Burberry Group Plc: a £2.5bn business, contracting, with narrowing margins.

Where's the money from?

Revenue £2.5bn (FY2025), down 17% YoY

No segmental split disclosed in the filed accounts — this is the total trading revenue line.

Is it growing?

£2.7bn → £2.5bn

Revenue down about 10% across 8 filed years.

Is it solid?

15.0% → -0.1%

Operating margin narrowed over the period.

Who's behind it?

9 active directors

Full board and backgrounds in the People tab.

luxury fashion retail · global · high complexity

Deep-Dive · Company Intelligence

Inside Burberry Group PLC

Report overview

Burberry's revenue fell £507m and operating profit swung by £421m in a single financial year.

£813.0m Cash at bank vs £441.0m FY2024

£2.46bn Turnover vs £2.97bn FY2024

£-66.0m Pre-tax profit vs £383.0m FY2024

£0.92bn Net assets vs £1.15bn FY2024

A year ago Burberry was generating £383m profit before tax on nearly £3bn of revenue. The filing for FY2025 shows a £66m pre-tax loss on £2.46bn of revenue — a swing of £449m in twelve months. Gross margin collapsed from 68p in every pound of revenue to 62p. Yet cash on the balance sheet nearly doubled, to £813m, because the business stopped returning money to shareholders and cut capital spending sharply. The filing captures a brand in rapid contraction, not yet stabilised.

Selective validation flags on FY2025 accounts — tap to open Verification and see which lines we cross-checked against the filed PDF.

Explore 02Financials 03Risk 05People 06AI Insights 08Filings 10Verification

Scroll

Company No.03458224

Statusactive

Latest accountsFY2025 accounts

Filed 23 September 2025 10 months ago

AuditorErnst & Young LLP

The story

What happened, in chapters

The year, beat by beat — each one a signal from the filing, source cited. Open “the full working” on any beat for the analyst detail.

Revenue falls off a cliff.

Turnover dropped £507m year-on-year — the steepest single-year fall in the filing record.

-17%

Turnover FY2024 £3.0bn FY2025 £2.5bn

The full working

A 17% revenue decline at this scale is not a rounding error; it erases roughly the entire revenue of a mid-sized UK retailer in one year. Gross profit fell even faster than turnover — down 23% — meaning costs did not shrink proportionally as sales left. That gap is the core mechanical problem this filing documents.

Source · Profit & Loss Account FY2024–FY2025.

Profit becomes a loss.

Operating profit swung £421m into the red — the most dramatic single line in the filing.

Operating profit

FY2024 £418m

FY2025 -£3m

The full working

The move from £418m operating profit to a £3m operating loss is effectively a 101% reversal. Below the operating line, net finance costs pushed the pre-tax result to a £66m loss and the after-tax loss to £75m. A tax credit of only £9m offered very limited relief against the scale of the reversal.

Source · Profit & Loss Account FY2024–FY2025.

Cash up, equity down.

Cash nearly doubled while net assets fell £233m — a striking contrast buried in the balance sheet.

£813m Cash on hand FY2025

£921m Net assets FY2025

The full working

Cash rose from £441m to £813m — an 84% increase — largely because financing outflows swung from negative £865m in FY2024 to positive £48m in FY2025, meaning shareholder distributions that consumed £865m the prior year were effectively halted. Net assets fell from £1.154bn to £921m over the same period.

Source · Balance Sheet FY2025; Cash Flow Statement FY2024–FY2025.

Liabilities keep climbing.

Current liabilities rose £254m even as the business shrank — tightening the liquidity picture.

+30%

Current liabilities FY2024 £857m FY2025 £1.1bn

The full working

Current liabilities jumped 30% to £1.111bn against current assets of £1.652bn. Long-term liabilities edged up a further 4% to £1.305bn. The combined liability stack of £2.416bn now sits close to total assets of £3.379bn, leaving net assets of £921m as the buffer.

Source · Balance Sheet FY2025.

Who is steering the ship?

No single shareholder controls more than 25% — and the board is predominantly non-British.

Sep 2024 Alessandra Cozzani appointed (CFO)
Sep 2021 Danuta Gray appointed
Jul 2024 Joshua Schulman appointed CEO
Jan 2018 Orna Nichionna joins board
Apr 2025 Yi Jin joins board

Source · PSC Register; Director appointments, Companies House.

Filing history and trust signals.

Accounts were filed on time and the company has traded under its current name since 2002.

Sep 2025 FY2025 accounts filed
Oct 1997 Incorporated as Hackremco (No. 1279) Limited
Mar 1999 Renamed Burberry Group Limited
Jun 2002 Renamed Burberry Group PLC
Dec 1997 Renamed Burberrys Group Limited

Source · Companies House filing history; Verif-AI TrustScore.

The brief

Five questions, answered

The questions you'd ask a credit analyst over coffee — answered from this company's filings, with the source for every figure.

Q1 Can they pay their bills next year?

Current assets of £1.652bn sit above current liabilities of £1.111bn, giving a current ratio above 1.4x.

Cash alone stands at £813m — up from £441m — after the company effectively stopped large shareholder distributions. Operating cash flow was £429m in FY2025, down from £506m. The liquidity position looks adequate in absolute terms, though current liabilities grew 30% in a year when revenue fell 17%.

Source · Balance Sheet FY2025; Cash Flow Statement FY2025.

Q2 Are they actually making money, or just turning it over?

No, not in FY2025.

Turnover was £2.461bn but the business recorded a £3m operating loss and a £75m loss after tax. Gross margin fell from roughly 68% to 62% as gross profit dropped 23% on a 17% revenue fall — costs did not fall proportionally. In FY2024 the same business made £271m profit after tax, so the deterioration is sharp and concentrated in a single year.

Source · Profit & Loss Account FY2024–FY2025.

Q3 Who owns and controls the business, really?

No Person of Significant Control is registered at Companies House, indicating either no single shareholder holds more than 25% of shares or voting rights, or that interests are held via nominee arrangements.

Burberry Group PLC is a listed entity; the filing does not name an ultimate parent. Control is exercised through a nine-person board spanning five nationalities, with a CEO appointed mid-2024.

Source · PSC Register; Director appointments, Companies House.

Q4 Is the filing history clean, or are accounts late / amended?

The FY2025 accounts were filed 23 September 2025 — no indication of late or amended filings in the brief.

The company has four prior names on record dating to its 1997 incorporation, with the current name adopted in June 2002. A share allotment (SH01) was filed 1 July 2026 and a resolution was filed 21 July 2025, both routine corporate actions. No replacement or amended accounts are flagged.

Source · Companies House filing history; Filing signals.

Q5 Where are the red flags hiding in the notes?

The most visible structural stress is the speed of equity erosion: net assets fell 20% from £1.154bn to £921m in one year, driven by a £75m after-tax loss.

Long-term liabilities of £1.305bn exceed total equity by £384m. The TrustScore Financial dimension scores 50/100 — the weakest of the four components — reflecting the loss year and margin compression. No going-concern language or secured-charge details are disclosed in the brief.

Source · Balance Sheet FY2025; Verif-AI TrustScore.

