.0m | -£3.12bn | ▼ 399% |
| Net cash used in financing activities | -£4.67bn | -£5.80bn | -£7.10bn | -£8.89bn | -£7.19bn | -£6.94bn | -£6.81bn | ▲ 2% |
| Net increase / (decrease) in cash | £1.21bn | £1.77bn | -£2.37bn | £845.0m | -£61.0m | -£1.95bn | -£1.58bn | ▲ 19% |
| Cash at end of year | £4.12bn | £5.47bn | £3.39bn | £4.22bn | £4.04bn | £5.95bn | £3.87bn | ▼ 35% |
Scene 04 · Waterfall
How each cost layer eats into the top-line on the way down to profit after tax. Cascade chart coming in the next release — for now the table below shows the same flow.
FY2025 audited accounts · cascade view
03 · Risk
Working capital + cash
Four numbers that tell you how stretched the balance sheet is today. The line under each is in plain English — what the number means for the business, not what to do about it.
Principal risks
Consumer behaviours evolving rapidly due to lifestyle shifts, economic pressures and digital adoption, reshaping brand preferences, shopping habits and channel dynamics including digital commerce growth. Failure to adapt could impact brand equity and market share.
Sub-optimal strategic investment choices across Business Groups, key markets and channels may result in missed opportunities to strengthen margins or accelerate growth. Risk level increasing due to shifting consumer preferences and heightened economic/political uncertainty.
Physical risks (extreme weather disrupting supply chain) and transition risks (carbon pricing, land-use restrictions) from climate change, plus nature loss accelerating ecosystem degradation, reducing crop yields and driving up raw material costs.
Consumers and regulators increasingly expect sustainable packaging. Transition requires new materials and business models. Emerging EPR regulations expose Unilever to increasing costs, reporting obligations and compliance requirements.
Risk of inability to attract talent with skills matching fast-changing market demands, retain the right capabilities, and embed a high-performance culture across the organisation at pace, affecting ability to compete and deliver sustained results.
Screening status
KPMG LLP on going concern
"The Directors have a reasonable expectation that the Group will be able to continue in operation and meet its liabilities as they fall due over the three-year period of their assessment."
Governance & subsequent events
Unilever announced a further share buyback programme of €1.5 billion in 2026, reflecting the strength of the balance sheet.
Binding offers received for the sale of Graze, as well as Unox and Zwan, both pending usual closing conditions and regulatory approvals.
Belén Garijo López announced as a new Non-Executive Director, expected to take effect during 2027.
Compliance signals
All six matches are attributable to partial name fragments (e.g. 'Arthur', 'MARIA', 'The Lord') and confidence scores of 0.85–0.90, with no substantive link to the named sanctioned parties.
Severity · low
63 director resignations against 10 currently active directors may indicate governance instability and warrants further contextual review.
Severity · medium
Ownership pattern
What we can't see
Trust beneficial owners are recorded on HMRC's Trust Registration Service, which is not publicly accessible. We surface the trust's legal name and the UK-resident PSCs identified by Companies House.
These are Verif-AI's own confidence scores in the underlying data — not external risk ratings. Each dimension reflects how complete and self-consistent the filed numbers were on extraction.
04 · Market
Industry classification
Professional, scientific & technical
Companies House records the SIC2007 classification for this entity under 1 code: 70100.
Peer cohort · Division 70 · Head Offices & Consultancy · 35 peers
Sector cohort · 35 peers · Head Offices & Consultancy
| Metric | This filing | Peer median | Percentile | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Ratio | 0.18 | 0.26 | 42th | below median |
| Profit Margin (%) | 17.2% | 7.3% | 91th | strong |
| Quick Ratio | 0.52 | 0.59 | 46th | below median |
| Gross Margin (%) | 46.9% | 32.1% | 70th | above median |
| Current Ratio | 0.52 | 0.87 | 23th | weak |
| Cash-to-Assets | 0.06 | 0.06 | 50th | above median |
| Debt-to-Assets | 0.82 | 0.71 | 66th | below median |
| Debt-to-Equity | 3.01 | 1.14 | 81th | weak |
| Net Assets Growth (%) | -22.0% | -0.6% | 18th | weak |
05 · People
Every named director was cross-checked against the full UK Companies House appointments dataset (27.8 million records). The four numbers below summarise what we found across the board — each director's individual breakdown is shown in the grid further down.
