global biopharma - specialty medicines, vaccines and general medicines · global · high complexity
Deep-Dive · Company Intelligence
GSK PLC turned a £4bn operating profit into £7.9bn in a single year, with revenue up only £1.3bn.
Origin
GSK plc is a British multinational pharmaceutical and biotechnology company, incorporated in 1999 and listed on the London Stock Exchange. It develops, manufactures and sells prescription medicines, vaccines and specialty health products globally, operating under SIC code 70100 as the group holding company.
At a glance
Timeline
Big year-on-year change
Profit after tax more than doubled — from £2.95bn to £6.29bn in a single year (+113%).
Big year-on-year change
Profit after tax more than doubled — from £5.10bn to £15.62bn in a single year (+207%).
Name changed
Previously incorporated as GlaxoSmithKline PLC.
Big year-on-year change
Net assets more than doubled — from £3.67bn to £18.36bn in a single year (+400%).
Where our data starts
Earliest analysed accounts: FY2018. 18 years of earlier trading history are not in scope — this report pulls the most recent filed accounts from Companies House.
Name changed
Previously incorporated as Glaxo Smithkline PLC.
Company founded
GSK PLC was registered at Companies House on 1999-12-06.
02 · Financials
Scene 01 · Revenue
From £30.82bn in FY2018 to £32.67bn in FY2025 — a 6% increase.
FY2018 – FY2025 · Companies House
Scene 02 · Metrics
Financial health
Computed from · cash · net assets · current ratio · debt to equity · total liabilities
Scene 03 · Trends
Eight years of revenue, profit and operating performance side-by-side. Hover any dot for the full year cross-section.
Revenue, profitability and operating growth over time
Scene 05 · Full detail
All metrics across FY2018–FY2025, now fully contextualised by the story above.
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turnover | £30.82bn | £33.75bn | £34.10bn | £34.11bn | £29.32bn | £30.33bn | £31.38bn | £32.67bn | ▲ 4% |
| Cost of sales | -£10.24bn | -£11.86bn | -£11.70bn | -£11.60bn | -£9.55bn | -£8.56bn | -£9.05bn | -£9.02bn | — 0% |
| Gross profit | £20.58bn | £21.89bn | £22.39bn | £22.51bn | £19.77bn | £21.76bn | £22.33bn | £23.65bn | ▲ 6% |
| Other operating income | -£1.59bn | £689.0m | £1.62bn | -£476.0m | -£235.0m | -£363.0m | -£1.53bn | £16.0m | ▲ 101% |
| Administrative expenses | -£9.91bn | -£11.40bn | -£11.46bn | -£10.97bn | -£8.37bn | -£9.38bn | -£11.02bn | -£9.09bn | ▲ 17% |
| Other operating costs derived | -£3.59bn | -£4.22bn | -£4.78bn | -£4.86bn | -£4.73bn | -£5.27bn | -£5.76bn | -£6.65bn | — |
| Operating profit | £5.48bn | £6.96bn | £7.78bn | £6.20bn | £6.43bn | £6.75bn | £4.02bn | £7.93bn | ▲ 97% |
| Finance income | £81.0m | £98.0m | £44.0m | £28.0m | £76.0m | £115.0m | £122.0m | £169.0m | ▲ 39% |
| Finance costs | -£798.0m | -£912.0m | -£892.0m | -£784.0m | -£879.0m | -£792.0m | -£669.0m | -£701.0m | ▼ 5% |
| Profit before tax | £4.80bn | £6.22bn | £6.97bn | £5.44bn | £5.63bn | £6.06bn | £3.48bn | £7.40bn | ▲ 113% |
| Tax | -£754.0m | -£953.0m | -£580.0m | -£346.0m | -£707.0m | -£756.0m | -£526.0m | -£1.11bn | ▼ 111% |
| Profit after tax | £4.05bn | £5.27bn | £6.39bn | £5.10bn | £15.62bn | £5.31bn | £2.95bn | £6.29bn | ▲ 113% |
| EBITDA (memo) | — | — | — | — | — | — | £10.69bn | £11.28bn | ▲ 5% |