Honest limits

What the filings can't tell you

We surface gaps plainly rather than guess. Use the chapters and tabs below to dig into what is on record.

Data quality note

No agent flagged a going-concern disclosure or covenant breach, but the interest-cover calculation is derived rather than directly stated in the filings, so lenders' actual covenant headroom has not been independently verified.

Origin

Burberry Group PLC

Burberry Group plc is a British luxury fashion house designing, making and selling clothing, accessories and beauty products under the Burberry brand. It operates through directly owned stores, concessions, wholesale and digital channels worldwide.

Where the money comes from

Revenue £2.5bn (FY2025), down 17% YoY No segmental split disclosed in the filed accounts — this is the total trading revenue line.

At a glance

Key data

Founded 1997 8 years on file

Turnover £2.46bn ▼ 17.1% YoY

Pre-tax profit £-66.0m ▼ 117.2% YoY

Auditor Audit exempt Section 479A (audit exempt)

Timeline

How we got here

2025 01 of 20

Big year-on-year change

Profit after tax collapse

Profit after tax collapsed 128% — from £271.0m to -£75.0m.

2024 02 of 20

Crisis

Profit Warning and CEO Exit

Burberry issued a profit warning, suspended dividend payments, and announced Akeroyd's departure to be replaced by Joshua Schulman, as store sales dropped up to 23% across key markets and shares fell 15%.

2022 03 of 20

Joined the board

Alan Stewart joins the board

Alan Stewart was first appointed as a director on 1 September 2022.

2022 04 of 20

Leadership change

Akeroyd Takes Over as CEO

Jonathan Akeroyd, formerly of Versace, replaced departing Marco Gobbetti as chief executive with a £6 million golden hello package, tasked with driving the next phase of Burberry's luxury growth strategy.

2021 05 of 20

Big year-on-year change

Profit after tax surge

Profit after tax more than doubled — from £121.6m to £375.9m in a single year (+209%).

2021 06 of 20

Joined the board

Danuta Gray joins the board

Danuta Gray was first appointed as a director on 1 December 2021.

2021 07 of 20

Crisis

China Boycott Over Xinjiang

Burberry became the first luxury brand targeted in a Chinese consumer boycott linked to sanctions over alleged Uyghur human rights abuses in Xinjiang, with brand ambassador Zhou Dongyu terminating her contract.

2020 08 of 20

Big year-on-year change

Profit after tax collapse

Profit after tax collapsed 64% — from £339.1m to £121.6m.

2018 09 of 20

Crisis

Unsold Goods Destruction Scandal

Burberry faced a public crisis after reports revealed it had destroyed over £90 million worth of unsold goods over five years to protect the brand; it subsequently announced an immediate halt to the practice and a ban on real fur.

2018 10 of 20

Leadership change

Gerry Murphy Becomes Chairman

Gerry Murphy replaced John Peace as chairman of the board, completing a leadership overhaul alongside the appointment of Marco Gobbetti as CEO and Riccardo Tisci as chief creative officer.

2018 11 of 20

Joined the board

Orna Nichionna joins the board

Orna Nichionna was first appointed as a director on 3 January 2018.

2017 12 of 20

Joined the board

Ronald Leroy Frasch joins the board

Ronald Leroy Frasch was first appointed as a director on 1 September 2017.

2018 13 of 20

Where our data starts

Financial deep-dive begins

Earliest analysed accounts: FY2018. 16 years of earlier trading history are not in scope — this report pulls the most recent filed accounts from Companies House.

2013 14 of 20

Leadership change

Ahrendts Departs for Apple

Angela Ahrendts announced she would leave to become Senior Vice President of retail at Apple Inc., having grown Burberry's sales to over £2 billion and more than tripling its market capitalisation to £7 billion during her tenure.

2006 15 of 20

Leadership change

Ahrendts Appointed CEO

Angela Ahrendts joined from Liz Claiborne and took up the CEO position, partnering with creative director Christopher Bailey to reverse the brand's association with 'chav' culture and reposition it as a premium luxury label.

2005 16 of 20

Notable event

GUS Divests Burberry Stake

Great Universal Stores divested its remaining interest in Burberry in December 2005, making Burberry fully independent after 50 years of GUS ownership.

2002 17 of 20

Stock-exchange listing

Burberry Floated on LSE

Burberry Group plc was initially floated on the London Stock Exchange in July 2002, marking its transition to a publicly listed company while GUS retained a significant stake.

2002 18 of 20

Name changed

Rebrand

Previously incorporated as Burberry Group Limited.

1999 19 of 20

Name changed

Rebrand

Previously incorporated as Burberrys Group Limited.

1997 20 of 20

Name changed

Rebrand

Previously incorporated as Hackremco (No. 1279) Limited.

Go deeper

Explore the evidence

Explore 02Financials 03Risk 05People 06AI Insights 08Filings 09Summary 10Verification

02 · Financials

The numbers, year by year

FY2025 accounts · Companies House (PDF accounts)

Scene 01 · Revenue

Turnover broadly flat

From £2.73bn in FY2018 to £2.46bn in FY2025 — a 10% decline. The most dramatic acceleration came in FY2022, when turnover surged 21% in a single year.

Annual Turnover vs Cost of Sales

FY2018 – FY2025 · Companies House (PDF accounts) · hover any point for the full year

Turnover Cost of Sales Gross Profit (shaded gap)

Latest turnover · FY2025 £2.46bn -17.1% vs prior year

Cost of sales · FY2025 £923.0m Gross margin 62.5% of turnover

Gross profit (implied) £1.54bn Turnover minus cost of sales

Across 7 years -10% £2.73bn → £2.46bn

’18 ’19 ’20 ’21 ’22 ’23 ’24 ’25

Scene 02 · Metrics

The headline numbers

All figures in GBP (£) · as filed, not converted

Cash at bank £813.0m ▲ +84.4% vs £441.0m FY2024 Nearly doubled — a step-change year.

Turnover £2.46bn ▼ 17.1% vs £2.97bn FY2024 A meaningful slip — well below last year's reading.

Pre-tax profit £-66.0m ▼ 117.2% vs £383.0m FY2024 Collapsed — most of the value last year is gone.

Net assets £0.92bn ▼ 20.2% vs £1.15bn FY2024 A meaningful slip — well below last year's reading.

Financial health

Fair · 4 signals

Net assets declining Loss-making High leverage Cash growing

          + Why this rating
        

Net assets declining — Net assets fell 20.2% — the company is losing value
Loss-making — Loss of £66,000,000 on turnover of £2,461,000,000
High leverage — Debt-to-equity of 2.62 — the company is heavily indebted relative to its equity
Cash growing — Cash increased 84.4% year-on-year

Computed from · cash · net assets · current ratio · debt to equity · total liabilities

Scene 03 · Trends

How the numbers moved

Eight years of revenue, profit and operating performance side-by-side. Hover any dot for the full year cross-section.