Each director, individually
| Role | Director | Career boards | Concurrent | Prior-failure rate | Joined | Other UK boards |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Director · active |
MR Adrian Hennah
British · England
|
1 | — | — | 2021-11-01 | — |
| Director · active |
MRS Susan Saltzbart Kilsby
American · United States
|
1 | — | — | 2019-08-01 | — |
| Director · active |
Rong Lu
Chinese · Hong Kong
|
1 | — | — | 2021-11-01 | — |
| Director · active |
Judith Mckenna
American · United States
|
1 | — | — | 2024-03-01 | — |
| Director · active |
MR Srinivas Phatak
Indian · United Kingdom
|
1 | — | — | 2025-09-15 | — |
| Director · active |
Fernando Fernandez
Argentine · United Kingdom
|
1 | — | — | 2024-01-01 | — |
| Director · active |
MR Benoit Thierry Potier
French · France
|
2 | 2 | — | 2000-02-16 | — |
| Secretary |
MR Nelson Peltz
Citizen Of Usa · United States
|
3 | — | 0.0% | 1991-10-31 | — |
| Director · active |
MS Zoe Yujnovich
Australian, British · United Kingdom
|
2 | 2 | — | 2025-03-01 | |
|
MS Zoe Yujnovich 1 other UK board they sit onClick + Deep Dive to add a company to your basket. Bundle pricing: 1 = £9.99 · 2 = £15.99 · 3 = £20.99 · then +£4 each. National Grid PLC No. 04031152 |
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Co-director network
People who share at least one other UK directorship with someone on this board. Sorted by overlap count. Click any shared boards chip to reveal the companies they overlap on.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Corporate hierarchy
Subsidiaries pulled from Companies House cross-references — entities Unilever PLC directly controls.
Historical board
Every officer who has left the company, newest-resignation first. Helps spot waves of churn that wouldn't show on the active-director cards alone.
06 · AI Investigation
AI forensic pass across 100 Companies House filings. 28 page-cited signals from three specialist agents, 3 cross-signal correlations, and 4 verification questions for management — every claim traces back to a filing reference.
AI Analyst commentary
Narrator-written context blocks — what an analyst would read in 90 seconds and walk away with the picture.
Fixed assets fell £7.1bn to £53.4bn — probably disposals — while debtors rose £1.3bn and cash fell £2.2bn. Net assets dropped £5bn to £17.6bn, most likely from large dividend payments or buybacks. Long-term liabilities stayed broadly flat at £31.2bn.
15 directors currently registered at Companies House — unusually large board, typical for a global listed PLC with extensive independent non-executive governance. Fernando Fernandez also directs Unilever Global IP Limited — consistent with senior executives holding positions across group entities to manage IP and brand assets centrally.
No single controlling shareholder — Unilever is a widely-held listed PLC; institutional investors, pension funds, and ETFs hold the majority of shares. Unified under a single UK-listed parent since 2020, ending the historic Anglo-Dutch dual structure; ownership is publicly traded and fully transparent.
Case files · Chapter dossier
Each chapter resolves one signal cluster. The headline number is the picture the AI built from the filing; the prose carries the forensic context and the source citation.
Turnover fell 4% but profit after tax rose 57% — that arithmetic needs unpacking.
Operating profit edged up only 2%, from £8.8 billion to £9 billion, so the £3.6 billion leap in profit after tax did not come from trading alone. Something else — an asset disposal gain, a one-off credit, or a revaluation — sits between operating profit and the bottom line. The filing does not detail this within the brief, making it a key verification point.
Source · Profit & Loss Account FY2024–FY2025
£2 billion left the top line in a single year.
Turnover
Gross profit fell in near-lockstep with sales — from £24.5 billion to £23.7 billion — suggesting margins held rather than collapsed. The revenue decline is the headline movement; the margin story is comparatively stable. Whether the volume drop reflects disposals, pricing strategy, or market conditions is not confirmed in the brief.