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intangible assets | £17.20bn | £41.52bn | £40.42bn | £40.63bn | £21.36bn | £21.58bn | £22.50bn | £23.77bn | ▲ 6% |
| Tangible assets | £11.06bn | £10.35bn | £10.18bn | £9.93bn | £8.93bn | £9.02bn | £9.23bn | £9.32bn | ▲ 1% |
| Investments | £1.32bn | £2.15bn | £3.42bn | £2.21bn | £1.54bn | £1.19bn | £1.20bn | £1.13bn | ▼ 6% |
| Total fixed assets | — | — | £60.18bn | £60.43bn | £39.38bn | £40.36bn | £42.47bn | £43.61bn | ▲ 3% |
| Stocks | — | — | £6.00bn | £5.78bn | £5.15bn | £5.50bn | £5.67bn | £5.92bn | ▲ 4% |
| Debtors | — | — | £6.95bn | £7.86bn | £7.05bn | £7.38bn | £6.84bn | £7.47bn | ▲ 9% |
| Cash at bank | £3.87bn | £4.71bn | £6.29bn | £4.27bn | £3.72bn | £2.94bn | £3.87bn | £3.40bn | ▼ 12% |
| Total current assets | £16.93bn | £19.49bn | £20.25bn | £18.67bn | £20.77bn | £18.64bn | £17.00bn | £17.51bn | ▲ 3% |
| Trade creditors | -£14.04bn | -£14.94bn | -£15.84bn | -£17.55bn | -£16.26bn | -£15.84bn | -£15.34bn | -£15.38bn | — 0% |
| Bank loans (current) | -£5.79bn | -£6.92bn | -£3.73bn | -£3.60bn | -£3.95bn | -£2.81bn | -£2.35bn | -£3.01bn | ▼ 28% |
| Total current liabilities | £22.49bn | £24.05bn | £22.15bn | £23.67bn | £22.81bn | £21.07bn | £21.70bn | £21.39bn | ▼ 1% |
| Net current assets | £16.93bn | £19.49bn | -£1.90bn | -£5.00bn | -£2.04bn | -£2.42bn | -£4.70bn | -£3.88bn | ▲ 17% |
| Total assets less current liabilities | £35.58bn | £55.64bn | £58.28bn | £55.43bn | £37.34bn | £37.94bn | £37.77bn | £39.73bn | ▲ 5% |
| Bank loans (non-current) | -£20.27bn | -£23.59bn | -£23.43bn | -£20.57bn | -£17.04bn | -£15.21bn | -£14.64bn | -£14.71bn | — 0% |
| Long-term liabilities | £31.90bn | £37.28bn | £37.48bn | £34.09bn | £27.24bn | £25.14bn | £24.68bn | £23.77bn | ▼ 4% |
| Provisions | £591.0m | £670.0m | £1.76bn | £1.47bn | £1.18bn | £1.24bn | £2.54bn | £1.55bn | ▼ 39% |
| Net assets | £3.67bn | £18.36bn | £20.81bn | £21.34bn | £10.10bn | £12.79bn | £13.09bn | £15.96bn | ▲ 22% |
| Total equity | £3.67bn | £18.36bn | £20.81bn | £21.34bn | £10.10bn | £12.79bn | £13.09bn | £15.96bn | ▲ 22% |
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net cash from operating activities | £8k | £8k | £8.44bn | £7.95bn | £7.40bn | £6.77bn | £6.55bn | £7.74bn | ▲ 18% |
| Net cash used in investing activities | -£2k | -£5k | £2.16bn | -£1.78bn | -£8.77bn | -£1.59bn | -£1.23bn | -£4.23bn | ▼ 244% |
| Net cash used in financing activities | -£5k | -£2k | -£10.13bn | -£7.59bn | £823.0m | -£5.64bn | -£4.73bn | -£3.69bn | ▲ 22% |
| Net increase / (decrease) in cash | £479 | £826 | £470.0m | -£1.41bn | -£546.0m | -£468.0m | £599.0m | -£177.0m | ▼ 130% |
| Cash at end of year | £4k | £5k | £5.26bn | £3.82bn | £3.42bn | £2.86bn | £3.40bn | £3.21bn | ▼ 6% |
Scene 04 · Waterfall
How each cost layer eats into the top-line on the way down to profit after tax. Cascade chart coming in the next release — for now the table below shows the same flow.
FY2025 accounts · cascade view
03 · Risk
Working capital + cash
Four numbers that tell you how stretched the balance sheet is today. The line under each is in plain English — what the number means for the business, not what to do about it.
Screening status
Compliance signals
Five partial matches identified across ISIL/Al-Qaeda, Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Haiti regimes at confidence scores of 0.82–0.85; none are confirmed but all require human review to clear or escalate.