Financial performance trends

Revenue, profitability and operating growth over time

Turnover Gross profit Operating profit

’18 ’19 ’20 ’21 ’22 ’23 ’24 ’25

Financial year

Scene 05 · Full detail

Complete P&L statement

All metrics across FY2018–FY2025, now fully contextualised by the story above.

Profit and loss

GBP

Metric	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	Δ YoY
Turnover	£2.73bn	£2.72bn	£2.63bn	£2.34bn	£2.83bn	£3.09bn	£2.97bn	£2.46bn	▼ 17%
Cost of sales	-£835.4m	-£859.4m	-£927.6m	-£681.4m	-£815.0m	-£911.0m	-£959.0m	-£923.0m	▲ 4%
Gross profit	£1.90bn	£1.86bn	£1.71bn	£1.66bn	£2.01bn	£2.18bn	£2.01bn	£1.54bn	▼ 23%
Other operating income	—	—	—	—	£30.0m	£46.0m	£13.0m	£23.0m	▲ 77%
Administrative expenses	-£1.49bn	-£1.42bn	—	—	-£1.50bn	-£1.57bn	-£1.60bn	-£1.56bn	▲ 2%
Other operating costs derived	—	—	-£1.52bn	-£1.14bn	—	—	—	—	—
Operating profit	£410.3m	£437.2m	£188.7m	£521.1m	£543.0m	£657.0m	£418.0m	-£3.0m	swung −
Finance income	£7.8m	£8.7m	£7.6m	£3.1m	£3.0m	£21.0m	£31.0m	£25.0m	▼ 19%
Finance costs	-£5.5m	-£5.3m	-£27.8m	-£34.0m	-£34.0m	-£42.0m	-£66.0m	-£88.0m	▼ 33%
Profit before tax	£412.6m	£440.6m	£168.5m	£490.2m	£511.0m	£634.0m	£383.0m	-£66.0m	swung −
Tax	-£119.0m	-£101.5m	-£46.9m	-£114.3m	-£114.0m	-£142.0m	-£112.0m	-£9.0m	▲ 92%
Profit after tax	£293.6m	£339.1m	£121.6m	£375.9m	£397.0m	£492.0m	£271.0m	-£75.0m	swung −
EBITDA (memo)	£480.0m	£553.0m	£1.37bn	£1.42bn	£543.0m	£657.0m	£418.0m	-£3.0m	swung −

Balance sheet

GBP

Metric	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	Δ YoY
Intangible assets	£180.1m	£221.0m	£247.0m	£237.0m	£240.0m	£248.0m	£267.0m	£229.0m	▼ 14%
Tangible assets	£313.6m	£306.9m	£294.9m	£280.4m	£322.0m	£376.0m	£406.0m	£398.0m	▼ 2%
Investments	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total fixed assets	£681.3m	£723.6m	£1.60bn	£1.52bn	£1.66bn	£1.82bn	£1.89bn	£1.73bn	▼ 9%
Stocks	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Debtors	£206.3m	£251.1m	£53.7m	£45.0m	£328.0m	£359.0m	—	—	—
Cash at bank	£915.3m	£874.5m	£928.9m	£1.26bn	£1.22bn	£1.03bn	£441.0m	£813.0m	▲ 84%
Total current assets	£1.54bn	£1.61bn	£1.69bn	£1.98bn	£2.04bn	£1.86bn	£1.42bn	£1.65bn	▲ 16%
Trade creditors	-£460.9m	-£525.7m	-£447.5m	-£392.9m	-£481.0m	-£477.0m	-£439.0m	-£405.0m	▲ 8%
Bank loans (current)	-£23.2m	-£37.2m	—	—	—	—	£0	-£300.0m	swung −
Total current liabilities	£552.9m	£640.1m	£730.5m	£702.8m	£804.0m	£829.0m	£857.0m	£1.11bn	▲ 30%
Net current assets	£988.8m	£968.5m	£958.1m	£1.28bn	£1.23bn	£1.03bn	£567.0m	£541.0m	▼ 5%
Total assets less current liabilities	£1.43bn	£1.46bn	£2.33bn	£2.80bn	£2.89bn	£2.86bn	£2.51bn	£2.32bn	▼ 8%
Bank loans (non-current)	—	—	-£300.0m	-£297.1m	-£298.0m	-£298.0m	-£299.0m	-£438.0m	▼ 46%
Long-term liabilities	£71.4m	£50.7m	£1.23bn	£1.12bn	£1.28bn	£1.32bn	£1.26bn	£1.30bn	▲ 4%
Provisions	£65.0m	£85.3m	£41.8m	£55.8m	£64.0m	£62.0m	£57.0m	£60.0m	▲ 5%
Net assets	£1.43bn	£1.46bn	£1.22bn	£1.56bn	£1.62bn	£1.54bn	£1.15bn	£921.0m	▼ 20%
Total equity	£1.43bn	£1.46bn	£1.21bn	£1.56bn	£1.62bn	£1.54bn	£1.15bn	£921.0m	▼ 20%

Cash flow

GBP

Metric	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	Δ YoY
Net cash from operating activities	£678.4m	£411.4m	£455.8m	£591.4m	£699.0m	£750.0m	£506.0m	£429.0m	▼ 15%
Net cash used in investing activities	-£44.9m	-£124.5m	-£151.4m	-£90.5m	-£164.0m	-£147.0m	-£231.0m	-£127.0m	▲ 45%
Net cash used in financing activities	-£536.1m	-£343.4m	-£262.9m	-£159.1m	-£581.0m	-£821.0m	-£865.0m	£48.0m	swung +
Net increase / (decrease) in cash	£97.4m	-£56.5m	£41.5m	£341.8m	-£46.0m	-£218.0m	-£590.0m	£350.0m	swung +
Cash at end of year	£892.1m	£837.3m	£887.3m	£1.22bn	£1.18bn	£961.0m	£441.0m	£813.0m	▲ 84%

Scene 04 · Waterfall

From revenue to profit

How each cost layer eats into the top-line on the way down to profit after tax. Cascade chart coming in the next release — for now the table below shows the same flow.

Revenue£2.46bn
Cost of sales−£923.0m
Gross profit£1.54bn
Operating costs−£1.54bn
Operating profit-£3.0m
Tax−£72.0m
Profit after tax-£75.0m

FY2025 accounts · cascade view

03 · Risk

What the filings reveal

Concrete signals · descriptive only

Screening 1 to review Name overlaps — not auto-cleared Balance-sheet stress 1.49× short-term cover Current ratio · FY2025 accounts Compliance signals 3 medium findings 3 surfaced in total Auditor Unqualified Ernst & Young LLP

Working capital + cash

Where the money sits

Four numbers that tell you how stretched the balance sheet is today. The line under each is in plain English — what the number means for the business, not what to do about it.

Short-term cover Current ratio · liquidity 1.49× For every £1 of short-term bills they hold £1.49 of cash and quickly-sellable assets. Covered, but no real buffer.

Brand & goodwill share Intangibles ratio · asset quality 6.8% Most assets are physical or financial — buildings, cash, receivables. Easier to value.