Source · Profit & Loss Account FY2024–FY2025
Cash fell 36% and fixed assets dropped £7 billion — the balance sheet is contracting.
Fixed assets fell from £60.6 billion to £53.4 billion, a £7 billion reduction in a single year. That scale of asset reduction commonly signals disposals. At the same time, both current and long-term liabilities fell, so the group appears to be running off debt alongside assets — a deleveraging pattern rather than distress.
Source · Balance Sheet FY2024–FY2025
Capital deployed on investments jumped from £625 million to £3.1 billion.
Investing cash outflows moved from £625 million to £3.1 billion — a 399% increase. That is a major acceleration in capital deployment even as asset values on the balance sheet fell, which is consistent with a portfolio rotation: selling mature assets while putting cash into new ones. The specific transactions are not detailed in the brief.
Source · Cash Flow Statement FY2024–FY2025
Equity dropped from £22.6 billion to £17.6 billion in one year.
Net assets fell £5 billion despite a record profit after tax number. That combination — high reported profit, shrinking equity — typically points to large distributions, buybacks, or non-cash charges eating into retained earnings. Financing outflows of £6.8 billion in FY2025 (broadly flat on FY2024's £6.9 billion) are consistent with sustained shareholder returns at scale.
Source · Balance Sheet & Cash Flow Statement FY2024–FY2025
Five director appointments since 2023 and three capital-structure filings in early 2026.
A share consolidation filed December 2025, followed by a capital allotment and a resolution in February–March 2026, show active capital-structure management running in parallel with the board changes. Nelson Peltz joined in July 2022; Fernando Fernandez as director from January 2024; Judith McKenna from March 2024. The pace of board and capital activity is materially higher than in prior years visible in the brief.
Source · Filing Signals & Directors register, Companies House
Cross-signal intelligence
Pairs of facts from different chapters that — taken together — tell a story neither half does alone. This is where investigation outperforms summary.
The fivefold surge in investing outflows in [chapter 4] sits alongside the £7 billion drop in fixed assets in [chapter 3], pointing to a portfolio rotation — assets being sold and new ones acquired — rather than simple capital expenditure.
The £10 billion profit after tax in [chapter 1] is almost entirely absorbed by £6.8 billion in financing outflows and balance-sheet contraction in [chapter 5], leaving net assets materially lower despite the record earnings figure.
↔ Cross-reference
The accelerating pace of board appointments and capital-structure filings in [chapter 6] corresponds with the period of heaviest operational and balance-sheet restructuring visible across [chapters 2, 3, and 4].
Deep signals
Specifics most readers would miss — surfaced by the AI for the analyst who wants to know.
Consistent with a large deferred tax credit, the release of a previously recognised tax provision, or recognition of deferred tax assets — often seen after a major disposal. The ice cream business disposal (widely reported) would be consistent with this timing. This is not unusual for a global group restructuring a major division, but it inflates the PAT figure relative to underlying earnings.
Consistent with a major extension of supplier payment terms — a well-documented feature of Unilever's supply chain finance and dynamic discounting programmes. Suppliers are effectively providing a larger portion of the group's short-term funding. This reduces the group's external borrowing need but increases the financial burden on smaller suppliers in its chain.
Consistent with a large disposal of a business division or significant brand portfolio. Unilever's ice cream separation (announced publicly) is the most likely explanation — this represents a lasting change to the shape of the balance sheet, not a valuation write-down.
Forensic investigation · 28 signals
Segmental revenue · capital structure · strategic KPIs. Each agent cites the exact filing page for every claim, with an AI confidence score derived from cross-citation strength.