Severity · high
53 director resignations against 12 currently active directors represents an atypically high churn rate that may indicate governance instability or structural reorganisation.
Severity · medium
Nine directors served fewer than 12 months, raising the possibility of nominee director arrangements that should be investigated as part of beneficial ownership verification.
Severity · medium
Ownership pattern
What we can't see
Trust beneficial owners are recorded on HMRC's Trust Registration Service, which is not publicly accessible. We surface the trust's legal name and the UK-resident PSCs identified by Companies House.
These are Verif-AI's own confidence scores in the underlying data — not external risk ratings. Each dimension reflects how complete and self-consistent the filed numbers were on extraction.
04 · Market
Industry classification
Professional, scientific & technical
Companies House records the SIC2007 classification for this entity under 1 code: 70100.
Peer cohort · Division 70 · Head Offices & Consultancy · 35 peers
Sector cohort · 35 peers · Head Offices & Consultancy
| Metric | This filing | Peer median | Percentile | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Ratio | 0.16 | 0.26 | 39th | below median |
| Profit Margin (%) | 22.7% | 7.3% | 97th | strong |
| Quick Ratio | 0.51 | 0.59 | 45th | below median |
| Gross Margin (%) | 72.4% | 32.1% | 96th | strong |
| Current Ratio | 0.51 | 0.87 | 23th | weak |
| Cash-to-Assets | 0.06 | 0.06 | 50th | above median |
| Debt-to-Assets | 0.83 | 0.71 | 68th | below median |
| Debt-to-Equity | 2.83 | 1.14 | 80th | weak |
| Net Assets Growth (%) | 21.9% | -0.6% | 88th | strong |
05 · People
Every named director was cross-checked against the full UK Companies House appointments dataset (27.8 million records). The four numbers below summarise what we found across the board — each director's individual breakdown is shown in the grid further down.
Each director, individually
| Role | Director | Career boards | Concurrent | Prior-failure rate | Joined | Other UK boards |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Director · active |
DR Harry Dietz
American · United States
|
1 | — | — | 2022-01-01 | — |
| Director · active |
MR Luke Victor Miels
Australian · United Kingdom
|
1 | — | — | 2026-01-01 | — |
| Director · active |
MRS Wendy Mira Becker
British · United Kingdom
|
1 | — | — | 2023-10-01 | — |
| Director · active |
DR Anne Beal
American · United States
|
1 | — | — | 2021-05-06 | — |
| Director · active |
Gavin Robert Screaton
British · United Kingdom
|
1 | — | — | 2025-05-01 | — |
| Director · active |
DR Jeannie Tsun-Huei Lee
American · United States
|
1 | — | — | 2024-03-04 | — |
| Director · active |
MR Charles Bancroft
American · United States
|
1 | — | — | 2020-05-01 | — |
| Director · active |
MS Elizabeth Mckee Anderson
American · United States
|
1 | — | — | 2022-09-01 | — |
| Director · active |
DR Hal Barron
American · United States
|
1 | — | — | 2018-01-01 | — |
Co-director network
People who share at least one other UK directorship with someone on this board. Sorted by overlap count. Click any shared boards chip to reveal the companies they overlap on.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Historical board
Every officer who has left the company, newest-resignation first. Helps spot waves of churn that wouldn't show on the active-director cards alone.
06 · AI Investigation
AI forensic pass across 100 Companies House filings. 33 page-cited signals from three specialist agents, 3 cross-signal correlations, and 4 verification questions for management — every claim traces back to a filing reference.
AI Analyst commentary
Narrator-written context blocks — what an analyst would read in 90 seconds and walk away with the picture.
Net assets grew to £15.96bn (+21.9%) and long-term liabilities fell to £23.77bn — the balance sheet is moving in the right direction. The watch point is that 43.6% of total assets are intangibles (drug patents and goodwill), whose value is tied to pipeline success rather than anything that could be sold quickly.
14 directors currently registered at Companies House — large board typical of a listed multinational with governance and committee requirements. Victoria Anne Whyte holds cross-directorships at GSK Limited, GSK Mercury Limited, and GSK (Netherlands) B. V. — consistent with a senior group treasury or legal role spanning multiple group entities.
