electricity and gas transmission and distribution · global · high complexity
Deep-Dive · Company Intelligence
National Grid earned more in FY2025 while selling less, and doubled its cash pile to £1.18bn.
Origin
National Grid plc owns and operates electricity and gas transmission networks across Great Britain and the north-eastern United States. It is one of the largest investor-owned utility companies in the world, generating regulated revenues from the transport of energy rather than its production or supply.
At a glance
Timeline
Big year-on-year change
Operating profit surged 51% — from £2.90bn to £4.37bn.
Big year-on-year change
Profit after tax grew 29% — from £1.27bn to £1.64bn.
Big year-on-year change
Profit after tax collapsed 58% — from £3.55bn to £1.50bn.
Where our data starts
Earliest analysed accounts: FY2018. 13 years of earlier trading history are not in scope — this report pulls the most recent filed accounts from Companies House.
Name changed
Previously incorporated as National Grid Transco PLC.
Name changed
Previously incorporated as National Grid Group PLC.
Company founded
National Grid PLC was registered at Companies House on 2000-07-11.
02 · Financials
Scene 01 · Revenue
From £15.25bn in FY2018 to £18.38bn in FY2025 — a 21% increase. The most dramatic acceleration came in FY2022, when turnover surged 25% in a single year.
FY2018 – FY2025 · Companies House
Scene 02 · Metrics
Financial health
Computed from · cash · net assets · current ratio · debt to equity · total liabilities
Scene 03 · Trends
Eight years of revenue, profit and operating performance side-by-side. Hover any dot for the full year cross-section.
Revenue, profitability and operating growth over time
Scene 05 · Full detail
All metrics across FY2018–FY2025, now fully contextualised by the story above.
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turnover | £15.25bn | £14.93bn | £14.54bn | £14.78bn | £18.45bn | £21.66bn | £19.85bn | £18.38bn | ▼ 7% |
| Cost of sales | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross profit | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Other operating income | — | — | — | — | £228.0m | £989.0m | £12.0m | — | — |
| Administrative expenses | -£11.76bn | -£12.06bn | — | — | -£14.31bn | -£17.77bn | -£15.39bn | -£13.44bn | ▲ 13% |
| Operating profit | £3.49bn | £2.87bn | £2.78bn | £2.90bn | £4.37bn | £4.88bn | £4.47bn | £4.93bn | ▲ 10% |
| Finance income | £127.0m | £88.0m | £54.0m | £58.0m | £50.0m | £138.0m | £248.0m | £450.0m | ▲ 81% |
| Finance costs | -£1.01bn | -£1.16bn | -£1.17bn | -£928.0m | -£1.07bn | -£1.60bn | -£1.71bn | -£1.81bn | ▼ 6% |
| Profit before tax | £2.66bn | £1.84bn | £1.75bn | £2.08bn | £3.44bn | £3.59bn | £3.05bn | £3.65bn | ▲ 20% |
| Tax | £889.0m | -£339.0m | -£480.0m | -£442.0m | -£1.26bn | -£876.0m | -£831.0m | -£821.0m | ▲ 1% |
| Profit after tax | £3.55bn | £1.50bn | £1.27bn | £1.64bn | £2.18bn | £2.71bn | £2.22bn | £2.83bn | ▲ 28% |
| EBITDA (memo) | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intangible assets | £6.34bn | £6.95bn | £7.01bn | £6.03bn | £12.80bn | £13.45bn | £13.16bn | £13.10bn | — 0% |
| Tangible assets | £39.85bn | £43.91bn | £49.76bn | £47.04bn | £57.53bn | £64.43bn | £68.91bn | £74.09bn | ▲ 8% |
| Investments | £3.07bn | £1.27bn | £1.54bn | £1.62bn | £2.07bn | £2.16bn | £2.30bn | £1.41bn | ▼ 39% |
| Total fixed assets | £52.11bn | £55.02bn | £61.76bn | £57.28bn | £76.90bn | £83.53bn | £87.95bn | £92.41bn | ▲ 5% |
| Stocks | £341.0m | £370.0m | £549.0m | £439.0m | £511.0m | £876.0m | £828.0m | £557.0m | ▼ 33% |
| Debtors | £2.91bn | £3.28bn | £2.99bn | £2.92bn | £3.71bn | £3.88bn | £3.42bn | £4.09bn | ▲ 20% |
| Cash at bank | £329.0m | £252.0m | £73.0m | £157.0m | £204.0m | £163.0m | £559.0m | £1.18bn | ▲ 111% |
| Total current assets | £6.68bn | £7.95bn | £5.80bn | £9.94bn | £17.96bn | £9.17bn | £10.38bn | £14.33bn | ▲ 38% |
| Trade creditors | -£1.98bn | -£2.40bn | -£3.60bn | -£3.52bn | -£4.92bn | -£5.07bn | -£4.08bn | -£4.47bn | ▼ 10% |