Screening status

Independent checks completed

No critical risk flagsNo kill switches fired Sanctions check · ClearFCDO + OFAC + EU screen Potential sanctions · 1 reviewLow-confidence name overlap Politically-exposed persons · None foundPEP screen · 0 hits Disqualified directors · NoneCH disqualified register · clear Auditor · Ernst & Young LLP Audit opinion · UnqualifiedUnqualified ISA-700 opinion Status · Active

Compliance signals

What the compliance pass surfaced

Weak sanctions name overlap

Severity · Medium

Screening returned a partial name overlap: 'HACKWOOD DIRECTORS LIMITED' against 'HELFORD DIRECTORS LIMITED' on the IRAQ2 list (82% name similarity). No identifier corroboration — an unconfirmed overlap, not a confirmed hit.

Short Director Tenures

Severity · Medium

Two directors — Blake, Brian Edmund and Hackwood Directors Limited — served fewer than 12 months, a pattern consistent with nominee director arrangements or rapid leadership change.

Elevated Director Turnover

Severity · Medium

Six director resignations in the past three years, against a current board of nine, represent a turnover rate concentrated in a short window that may indicate underlying governance instability.

        Internal data-quality signals · expand
      

These are Verif-AI's own confidence scores in the underlying data — not external risk ratings. Each dimension reflects how complete and self-consistent the filed numbers were on extraction.

Financial completeness 50

Compliance signals 70

Operational disclosure 72

Data confidence 70

04 · Market

Sector and benchmarks

SIC2007 · cohort metrics

Industry classification

Professional, scientific & technical

Companies House records the SIC2007 classification for this entity under 1 code: 70100.

Peer cohort · Division 70 · Head Offices & Consultancy · 46 peers

Sector cohort · 46 peers · Head Offices & Consultancy

How this filing compares

Metric	This filing	Peer median	Percentile	Assessment
Cash Ratio	0.73	0.25	93th	strong
Profit Margin (%)	-2.7%	7.3%	1th	weak
Quick Ratio	0.73	0.55	74th	above median
Gross Margin (%)	62.5%	32.8%	83th	strong
Current Ratio	1.11	0.87	70th	above median
Cash-to-Assets	0.27	0.06	78th	strong
Debt-to-Assets	0.82	0.71	67th	below median
Debt-to-Equity	2.62	1.35	75th	below median
Net Assets Growth (%)	-20.2%	-0.3%	12th	weak

05 · People

The people behind the company

10 directors · 0 PSCs · 27.8m UK appointments cross-referenced

Every named director was cross-checked against the full UK Companies House appointments dataset (27.8 million records). The four numbers below summarise what we found across the board — each director's individual breakdown is shown in the grid further down.

Directors analysed 9 1 corporate · cross-checked against 27.8m records

Avg failure rate 0.0% share of prior companies that went into liquidation / dissolution

Max concurrent boards 1 most active director sits on 1 board · 1.0 avg

Phoenix signals 0 no director linked to dissolved-and-restarted companies

Each director, individually

Career history + cross-references

Role	Director	Career boards	Concurrent	Prior-failure rate	Joined	Other UK boards
Director · active	Ronald Leroy Frasch American · United States	1	—	—	1 September 2017	—
Director · active	Orna Nichionna Irish · United Kingdom	1	—	—	3 January 2018	—
Director · active	Gerard Martin Murphy Irish · England	1	—	—	17 May 2018	—
Director · active	Danuta Gray British · United Kingdom	1	—	—	1 December 2021	—
Director · active	Alan Stewart British · United Kingdom	1	—	—	1 September 2022	—
Director · active	Catherine Elizabeth Ferry British · England	1	—	—	17 July 2023	—
Director · active	Alessandra Cozzani Italian · Italy	1	—	—	1 September 2023	—
Director · active	Joshua Gallay Schulman American · England	1	—	—	17 July 2024	—
Director · active	YI Jin Italian · United Kingdom	1	—	—	1 April 2025	—

Co-director network

Who sits on other UK boards alongside these directors

People who share at least one other UK directorship with someone on this board. Sorted by overlap count. Click any shared boards chip to reveal the companies they overlap on.

David Gordon Bury 31 career appointments · 3 failed · 9.7% failure rate 1 shared board

Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.

Caroline Anne Marland 21 career appointments · 2 failed · 9.5% failure rate 1 shared board

Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.

MR David Morris 99 career appointments · 7 failed · 7.1% failure rate 1 shared board

Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.

MR Paul Graeme Cooper 187 career appointments · 11 failed · 5.9% failure rate 1 shared board

Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.

Paul Alan Atkinson 171 career appointments · 10 failed · 5.8% failure rate 1 shared board

Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.

        + Show the 35 resigned officers
      

Historical board

Resigned network

Every officer who has left the company, newest-resignation first. Helps spot waves of churn that wouldn't show on the active-director cards alone.

2002

Paul Graeme Cooper

Secretary Served 1997 → 2002

2011

Michael Neil Copinger Mahony

Secretary Served 2002 → 2011

2017

Catherine Anne Sukmonowski

Secretary Served 2011 → 2017

2018

Paul Derek Tunnacliffe

Secretary Served 2017 → 2018

1997

Hackwood Secretaries Limited

Corporate Nominee Secretary Served 1997 → 1997

2014

Angela Jean Ahrendts-Couch

Director Served 2006 → 2014

2024

Jonathan Mark Akeroyd

Director Served 2022 → 2024

2025

Fabiola Raquel Arredondo

Director Served 2015 → 2025

2002

Paul Alan Atkinson

Director Served 1997 → 2002

2018

Christopher Paul Bailey

Director Served 2014 → 2018

2025

Antoine Jean Jacques Arnauld Bernard De Saint-Affrique

Director Served 2021 → 2025

2005

Brian Edmund Blake

Director Served 2004 → 2005

2017

Philip Bowman

Director Served 2002 → 2017

2007

Rose Marie Bravo

Director Served 2002 → 2007

2023

Julie Brown

Director Served 2017 → 2023

2002

David Gordon Bury

Director Served 1997 → 2002

2019

Ian Russell Carter

Director Served 2007 → 2019

2013

Stacey Lee Cartwright

Director Served 2004 → 2013

2020

David Jeremy Darroch

Director Served 2014 → 2020

2017

Carol Ann Fairweather

Director Served 2013 → 2017

2025

Samuel Andrew Fischer

Director Served 2019 → 2025

2019

Stephanie George

Director Served 2006 → 2019

2021

Marco Gobbetti

Director Served 2017 → 2021

2023

Matthew David Key

Director Served 2013 → 2023

2024

Debra Louise Lee

Director Served 2019 → 2024

2006

Caroline Anne Marland

Director Served 2003 → 2006

2022

Carolyn Julia Mccall

Director Served 2014 → 2022

2004

Michael Edward Metcalf

Director Served 2002 → 2004

2002

David Morris

Director Served 1997 → 2002

2004

Thomas John O Neill

Director Served 2002 → 2004

2018

John Wilfred, Sir Peace

Director Served 2002 → 2018

2007

Guy Peyrelongue

Director Served 2002 → 2007

2017

John Barry Smith

Director Served 2009 → 2017

2015

David Alan Tyler

Director Served 1997 → 2015

1997

Hackwood Directors Limited

Corporate Nominee Director Served 1997 → 1997

06 · AI Investigation

Case file open · File no. 03458224 · 28 July 2026 · Trust signal · 60/100 · AI confidence · 96%

Burberry is a luxury brand in full-blown distress.