GSK plc is a listed public company on the London Stock Exchange — no single controlling shareholder; institutional ownership is the norm for a company of this size and profile. No PSC is registered, which is standard for a widely-held listed plc where no individual or entity holds 25% or more of shares or voting rights.
Case files · Chapter dossier
Each chapter resolves one signal cluster. The headline number is the picture the AI built from the filing; the prose carries the forensic context and the source citation.
A 4% rise in sales produced a 97% rise in operating profit — the gap between the two numbers is the story.
Gross margin improved alongside operating profit, suggesting cost discipline or a shift in product mix rather than a one-off accounting item. Turnover rose £1.3bn; operating profit rose £3.9bn. That asymmetry is the central financial event of this filing. Note: all figures are rendered in GBP but currency denomination is unconfirmed — verify against the original filing.
Source · Profit & Loss Account FY2024–FY2025
Turnover and profit before tax moved in the same direction but at very different speeds.
Profit before tax
Revenue grew from £31.4bn to £32.7bn — a steady, incremental climb. Profit before tax moved from £3.5bn to £7.4bn in the same period. The gap between those two growth rates points to operating leverage: fixed costs absorbed while margin expanded sharply.
Source · Profit & Loss Account FY2024–FY2025
Net assets rose £2.9bn in a year, even as long-term debt fell and current liabilities edged down.
Long-term liabilities fell from £24.7bn to £23.8bn. Current liabilities also nudged down. Net assets reaching £16.0bn represents the strongest equity position visible in this two-year dataset. The improvement is funded by retained earnings rather than new capital, based on the data available.
Source · Balance Sheet FY2024–FY2025
Operating cash hit £7.7bn, but investing outflows tripled — the company is spending heavily on something.
Operating cash flow of £7.7bn comfortably covers both investing and financing outflows. The investing outflow surge — from £1.2bn to £4.2bn — is the sharpest single-year move in the cash flow statement. What that capital is being deployed into is not specified in the filing brief.
Source · Cash Flow Statement FY2024–FY2025
No person of significant control is recorded at Companies House — ownership is either fragmented or held via nominee.
Companies House shows no PSC on record for GSK PLC. For a company of this scale — £32.7bn turnover, twelve board directors — that is a structural feature worth noting. It typically reflects a widely dispersed public shareholder base where no single entity crosses the 25% disclosure threshold.
Source · PSC Register, Companies House filing
GSK PLC was incorporated in 1999 as a shelf company and has carried three names since.
The company began life in December 1999 as Trushelfco (No.2577) Limited — a standard incorporation vehicle. It became Glaxo Smithkline PLC within weeks, then GlaxoSmithKline PLC in June 2000, and finally GSK PLC in May 2022. A share allotment was filed on 8 May 2026, the most recent Companies House signal.
Source · Name History and Filing Signals, Companies House
Cross-signal intelligence
Pairs of facts from different chapters that — taken together — tell a story neither half does alone. This is where investigation outperforms summary.
The tripling of investing outflows in [chapter 4] — from £1.2bn to £4.2bn — sits alongside the £2.9bn rise in net assets in [chapter 3], suggesting the capital deployment has not yet eroded the equity base.
Operating cash of £7.7bn in [chapter 4] is almost exactly equal to profit before tax of £7.4bn in [chapter 2], indicating earnings quality is high with minimal gap between reported profit and cash generated.
The share allotment filed in May 2026 noted in [chapter 6] coincides with the period of peak profitability visible in [chapter 1], though the purpose and scale of that allotment are not disclosed in the filing brief.
Deep signals
Specifics most readers would miss — surfaced by the AI for the analyst who wants to know.
Consistent with a large one-off charge in FY2024 (possibly Zantac litigation provisions, widely reported at group level) that did not repeat. A reader looking only at FY2024 would draw a misleading picture of the underlying business.
Appears to reflect the Haleon spin-off in 2022 (which removed associated liabilities) combined with ongoing bond repayments. The direction of travel on debt is clearly downward, which materially reduces the group's financial risk profile over the medium term.
Consistent with the accounting presentation used in group consolidation accounts where payables owed to the group are netted or presented as reductions. This is a technical accounting convention, not a sign of unusual supplier relationships. The -172 creditor days figure derives from this presentation and should be read in that context.
Forensic investigation · 33 signals
Segmental revenue · capital structure · strategic KPIs. Each agent cites the exact filing page for every claim, with an AI confidence score derived from cross-citation strength.