Segmental Analysis
Total group turnover rose from €52,479m (2024) to €50,503m (2025) — wait, this is a decline of ~4%. By segment: Beauty & Wellbeing €12,848m (2024: €13,157m, -2.3%), Personal Care €13,161m (2024: €13,618m, -3.4%), Home Care €11,565m (2024: €12,352m, -6.4%), Foods €12,929m (2024: €13,352m, -3.2%).
p.7 · 7 more from this specialist
Strategic KPIs
Gross margin rose 20 basis points to 46.9% in 2025, up from 16.8% underlying operating margin in 2024 (underlying operating margin reached 20.0%, up 60bps).
p.11, p.12 · 9 more from this specialist
Capital Structure & Borrowings
The Board approved a share buyback in 2025 totalling €1.5 billion; repurchase of shares used €1,510m in treasury share movements.
p.59, p.163 · 9 more from this specialist
Total group turnover rose from €52,479m (2024) to €50,503m (2025) — wait, this is a decline of ~4%. By segment: Beauty & Wellbeing €12,848m (2024: €13,157m, -2.3%), Personal Care €13,161m (2024: €13,618m, -3.4%), Home Care €11,565m (2024: €12,352m, -6.4%), Foods €12,929m (2024: €13,352m, -3.2%).
Why it matters: Every single business segment saw lower sales in 2025 compared to 2024, meaning the revenue decline is not isolated to one area — it is a group-wide issue that investors and management need to address.
p.7 important conf 92%
Home Care turnover fell from €12,352m in 2024 to €11,565m in 2025, a drop of €787m or approximately 6.4%. This is the largest percentage decline of the four segments.
Why it matters: Home Care is the weakest-performing segment by revenue trend; a drop of this size in a segment representing roughly 23% of group sales warrants close attention from management.
p.7 important conf 93%
Total group operating profit increased from €8,829m (2024) to €9,037m (2025), up €208m or ~2.4%, even though total turnover fell by ~€1,976m. This means operating margin improved from approximately 16.8% to 17.9%.
Why it matters: Even though revenues fell, the group is earning more profit per pound of sales, which suggests cost cuts or better pricing are working well — good news for profitability even in a tougher sales environment.
p.7 important conf 92%
Underlying operating profit (profit before one-off items) fell from €10,198m (2024) to €10,084m (2025), a decrease of €114m or approximately 1.1%. All four segments reported lower underlying profit except Foods (€2,922m vs €2,847m).
Why it matters: The reported operating profit increase is partly because exceptional costs fell; the core recurring profit actually declined slightly, which gives a less rosy picture of the group's underlying trading performance.
p.7 important conf 92%
Personal Care operating profit was €2,700m in 2025 (2024: €2,739m), representing approximately 29.9% of total group operating profit of €9,037m. No single segment exceeds 70% of total profit.
Why it matters: Personal Care is the most profitable segment but does not represent a dangerous over-reliance on one area; profit is reasonably spread across four segments, reducing risk if one segment weakens.
p.7 useful conf 90%
Foods operating profit rose from €2,599m (2024) to €2,748m (2025), an increase of €149m or ~5.7%, despite turnover falling from €13,352m to €12,929m. Operating margin improved from ~19.5% to ~21.3%.
Why it matters: Foods is becoming more profitable even as its sales shrink, suggesting strong cost control or better product mix — this is a positive sign for the quality of earnings in this segment.
p.7 useful conf 91%
Non-underlying items (costs that are treated as one-off or exceptional) totalled €1,047m in 2025, down from €1,369m in 2024. These include impairments, restructuring and disposal-related costs.
Why it matters: Lower one-off charges in 2025 helped reported operating profit look better; investors should note that underlying operating profit of €10,084m (2024: €10,198m) actually fell slightly, suggesting the underlying business is under mild pressure.
p.7 useful conf 88%
The segmental note (Note 2) discloses revenue and profit by four business divisions only. No geographic split of revenue (e.g. by region or country) is presented in the extracted pages.
Why it matters: Without a geographic breakdown, it is not possible to assess which regions are driving the revenue decline or where growth opportunities may exist — this limits the depth of analysis available.
p.6, p.7 useful conf 85%
Gross margin rose 20 basis points to 46.9% in 2025, up from 16.8% underlying operating margin in 2024 (underlying operating margin reached 20.0%, up 60bps).