AI forensic pass across 100 Companies House filings. 28 page-cited signals from three specialist agents, 3 cross-signal correlations, and 4 verification questions for management — every claim traces back to a filing reference.

Critical

Load-bearing signals

Warning

Context to the summary

Structural

Supporting facts

Evidence

Distinct pages cited

AI Analyst commentary

What the numbers, the board, and the ownership say

Narrator-written context blocks — what an analyst would read in 90 seconds and walk away with the picture.

Balance sheet

Net assets have dropped from £1.54bn at peak (FY2023) to £921m today — a £618m erosion in two years. Cash doubled to £813m, which looks reassuring, but current liabilities of £1.11bn now exceed that cash, and lease obligations represent more than a third of total liabilities.

Board

14 individual directors currently registered at Companies House — plus one corporate secretary (Hackwood Secretaries Limited, excluded from director count). Board includes CEO Joshua Schulman and Chairman Gerard Murphy — both appointed as part of a leadership reset following the FY2024–2025 downturn.

Ownership

Burberry Group plc is a widely held listed company on the London Stock Exchange — no single controlling shareholder; institutional ownership is typical. No PSC registered — consistent with a publicly listed plc where no individual or entity holds 25%+ of shares or voting rights.

Case files · Chapter dossier

The investigation, chapter by chapter

The investigation as one running thread — each beat resolves a signal cluster, page-cited. Open “the full working” on any beat for the forensic detail.

Revenue falls off a cliff.

Turnover dropped £507m year-on-year — the steepest single-year fall in the filing record.

-17%

Turnover FY2024 £3.0bn FY2025 £2.5bn

The full working

Source · Profit & Loss Account FY2024–FY2025.

Profit becomes a loss.

Operating profit swung £421m into the red — the most dramatic single line in the filing.

Operating profit

FY2024 £418m

FY2025 -£3m

The full working

Source · Profit & Loss Account FY2024–FY2025.

Cash up, equity down.

Cash nearly doubled while net assets fell £233m — a striking contrast buried in the balance sheet.

£813m Cash on hand FY2025

£921m Net assets FY2025

The full working

Source · Balance Sheet FY2025; Cash Flow Statement FY2024–FY2025.

Liabilities keep climbing.

Current liabilities rose £254m even as the business shrank — tightening the liquidity picture.

+30%

Current liabilities FY2024 £857m FY2025 £1.1bn

The full working

Source · Balance Sheet FY2025.

Who is steering the ship?

No single shareholder controls more than 25% — and the board is predominantly non-British.

Sep 2024 Alessandra Cozzani appointed (CFO)
Sep 2021 Danuta Gray appointed
Jul 2024 Joshua Schulman appointed CEO
Jan 2018 Orna Nichionna joins board
Apr 2025 Yi Jin joins board

Source · PSC Register; Director appointments, Companies House.

Filing history and trust signals.

Accounts were filed on time and the company has traded under its current name since 2002.

Sep 2025 FY2025 accounts filed
Oct 1997 Incorporated as Hackremco (No. 1279) Limited
Mar 1999 Renamed Burberry Group Limited
Jun 2002 Renamed Burberry Group PLC
Dec 1997 Renamed Burberrys Group Limited

Source · Companies House filing history; Verif-AI TrustScore.

Cross-signal intelligence

AI correlations across the filing

Pairs of facts from different chapters that — taken together — tell a story neither half does alone. This is where investigation outperforms summary.

The cash build visible in [chapter 3] is directly explained by the financing reversal: the £865m outflow to shareholders in FY2024 fell to a £48m inflow in FY2025, conserving liquidity precisely as the losses in [chapter 2] arrived.

The 30% rise in current liabilities in [chapter 4] runs in the opposite direction to the revenue contraction in [chapter 1], suggesting fixed or semi-fixed obligations are not shrinking as fast as the top line.

The board turnover shown in [chapter 5] — a new CEO in July 2024 and a new director in April 2025 — coincides with the financial year that produced the loss recorded in [chapter 2], placing significant strategic change at exactly the moment the numbers deteriorated.

Deep signals

Buried in the filing

Specifics most readers would miss — surfaced by the AI for the analyst who wants to know.

Working capital structured to pay suppliers before receiving cash

This appears consistent with a luxury wholesale model where Burberry pays manufacturers quickly (to maintain supplier relationships and production priority) while department-store customers take standard 30–60 day terms. The structural gap isn't a sign of weakness, but it means a very large slug of cash is permanently tied up just keeping the trading cycle turning.

Lease obligations represent over a third of total liabilities

Burberry's store estate is a fixed overhead that runs regardless of sales performance. When revenue falls 17%, the rent bill doesn't. This is a typical pattern for premium high-street and concession retailers — the cost base is sticky, which is why the swing to a loss happened so quickly once revenue softened.

Cash recovery in a loss year — a deliberate preservation move

Rising cash alongside a trading loss is consistent with management cutting or suspending shareholder returns. In FY2024 Burberry spent heavily on buybacks and dividends; in FY2025 those outflows appear to have been sharply reduced, allowing cash to rebuild. The cash increase is a management decision, not evidence that trading improved.

Forensic investigation · 28 signals

Three specialist agents, working in parallel

Segmental revenue · capital structure · strategic KPIs. Each agent cites the exact filing page for every claim, with an AI confidence score derived from cross-citation strength.

Segmental Analysis

Retail/Wholesale revenue fell 18% — a big drop in the main business

Retail/Wholesale revenue fell from £2,906m to £2,395m, a drop of £511m or 17.6% year-on-year. This segment makes up 97.3% of total group revenue of £2,461m.

p.5, p.6 · 7 more from this specialist

Strategic KPIs

Revenue fell 15% — a big drop driven by weaker demand

Full-year revenue dropped from £2,968m to £2,461m, down 15% at constant exchange rates (CER).

p.6, p.16, p.28 · 9 more from this specialist

Capital Structure & Borrowings

Interest cover is dangerously thin — costs nearly swamp earnings

Operating loss was £3m; finance costs were £88m, giving interest cover of roughly -0.03x

p.173 · 9 more from this specialist

          + Show all 28 specialist findings
        

Segmental Analysis (8)

Retail/Wholesale revenue fell 18% — a big drop in the main business

Retail/Wholesale revenue fell from £2,906m to £2,395m, a drop of £511m or 17.6% year-on-year. This segment makes up 97.3% of total group revenue of £2,461m.

Why it matters: Almost all of Burberry's sales come from this one channel, so this large fall drives the entire group result downward.

p.5, p.6 critical conf 99%

Retail/Wholesale segment swung to an adjusted operating loss of £36m

Retail/Wholesale adjusted operating profit fell from £359m in 2024 to a loss of £36m in 2025 — a swing of £395m. Total group adjusted operating profit fell from £418m to £26m.