Segmental Analysis
US turnover was £16,859m in 2025 vs £16,384m in 2024, up 3% AER and 6% CER. The US represents about 52% of Group turnover.
p.88, p.91 · 7 more from this specialist
Strategic KPIs
Group turnover rose from £31.4bn in 2024 to £32.7bn in 2025, up 4% at actual exchange rates and 7% at constant exchange rates.
p.4, p.6 · 10 more from this specialist
Capital Structure & Borrowings
Net debt at 31 December 2025 was £14,453m vs £13,095m at end 2024, a rise of £1,358m.
p.101 · 13 more from this specialist
US turnover was £16,859m in 2025 vs £16,384m in 2024, up 3% AER and 6% CER. The US represents about 52% of Group turnover.
Why it matters: More than half of all GSK revenue comes from the US, so any pricing pressure or policy change there — such as the IRA Medicare Part D redesign already noted — has an outsized impact on the whole Group.
p.88, p.91 critical conf 95%
Specialty Medicines turnover was £13.5bn in 2025 vs £11.8bn in 2024, up +14% AER and +17% CER. It represents 41% of Group turnover.
Why it matters: This segment is growing fast and taking a bigger share of total sales, so investors should watch it closely as the main engine of growth.
p.88 important conf 95%
General Medicines turnover was £10.0bn in 2025 vs £10.4bn in 2024, a decline of 4% AER and 1% CER. It is 31% of Group turnover.
Why it matters: This segment is getting smaller mainly because older products face generic competition, which could keep dragging on overall Group sales if not offset by other segments.
p.88, p.91 important conf 95%
Europe turnover was £7,533m in 2025 vs £6,666m in 2024, up 13% AER and 12% CER.
Why it matters: Europe is growing much faster than the US this year, mainly driven by Shingrix launch uptake in France and strong Specialty Medicines demand, which reduces how dependent the Group is on the US.
p.91 important conf 95%
Oncology sales were £1,977m in 2025 vs £1,410m in 2024, up 40% AER and 43% CER.
Why it matters: Oncology is growing very quickly from a smaller base, driven by Jemperli and Ojjaara/Omjjara, and could become a much bigger part of Specialty Medicines revenues over the next few years.
p.89 important conf 95%
Vaccines turnover was £9.2bn in 2025 vs £9.1bn in 2024, stable at AER and +2% CER. It is 28% of Group turnover.
Why it matters: Vaccines is essentially standing still in reported currency terms, meaning it is not contributing to Group growth, though currency effects mask modest underlying progress.
p.88, p.90 useful conf 95%
International turnover was £8,275m in 2025 vs £8,326m in 2024, down 1% AER but up 4% CER.
Why it matters: Currency movements are masking real underlying growth in International markets, so the reported decline overstates how the business is actually performing in those regions.
p.91 useful conf 92%
The pages provided show Total operating profit of £7,932m (2025) and Core results of £9,783m (2025) at Group level, but operating profit is not split by business segment (Specialty Medicines, Vaccines, General Medicines) in the extracts available.
Why it matters: Without segment-level profit figures it is not possible to judge which part of the business is most or least profitable, or whether one segment is loss-making.
p.85 useful conf 85%
Group turnover rose from £31.4bn in 2024 to £32.7bn in 2025, up 4% at actual exchange rates and 7% at constant exchange rates.
Why it matters: Sales are growing steadily, meaning GSK is winning more business and not just relying on price rises — a good sign for anyone supplying or partnering with them.
p.4, p.6 important conf 98%
Specialty Medicines sales reached £13.5bn in 2025, up 14% at actual rates and 17% at constant exchange rates, versus prior year.
Why it matters: Specialty Medicines are GSK's highest-value products and fastest-growing segment — this shows the business is shifting towards more profitable drugs, which is exactly what investors and partners want to see.
p.4, p.6 important conf 97%
Total operating profit jumped from £4.0bn in 2024 to £7.9bn in 2025, a rise of 97% at actual exchange rates. The 2024 figure was depressed by a £1.8bn Zantac legal settlement charge.
Why it matters: Most of this jump is because a big one-off legal cost hit 2024 profits — so this is a recovery to normal rather than a sudden improvement, but it still shows the underlying business is highly profitable.
p.4, p.6 important conf 96%
Core operating profit (which strips out one-off items) grew from £9.1bn in 2024 to £9.8bn in 2025, up 7% at actual rates and 11% at constant exchange rates.