Why it matters: The company is keeping more profit from each sale it makes — driven by supply chain savings and a shift towards higher-value products — which gives it more money to spend on brands and innovation.
p.11, p.12 important conf 95%
Underlying operating margin reached 20.0% in 2025, up from 19.4% in 2024 and 17.6% in 2023.
Why it matters: The profit the business makes from day-to-day operations has improved steadily over three years — showing the cost-cutting and efficiency programme is working.
p.11, p.14 important conf 97%
Power Brands delivered 4.3% underlying sales growth and 2.2% volume growth, and now account for 78% of total turnover.
Why it matters: The company's biggest bets — its key brands like Dove and Vaseline — are outperforming the rest of the portfolio, which supports the strategy of cutting weaker brands and focusing resources.
p.11, p.12 important conf 93%
Brand and marketing investment (BMI) increased 10 basis points to 16.1% of turnover in 2025, up 300bps over the last five years.
Why it matters: The company is putting significantly more money behind its brands than it did five years ago — a signal of confidence in long-term growth, though it does reduce short-term profit.
p.12 important conf 92%
Unilever has now delivered 12 consecutive quarters of positive underlying volume growth as of end 2025.
Why it matters: A three-year run of volume growth shows the business is winning real customers — not just charging more — which is important for long-term health.
p.12 important conf 95%
Management guided for 2026 underlying sales growth to be within 4–6%, but at the bottom end, with at least 2% volume growth and a modest improvement in operating margin.
Why it matters: The company is being cautious about next year due to slower global markets — helpful for anyone assessing how much growth to expect.
p.5, p.13 important conf 95%
Underlying sales growth was 3.5% in 2025 (vs 4.3% in 2024), made up of 1.5% volume growth and 2.0% price growth.
Why it matters: Volume is now doing more of the work than price, which is a healthier sign — it means people are actually buying more, not just paying more.
p.11, p.12, p.14 useful conf 97%
Group turnover dropped from €52.5bn to €50.5bn, a fall of 3.8%, but currency headwinds alone knocked off 5.9%.
Why it matters: The underlying business is actually growing; the drop in reported sales is almost entirely down to foreign currencies falling against the euro, not a loss of customers or market share.
p.11, p.12, p.14 useful conf 97%
Free cash flow fell from €6.3bn to €5.9bn in 2025, with higher taxes from the Ice Cream demerger being the main cause.
Why it matters: The drop is largely a one-time cost rather than a sign the business is generating less cash — cash conversion remained at 100%, meaning almost all profit turned into cash.
p.12, p.14 useful conf 95%
Latin America grew only 0.5% in underlying sales, with volume declines in challenging markets affected by economic and political uncertainty.
Why it matters: This is a significant market where the company has had to cut prices to stay competitive, which drags on overall growth — management have flagged it needs fixing.
p.12 useful conf 88%
The Board approved a share buyback in 2025 totalling €1.5 billion; repurchase of shares used €1,510m in treasury share movements.
Why it matters: Returning €1.5bn to shareholders shows the company has strong enough cash flow to buy back shares, which reduces the share count and can lift earnings per share.
p.59, p.163 important conf 92%
The carrying amount of net assets distributed/derecognised on the Ice Cream demerger was €4,015m; total gain on demerger after tax was €3,373m.
Why it matters: A large chunk of assets and liabilities left the group in December 2025, so year-end figures are not directly comparable to 2024 — users should note the group is now smaller.
p.179 important conf 95%
Total contingent liabilities were €4,992m at end 2025 (up from €4,835m in 2024), almost all relating to Brazilian tax disputes.
Why it matters: These are not on the balance sheet but if the Brazilian courts rule against Unilever, the cash cost could be very large — although the company believes the risk of losing is low.
p.178 important conf 88%
Operating profit was €9,037m and finance costs were €1,024m, giving interest cover of 8.8x
Why it matters: The company earns nearly 9 times what it pays in interest, so there is plenty of buffer before debt becomes a problem for suppliers or creditors.
p.128 useful conf 95%
Leased assets net book value was €1,166m at 31 December 2025 (down from €1,410m in 2024); total lease cost outflow was €380m in 2025.