Why it matters: The core selling business is now loss-making at the operating level, which means the group's profit base has effectively collapsed in one year.

p.5 critical conf 99%

Group reported an operating loss of £3m versus a £418m profit last year

After adjusting items of £29m, reported operating loss was £3m (2024: operating profit £418m). Loss before taxation was £66m (2024: profit £383m).

Why it matters: The group moved from strong profitability to a near breakeven/loss position in a single year, which signals serious pressure on the business model.

p.5 critical conf 99%

Asia Pacific revenue fell £243m (19%) — the largest geographic region shrank fastest

Asia Pacific revenue fell from £1,286m in 2024 to £1,043m in 2025, a drop of £243m or 18.9%. It remains the largest geographic region at 42.4% of Retail/Wholesale revenue.

Why it matters: Asia Pacific is Burberry's biggest market, so a near-20% fall there has an outsized impact on total sales and shows the brand is losing ground in its key growth region.

p.6 critical conf 99%

EMEIA revenue fell £175m (17%) — Europe, Middle East, India and Africa also weak

EMEIA revenue fell from £1,017m to £842m, a drop of 17.2% year-on-year.

Why it matters: The home and nearby markets are shrinking at a similar pace to Asia, showing the sales decline is global rather than confined to one region.

p.6 critical conf 99%

Americas revenue fell £93m (15%) — smallest region but still a notable drop

Americas revenue fell from £603m to £510m, a decline of 15.4% year-on-year.

Why it matters: Americas is the smallest of the three regions but still saw a double-digit fall, confirming broad-based weakness across all geographies.

p.6 important conf 99%

Accessories revenue fell 20% — biggest product category declining fastest

Accessories revenue dropped from £1,055m to £841m (down 20.3%). It is the single largest product category at 35.2% of Retail/Wholesale revenue.

Why it matters: Accessories are typically a luxury brand's highest-margin products; a 20% fall here suggests customers are cutting back on the items that matter most to profitability.

p.6 important conf 99%

Licensing segment stayed profitable and grew slightly

Licensing revenue grew from £62m to £66m and adjusted operating profit was £62m (2024: £59m). Licensing contributes only 2.7% of total revenue.

Why it matters: Licensing is a small but fully profitable part of the business; it cannot offset the large losses in the main retail channel.

p.5 useful conf 99%

Strategic KPIs (10)

Revenue fell 15% — a big drop driven by weaker demand

Full-year revenue dropped from £2,968m to £2,461m, down 15% at constant exchange rates (CER).

Why it matters: A 15% revenue fall means Burberry is selling far less than a year ago, which makes it harder to cover costs and raises questions about whether customers still want the brand.

p.6, p.16, p.28 critical conf 99%

Like-for-like (comparable) store sales down 12%

Comparable store sales fell 12% in FY 2024/25, after being down 1% the year before.

Why it matters: This shows that even existing, established stores are selling a lot less — it is not just about closing stores, the underlying trading is weak.

p.28 critical conf 98%

Gross margin fell from 67.7% to 62.5% — less profit on each sale

Gross margin dropped by 520 basis points at reported rates (470bps at CER), from 67.7% to 62.5%.

Why it matters: Every pound of sales now brings in less profit than before, mainly because Burberry had to discount stock and write down unsold inventory — a sign of short-term brand and pricing pressure.

p.16 critical conf 99%

Adjusted profit fell 88% — almost wiped out in one year

Adjusted operating profit collapsed from £418m to £26m, an 88% fall at CER, giving a margin of just 1.0% versus 14.1% last year.

Why it matters: The business is barely breaking even on an adjusted basis — a single bad half could tip it into an operating loss, which limits its ability to invest or absorb further shocks.

p.7, p.16, p.29 critical conf 99%

Reported operating loss of £3m — the business moved into the red

Burberry reported an operating loss of £3m for FY 2024/25, versus a profit of £418m in FY 2023/24, a swing of £421m.

Why it matters: Moving from a healthy profit to a loss in one year shows how quickly conditions deteriorated, and suppliers or partners will want to watch whether this loss deepens next year.

p.7, p.16 critical conf 99%

Retail channel still dominant but sales fell sharply

Retail revenue fell from £2,400m to £2,076m (a drop of £324m or ~13%), while wholesale fell from £506m to £319m (a drop of ~37%).

Why it matters: Both the shop and the wholesale business shrank significantly, showing the weakness is broad-based and not limited to one sales route.

p.6 critical conf 97%

Adjusted Group ROIC fell to 1.0% — capital is barely working

Adjusted Group ROIC dropped from 15.3% in FY 2023/24 to 1.0% in FY 2024/25.

Why it matters: The company is now earning almost nothing on the capital tied up in the business — far below what investors typically expect from a luxury brand.

p.29 critical conf 97%

Dividend suspended — no cash returned to shareholders this year

Burberry suspended dividend payments from FY 2024/25 onwards, having previously paid a progressive dividend.

Why it matters: Stopping the dividend is a direct signal that cash is being conserved, which trade partners should note as a sign of financial caution at the top.

p.2 important conf 98%

Cash position improved to £708m despite tough trading

Cash (net of overdrafts) rose from £362m to £708m, though the group also had borrowings of £738m at year end.

Why it matters: The higher cash balance gives Burberry a short-term cushion to fund its turnaround plan, but the £738m of borrowings means the net position is actually negative, so the buffer is less strong than the headline suggests.

p.7 important conf 95%

Store count: 422 stores across three regions

Asia Pacific has 237 stores, EMEIA 100 stores and Americas 85 stores as at FY 2024/25 year-end. Two outlet stores were closed during the year.

Why it matters: The network stayed broadly stable in size, so the revenue fall is about weaker spend per store, not fewer shops — the problem is with customer demand, not store coverage.

p.6 useful conf 92%

Capital Structure & Borrowings (10)

Interest cover is dangerously thin — costs nearly swamp earnings

Operating loss was £3m; finance costs were £88m, giving interest cover of roughly -0.03x

Why it matters: The business is not earning enough from trading to pay its interest bill — that is a warning sign for anyone thinking about extending credit or trading on long payment terms.

p.173 critical conf 95%

£738m of drawn borrowings, £300m due within 12 months

Non-current borrowings were £438m and current borrowings were £300m as at 29 March 2025 (prior year: £299m non-current, nil current).

Why it matters: £300m of debt falls due in the next year. If the company cannot refinance or repay it, that is a serious short-term cash pressure.

p.175 critical conf 95%

Net debt is substantial relative to the size of the business

Cash was £813m; total drawn borrowings were £738m; bank overdrafts were £105m — giving net cash of roughly £-30m (debt exceeds cash slightly when overdrafts included).

Why it matters: The company holds a lot of cash but also a lot of debt, and the two roughly cancel out — the group is not in a strong net cash position once overdrafts and borrowings are counted.

p.175 important conf 85%

£1.08bn of lease debt adds a large extra layer of obligations

Total IFRS 16 lease liabilities were £1,081m (£866m non-current, £215m current) at 29 March 2025, down from £1,188m a year earlier.