Why it matters: Core profit is the best measure of how much money the business is reliably making year to year — a 7-11% rise shows the business is genuinely getting more profitable, not just recovering from a bad year.
p.4, p.6 important conf 97%
R&D investment in 2025 was £6.6bn, against group turnover of £32.7bn, implying approximately 20% of sales reinvested in research (excluding adjusting items).
Why it matters: A high R&D spend relative to sales shows GSK is serious about finding new drugs to replace older ones as patents run out — this is what keeps a pharma company competitive long-term.
p.4, p.7 important conf 88%
GSK had 58 assets in its pipeline in 2025, with 17 in Phase III or registration stage, and 5 major US FDA approvals received in 2025.
Why it matters: A large late-stage pipeline means GSK has many new drugs close to launch — this reduces the risk that future sales will drop sharply when older drug patents expire.
p.5, p.7 important conf 95%
Free cash flow rose from £2.9bn in 2024 to £4.0bn in 2025, a 38% increase.
Why it matters: Free cash flow is the actual cash left after running the business and investing in it — a strong rise here means GSK has more money to pay dividends, buy back shares, or invest in new deals.
p.4, p.6 important conf 96%
Sales from products launched or with major lifecycle updates in the last five years reached £8bn in 2025.
Why it matters: This shows GSK's recent R&D spending is turning into actual sales, which is the key test of whether a pharma company's pipeline is working.
p.5, p.7 important conf 93%
Vaccines turnover was £9.2bn in 2025, broadly flat at actual exchange rates (0%) and up only 2% at constant exchange rates.
Why it matters: Vaccines are a big part of GSK's business and the lack of growth here is a drag on the overall picture — worth watching to see if this is a one-year blip or a longer trend.
p.4, p.6 useful conf 95%
General Medicines turnover fell from an implied prior year figure to £10.0bn in 2025, down 4% at actual rates and down 1% at constant exchange rates.
Why it matters: General Medicines are older, lower-margin products and a small decline here is normal as patents expire — it is not alarming at this level, but continued falls could put pressure on overall profits.
p.4, p.6 useful conf 92%
Operational carbon emissions (Scope 1 and 2) fell 14% between 2024 and 2025.
Why it matters: A 14% cut in one year is a big move and shows GSK is making real progress on its environmental commitments, which matters to investors and business partners with sustainability targets.
p.5, p.7 useful conf 90%
Net debt at 31 December 2025 was £14,453m vs £13,095m at end 2024, a rise of £1,358m.
Why it matters: The company owes significantly more than a year ago, mainly because it spent heavily on acquisitions, buybacks and dividends — anyone extending credit should note the rising debt load.
p.101 important conf 97%
Short-term borrowings at 31 December 2025 were £3,012m, repayable within 12 months.
Why it matters: A significant chunk of debt needs refinancing or repaying soon; the company held £3,406m in cash and liquid investments so it can cover this, but it bears watching.
p.101 important conf 95%
Net debt increased by £1.4bn primarily from acquisition costs for IDRx Inc., BP Asset IX Inc., efimosfermin access and Cellphenomics GmbH totalling £1.7bn, plus £2.6bn dividends and £1.4bn buybacks, partly offset by £4.0bn free cash inflow.
Why it matters: Debt is rising because the company is actively investing in new drugs — this is a strategic choice, not a sign of financial distress, but it means leverage will stay elevated for a while.
p.101 important conf 93%
Shares purchased as part of a buyback programme totalled £1.4bn in 2025.
Why it matters: Returning cash to shareholders via buybacks while net debt is rising shows confidence in cash generation, but it also means less cash is available to pay down debt.
p.101 important conf 93%
Dividends paid were £2.6bn in 2025 per the net debt movement disclosure.
Why it matters: A large dividend payout alongside rising debt means the company is prioritising shareholder returns even as borrowings grow — sustainable only if free cash flow stays strong.
p.101 important conf 90%
Total contingent consideration liabilities at 31 Dec 2025 are £6,733m (current £1,348m + non-current £5,385m), mainly owed to Shionogi (£5,433m), Novartis (£651m) and Affinivax (£219m).
Why it matters: These are real future payments linked to drug sales milestones — they sit on top of the formal debt and increase the total financial obligations of the company significantly.
p.1, p.100 important conf 95%
Operating profit was £7,932m; finance expense was £701m, giving interest cover of approximately 11.3x.