Why it matters: Lease obligations are a real debt-like commitment; at €1.2bn they are significant but not alarming relative to the group's size.
p.157 useful conf 88%
Cash and cash equivalents stood at €3,941m at year end 2025 per the headline figures provided.
Why it matters: Nearly €4bn in cash means the company can cover short-term bills and debt payments without needing to borrow quickly.
p.128 useful conf 90%
Net assets were €17,587m at year end 2025; long-term liabilities were €31,222m.
Why it matters: The group carries more long-term liabilities than equity, which is typical for a large consumer goods company, but the equity base is large enough to absorb shocks.
p.128 useful conf 90%
The Board considered and approved quarterly dividends in 2025; no change to dividend policy was disclosed.
Why it matters: Steady dividend payments signal the company is confident in its cash generation, which is reassuring for anyone owed money by or trading with Unilever.
p.59 useful conf 80%
The documents reviewed contain no disclosure of covenant breaches, waivers, or emergency refinancing.
Why it matters: The absence of any distress signals means lenders have not imposed extra conditions on the company, which is a positive sign for trading partners.
p.161 useful conf 85%
Note 15 states the current long-term credit rating is A+/A1 and short-term is A1/P1; the group aims to maintain at least A/A2.
Why it matters: A strong high-quality rating means Unilever can borrow cheaply; suppliers and counterparties face very low default risk.
p.161 useful conf 90%
Specialist deep panels · Structured price capture
Below the prose findings, each agent publishes a structured numeric metrics block. Segmental revenue, named KPIs with YoY %, and capital-structure metrics — direct from the source filings.
Segmental analysis
Top-segment revenue concentration: 26.1% · Segment totals reconcile to the group P&L
Strategic KPIs
Capital structure
Management questions · Open inquiry
Generated by the AI from the disclosure gaps it detected. Hover or tap each card to surface the underlying evidence that triggered the question.
Verification gaps
High-trust analysis names its own blind spots. These are metrics the AI looked for and couldn't find — anything material to the verdict needs management or independent verification.
The segmental agent finding titled 'All four business segments grew turnover in 2025' contains an internal contradiction — the title states growth while the underlying data shows all four segments declined — suggesting a drafting error in that finding that readers should treat with care.
07 · Documents
Filing pattern + upcoming windows
Due at Companies House by 2027-06-30 for the period ending 2026-12-31.
Annual confirmation due by 2026-06-26 (made up to 2026-06-12).
Final chapter — The verdict
Good Trust
Revenue is shrinking, margins are expanding, and capital is flowing back to shareholders — this is a deliberate reshaping, not a slow decline.
FY2025 audited accounts
Signal Radar
Decisive findings
Consistent with a large deferred tax credit, the release of a previously recognised tax provision, or recognition of deferred tax assets — often seen after a major disposal. The ice cream business disposal (widely reported) would be consistent with this timing. This is not unusual for a global group restructuring a major division, but it inflates the PAT figure relative to underlying earnings.
Consistent with a major extension of supplier payment terms — a well-documented feature of Unilever's supply chain finance and dynamic discounting programmes. Suppliers are effectively providing a larger portion of the group's short-term funding. This reduces the group's external borrowing need but increases the financial burden on smaller suppliers in its chain.
Consistent with a large disposal of a business division or significant brand portfolio. Unilever's ice cream separation (announced publicly) is the most likely explanation — this represents a lasting change to the shape of the balance sheet, not a valuation write-down.
Unqualified KPMG LLP opinion — the cleanest outcome an audit can produce.
Underlying operating margin hit 20% for the first time. The profit the business makes from day-to-day operations has improved steadily over three years — showing the cost-cutting and efficiency programme is working.
Ice Cream demerger removed ~€4bn of net assets from balance sheet. A large chunk of assets and liabilities left the group in December 2025, so year-end figures are not directly comparable to 2024 — users should note the group is now smaller.
09 · Verification
What we read
Who we cross-checked
Screening status
Steps we ran
Each step in detail
Limits and caveats
No PSCs are recorded against this entity — typical for listed PLCs (widely held by institutional investors) and for dormant / micro-entity filings.
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