Why it matters: On top of borrowings, the group has over £1bn of lease commitments — mostly shop leases — which are fixed cash outflows regardless of trading performance.

p.175, p.204 important conf 98%

Dividend cut to zero in FY 2024/25 versus £233m paid in FY 2023/24

Dividends paid in the year were £152m (FY 2024/25) versus £233m (FY 2023/24); the income statement shows no interim or final dividend proposed for FY 2024/25.

Why it matters: The board has stopped paying a new dividend, which preserves cash but signals the business is under financial pressure.

p.173, p.176 important conf 92%

£29m restructuring charge added to costs this year

Restructuring costs of £29m were incurred in FY 2024/25 (nil last year), part of the 'Burberry Forward' programme expected to total £80m in cumulative costs.

Why it matters: There are more restructuring cash costs to come — up to £51m still to be spent — which will put further pressure on cash and debt levels.

p.192 important conf 97%

No covenant details disclosed in the pages provided

The extracted pages do not contain any specific loan covenant ratios, limits, or headroom disclosures.

Why it matters: Without knowing the loan limits the group must stay within, it is impossible to judge how close the company is to breaching its borrowing agreements.

important conf 80%

£5.75% £450m bond hedged with interest rate swaps maturing 2030

The group has a £450m medium-term note fixed-rate bond at 5.75%, carrying amount £438m, with interest rate swaps converting it to floating rate, maturing June 2030.

Why it matters: This is the main long-term debt instrument; it does not mature until 2030 so there is no immediate refinancing pressure on this portion.

p.201, p.202 useful conf 95%

Share buyback programme halted — no buybacks this year

The Directors' Report states no share buyback programmes were undertaken during the reporting period.

Why it matters: The company is not returning cash to shareholders via buybacks, consistent with cash preservation during a period of financial strain.

p.158 useful conf 98%

Cash outflows on leases were £394m in the year

Total cash paid on leases in the 52 weeks to 29 March 2025 was £394m (prior year: £417m), made up of £237m principal, £49m interest, and £91m variable/other payments.

Why it matters: Lease payments are the single largest fixed cash drain on the business each year, absorbing a very large share of operating cash flow.

p.204, p.205 useful conf 97%

Specialist deep panels · Structured price capture

Every figure the specialists extracted

Below the prose findings, each agent publishes a structured numeric metrics block. Segmental revenue, named KPIs with YoY %, and capital-structure metrics — direct from the source filings.

Segmental analysis

Revenue & operating profit by business division

Segment Revenue (latest) Operating profit Rev YoY

Retail/Wholesale €2.4bn €-36m -17.6%

Licensing €66m €62m +6.5%

Asia Pacific €1.0bn — -18.9%

EMEIA €842m — -17.2%

Americas €510m — -15.4%

Top-segment revenue concentration: 97.3% · Segment totals reconcile to the group P&L

Strategic KPIs

6 flagship metrics · 8 supporting

Total Revenue

£2k

-17.1% YoY

CER Revenue Growth

-15%

Comparable Store Sales Growth (CER)

-12%

Gross Margin

62.5%

-7.7% YoY

Adjusted Operating Profit

£26

-93.8% YoY

Adjusted Operating Margin

-92.9% YoY

+ Show 8 supporting KPIs

Reported Operating (Loss)/Profit

-£3

Adjusted Diluted EPS

-£15

-120.0% YoY

Diluted EPS

-£21

-128.3% YoY

Adjusted Group ROIC

-93.5% YoY

Cash (net of overdrafts)

£708

+95.6% YoY

Retail Revenue

£2k

-13.5% YoY

Wholesale Revenue

£319

-36.9% YoY

Total Store Count

422 stores

Capital structure

Debt, cover, and dividend posture

Net debt

£30m

Interest cover

-0.03×

Drawn debt

£738m

Dividend prior year

£233m

Management questions · Open inquiry

What management would need to answer next

Generated by the AI from the disclosure gaps it detected. Hover or tap each card to surface the underlying evidence that triggered the question.

Q01

The £300m of borrowings due within 12 months — has Burberry already secured a refinancing facility, and on what terms, given it cannot cover interest from trading profit?

↻ Flip for trigger

Why we'd ask this

Q02

What is the realistic exit path from the store estate? With £1bn of lease liabilities and falling like-for-like sales, how many leases are up for renewal or break in the next two years, and at what cost to exit?

↻ Flip for trigger

Why we'd ask this

Q03

Asia Pacific dropped nearly 20% — is this broad-based Chinese consumer weakness, or has Burberry specifically lost shelf-space and relevance versus European rivals such as Gucci and Louis Vuitton?

↻ Flip for trigger

Why we'd ask this

Q04

The 'Burberry Forward' restructuring still has up to £51m of cash costs to come — what are the expected savings, and by which financial year does management believe the business returns to a margin that covers its interest bill?

↻ Flip for trigger

Why we'd ask this

Verification gaps

What the filings don't disclose

High-trust analysis names its own blind spots. These are metrics the AI looked for and couldn't find — anything material to the summary needs management or independent verification.

08 · Documents

The filing trail

100 filings · Companies House

Filing distribution

SH01

34%

SH03

22%

SH06

21%

TM01

AP01

CS01

RESOLUTIONS

CH01

RP04AP03

Latest filings

1 Jul 2026 SH01 Capital allotment shares

29 May 2026 SH01 Capital allotment shares

1 May 2026 SH01 Capital allotment shares

7 Apr 2026 CS01 Confirmation statement with no updates

1 Apr 2026 SH01 Capital allotment shares

13 Feb 2026 SH01 Capital allotment shares

15 Jan 2026 SH01 Capital allotment shares

17 Dec 2025 SH01 Capital allotment shares

16 Dec 2025 SH01 Capital allotment shares

8 Dec 2025 CH01 Change person director company with change date

14 Nov 2025 SH01 Capital allotment shares

17 Oct 2025 SH01 Capital allotment shares

Catalyst timeline

Filing pattern + upcoming windows

100 filings · 2023 → 2027

Accounts Officers Capital Resolutions Other

2026Annual accounts

Next annual accounts due

Due at Companies House by 30 September 2026 for the period ending 31 March 2026.

2027Confirmation

Next confirmation statement due

Annual confirmation due by 10 April 2027 (made up to 27 March 2027).

Final chapter — What we found

What we found

60 MIXED SIGNALS

Verif-AI Synthesis

Mixed signals

A premium brand with a high-cost infrastructure — the gap between what it earns and what it costs to run is the only number that matters now.

FY2025 accounts

The five plain-English briefing questions are on Origin — read the story first, then return here for the TrustScore scorecard.

Signal Radar

How the score breaks down

Financial completeness 50/100

Operational disclosure 72/100

Compliance signals 70/100

Data confidence 70/100

Decisive findings

What decided this summary

The hard-hit facts that drove the score. Full breakdown — chapters, between-the-lines, all specialist findings — sits on AI Insights.

Asia Pacific revenue fell £243m (19%) — the largest geographic region shrank fastest

Asia Pacific revenue fell from £1,286m in 2024 to £1,043m in 2025, a drop of £243m or 18.9%. It remains the largest geographic region at 42.4% of Retail/Wholesale revenue.