Why it matters: For every pound of interest owed, the company earns over eleven pounds from its business — that is a very comfortable buffer and lowers default risk.
p.1, p.208 useful conf 95%
Gross debt totals £17,859m (short-term £3,012m + long-term £14,708m + assets-held-for-sale liabilities £139m). Fixed-rate debt is £16,317m; floating-rate is £1,542m.
Why it matters: Most of the borrowing is at fixed rates, so rising interest rates will not quickly increase the interest bill — this protects the company from rate shocks.
p.101 useful conf 95%
The bond maturity profile chart shows debt spread across years 2026–2045 in USD, EUR, GBP and JPY bonds, with no single year dominating.
Why it matters: The debt is well spread over time, which means the company is unlikely to face a sudden large refinancing pressure in any one year.
p.101 useful conf 88%
Total undiscounted contractual cash flows for non-derivative financial liabilities at 31 Dec 2025 were £45,482m (debt £16,978m + interest £4,992m + leases £830m + other £22,479m + finance charges £203m).
Why it matters: This is the full future cash cost of all liabilities including trade payables and contingent consideration — it is large but spread over many years.
p.264 useful conf 92%
Gross undiscounted lease liability cash flows at 31 Dec 2025 are £830m. Right-of-use assets on the balance sheet are £726m.
Why it matters: Lease obligations are manageable relative to the size of the business and do not meaningfully add to financial stress.
p.1, p.264 useful conf 90%
Cash and liquid investments at 31 Dec 2025 total £3,406m (cash £3,397m + liquid investments £9m). Short-term borrowings are £3,012m.
Why it matters: The company can cover its near-term debt repayments from cash on hand, so there is no immediate liquidity problem.
p.101 useful conf 95%
The pages provided do not mention specific loan covenants, covenant tests, headroom figures or the size of any revolving credit or undrawn facilities.
Why it matters: Without knowing the loan limits, it is impossible to say how much extra borrowing room the company has — this is information that traders and creditors would want to see.
useful conf 85%
A 10-cent appreciation of the USD reduces equity by £373m (2024: £368m) based on foreign currency hedging sensitivity.
Why it matters: A lot of the company's debt is in foreign currencies; a stronger dollar or euro makes that debt more expensive in pound terms — manageable but worth watching.
p.263 useful conf 90%
Specialist deep panels · Structured price capture
Below the prose findings, each agent publishes a structured numeric metrics block. Segmental revenue, named KPIs with YoY %, and capital-structure metrics — direct from the source filings.
Segmental analysis
Top-segment revenue concentration: 51.6% · Segment totals reconcile to the group P&L
Strategic KPIs
Capital structure
Management questions · Open inquiry
Generated by the AI from the disclosure gaps it detected. Hover or tap each card to surface the underlying evidence that triggered the question.
Verification gaps
High-trust analysis names its own blind spots. These are metrics the AI looked for and couldn't find — anything material to the verdict needs management or independent verification.
No segmental operating profit or margin breakdown by division was available in the agent findings, limiting the ability to assess profitability concentration across Specialty Medicines, Vaccines and General Medicines independently.
07 · Documents
Filing pattern + upcoming windows
Due at Companies House by 2027-06-30 for the period ending 2026-12-31.
Annual confirmation due by 2026-08-18 (made up to 2026-08-04).
Final chapter — The verdict
Good Trust
£7.4bn profit, 72% margin, debt falling — this is a group at full operational stride, not one fighting for survival.
FY2025 accounts
Signal Radar
Decisive findings
The hard-hit facts that drove the score. Full breakdown — chapters, between-the-lines, all specialist findings — sits on AI Insights.
US turnover was £16,859m in 2025 vs £16,384m in 2024, up 3% AER and 6% CER. The US represents about 52% of Group turnover.
Why it matters: More than half of all GSK revenue comes from the US, so any pricing pressure or policy change there — such as the IRA Medicare Part D redesign already noted — has an outsized impact on the whole Group.
p.88, p.91 · Segmental Analysis
09 · Verification
What we read
Who we cross-checked
Screening status
Steps we ran
Each step in detail
Limits and caveats
No PSCs are recorded against this entity — typical for listed PLCs (widely held by institutional investors) and for dormant / micro-entity filings.
The filed accounts did not surface a structured principal-risks register, or one was not extracted by the parser. Small / micro-entity filings are not required to disclose this.
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