Why it matters: Asia Pacific is Burberry's biggest market, so a near-20% fall there has an outsized impact on total sales and shows the brand is losing ground in its key growth region.

p.6

Adjusted profit fell 88% — almost wiped out in one year

Adjusted operating profit collapsed from £418m to £26m, an 88% fall at CER, giving a margin of just 1.0% versus 14.1% last year.

Why it matters: The business is barely breaking even on an adjusted basis — a single bad half could tip it into an operating loss, which limits its ability to invest or absorb further shocks.

p.7, p.16, p.29

Reported operating loss of £3m — the business moved into the red

Burberry reported an operating loss of £3m for FY 2024/25, versus a profit of £418m in FY 2023/24, a swing of £421m.

Why it matters: Moving from a healthy profit to a loss in one year shows how quickly conditions deteriorated, and suppliers or partners will want to watch whether this loss deepens next year.

p.7, p.16

10 · Verification

How we know

100 filings · 9 directors · 219 pages

This report reads the full filing package — digital iXBRL where available, the filed PDF (including notes), and the Companies House register — not a single uploaded document.

Figures are as filed by the company — Companies House does not verify the accuracy of information filed. Verif-AI checks internal consistency and flags anomalies, but cannot confirm the underlying figures are correct.

Reconciliation

All 33 reconciled lines tie exactly to the audited iXBRL filing

Every balance-sheet and profit & loss line traced to where we read it in the filing. iXBRL — read straight from the company's audited machine-readable tags, so it ties exactly. PDF — read from the filed accounts document, with the supporting note cited so you can check it. Flagged — our consistency check marked it for a closer look.

Line Our figure Source in filing Reconciliation

Profit & loss · p.173

Turnover £2.5bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Cost of sales −£923m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Gross profit £1.5bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Administrative expenses −£1.6bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Operating profit −£3m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Finance income £25m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Finance costs −£88m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Profit before tax −£66m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Tax −£9m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Profit after tax −£75m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Depreciation & amortisation −£413m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

EBITDA −£3m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Balance sheet · p.175

Intangible assets £229m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Tangible assets £398m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Fixed assets £1.7bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Stock £424m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Trade debtors £309m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Cash £813m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Current assets £1.7bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Total assets £3.4bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Trade creditors −£405m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Current liabilities £1.1bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Net current assets £541m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Total assets less current liabilities £2.3bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Bank loans (current) −£300m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Bank loans (non-current) −£438m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Lease liabilities (current) −£215m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Lease liabilities (non-current) −£866m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Deferred tax −£1m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Long-term liabilities £1.3bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Provisions £60m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Net assets £921m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Profit & loss reserves £466m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

33 read from audited iXBRL tags · 0 from the filed PDF.

What we read

Companies House filings

Total filings 100 2023 → 2026

Accounts filings 3 audited financial statements

Officer events 13 appointments + terminations

Capital events 78 share allotments + buybacks

Who we cross-checked

UK director appointment network

Directors verified 9 incl. 1 corporate officer

Records cross-referenced 27.8m UK appointments dataset

Avg failure rate 0.0% across prior appointments

Phoenix scan 0 directors flagged

Screening status

Independent checks completed

No critical risk flagsNo kill switches fired Sanctions check · ClearFCDO + OFAC + EU screen Potential sanctions · 1 reviewLow-confidence name overlap Politically-exposed persons · None foundPEP screen · 0 hits Audit opinion · UnqualifiedUnqualified ISA-700 opinion Auditor · Ernst & Young LLP Status · Active

Screened 46 names (registered company + officers/PSCs) against live lists: FCDO Consolidated UK Sanctions List — 57503 entries, refreshed 04 July 2026 · OFAC SDN (US Treasury) + akaName aliases + relationship graph — 39437 entries, refreshed 04 July 2026 · EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions — 29880 entries, refreshed 04 July 2026 · UK Parliament — current Members of Commons & Lords — 1441 entries, refreshed 04 July 2026 · Companies House — Disqualified Directors register, checked 04 July 2026.

Steps we ran

How the report was assembled

Pages read 219 PDF pages analysed

Steps run 9 0 skipped · 9 completed

AI checks 3 independent reviews

Years analysed 8 audited filings trended

Pipeline — what ran on this report

Read PDF accounts 219 pages Classify filing Extract audit notes Compliance screening Cross-check directors Build company timeline Plain-English analysis Capital structure review Processing filing

Limits and caveats

What this report doesn't claim

Persons with significant control

No PSCs are recorded against this entity — typical for listed PLCs (widely held by institutional investors) and for dormant / micro-entity filings.

Principal risks register

The filed accounts did not surface a structured principal-risks register, or one was not extracted by the parser. Small / micro-entity filings are not required to disclose this.

        Plain-English glossary · 10 terms
      

Pre-Tax Profit (PBT): What the company earned after paying all its running costs, but before paying the government its share of that profit.
In this filing: Burberry swung from a £383m profit in FY2024 to a £66m loss in FY2025 — a shift of £449m in 12 months.
Gross Profit / Gross Margin: What's left after the cost of making or buying the product — before paying for shops, staff, or marketing.
In this filing: Burberry's gross margin fell from 67.7% to 62.5%, meaning for every £1 sold, 6p more is now being absorbed by production costs.
Net Assets: Everything the company owns minus everything it owes — the owners' share of the business.
In this filing: Burberry's net assets fell from £1.15bn to £921m in one year, wiped out partly by the £75m after-tax loss and partly by dividends paid.
Current Liabilities: Bills and debts the company has to pay within the next 12 months.
In this filing: Burberry's short-term bills jumped 30% to £1.11bn in FY2025 — now £298m more than its cash pile.
Right-of-Use (ROU) Lease Liabilities: Store and office rents that accounting rules require companies to show as a debt on the balance sheet, even though it's just rent.
In this filing: These lease obligations make up 35.9% of Burberry's total liabilities — locked-in rent commitments that continue even if sales fall.
Debtor Days: How long, on average, customers take to pay their bills to the company.
In this filing: Burberry's customers take 46 days to pay — typical for luxury wholesale accounts.
Creditor Days: How long the company takes to pay its own suppliers.
In this filing: At –60 days, Burberry appears to pay suppliers before the invoice terms expire — faster than customers pay Burberry, creating a 106-day cash gap.
Working Capital Gap: The short-term cash a company needs to keep running — because it pays suppliers before collecting from customers.
In this filing: Burberry's 106-day gap means it needs about £715m sitting in the business just to keep trading normally.
Fixed Assets: Long-term things the company owns or controls — factories, equipment, stores under lease.
In this filing: Burberry's fixed assets of £1.73bn include a large chunk of store leases — these can't be sold quickly if cash runs tight.
Intangible Assets: Things you can't touch — brand value, trademarks, goodwill. Hard to sell if things go wrong.
In this filing: 37% of Burberry's total assets are intangible or lease-based — meaning a significant part of the balance sheet is hard to convert to cash in a crisis.