| Bank loans (current) | -£2.02bn | -£641.0m | -£4.07bn | -£3.74bn | -£8.21bn | -£66.0m | -£4.86bn | -£4.66bn | ▲ 4% |
| Total current liabilities | £8.70bn | £9.13bn | £8.56bn | £9.37bn | £24.77bn | £9.13bn | £11.39bn | £10.62bn | ▼ 7% |
| Net current assets | -£2.02bn | -£1.18bn | -£2.76bn | £570.0m | -£6.81bn | £36.0m | -£1.01bn | £3.71bn | ▲ 467% |
| Total assets less current liabilities | £50.09bn | £53.83bn | £59.00bn | £57.85bn | £70.09bn | £83.57bn | £86.94bn | £96.12bn | ▲ 11% |
| Bank loans (non-current) | -£2.38bn | -£2.60bn | -£26.72bn | -£27.48bn | £0 | -£106.0m | -£42.21bn | -£42.88bn | ▼ 2% |
| Long-term liabilities | £31.24bn | £34.47bn | £39.20bn | £37.99bn | £46.23bn | £54.01bn | £57.04bn | £58.30bn | ▲ 2% |
| Provisions | £2.05bn | £2.20bn | £2.65bn | £2.23bn | £2.54bn | £2.64bn | £3.11bn | £3.05bn | ▼ 2% |
| Net assets | £18.85bn | £19.37bn | £19.79bn | £19.86bn | £23.86bn | £29.56bn | £29.89bn | £37.83bn | ▲ 27% |
| Total equity | £18.85bn | £19.37bn | £19.79bn | £19.86bn | £23.86bn | £29.56bn | £29.89bn | £37.83bn | ▲ 27% |
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net cash from operating activities | £4.50bn | £4.32bn | £4.62bn | £4.46bn | £6.27bn | £6.90bn | £6.94bn | £6.81bn | ▼ 2% |
| Net cash used in investing activities | £2.24bn | -£3.03bn | -£3.19bn | -£5.12bn | -£14.01bn | £240.0m | -£7.60bn | -£10.59bn | ▼ 39% |
| Net cash used in financing activities | -£7.55bn | -£1.36bn | -£1.61bn | £750.0m | £7.77bn | -£7.17bn | £987.0m | £4.53bn | ▲ 359% |
| Net increase / (decrease) in cash | -£807.0m | -£80.0m | -£183.0m | £95.0m | £31.0m | -£35.0m | £427.0m | £765.0m | ▲ 79% |
| Cash at end of year | £329.0m | £252.0m | £73.0m | £157.0m | £182.0m | £163.0m | £559.0m | £1.18bn | ▲ 111% |
Scene 04 · Waterfall
How each cost layer eats into the top-line on the way down to profit after tax. Cascade chart coming in the next release — for now the table below shows the same flow.
FY2025 accounts · cascade view
03 · Risk
Working capital + cash
Four numbers that tell you how stretched the balance sheet is today. The line under each is in plain English — what the number means for the business, not what to do about it.
Principal risks
Risk of failing to influence future energy policies and secure satisfactory regulatory agreements, leading to poor regulatory outcomes, energy policies that negatively impact operations, reduced financial performance, fines/penalties or reputational damage.
Risk of failing to identify and/or deliver upon actions necessary to meet climate change targets and enable the wider energy transition, leading to legal risks or reputational impacts of not meeting targets and failing to reach net zero by 2050.
Risk of not positioning appropriately to political and societal expectations due to failure to proactively monitor the landscape, leading to reputational damage, political intervention or threats to licences to operate. Outlook increasing.
Risk of not having the capability or capacity necessary to deliver on existing or future commitments due to ineffective planning, insufficient development, and failure to attract and retain people in a competitive market for skills and talent.
Risk of being unable to adequately anticipate and manage disruptive forces due to a cyber-attack, poor recovery of critical systems or malicious parties, resulting in inability to operate the network or loss of confidentiality/integrity/availability of systems.
Screening status
Governance & subsequent events
John Pettigrew announced retirement as CEO after 35 years of service; to step down later in 2025.
Zoë Yujnovich (global executive at Shell plc) announced as incoming Chief Executive, to assume the role on 17 November 2025.
Sale of National Grid Renewables to Brookfield Asset Management announced; completion expected in first half of 2025/26.
NESO published its interim report investigating the outage following a fire at the North Hyde electrical substation in March 2025; final report expected June 2025.
Compliance signals
Partial name match (confidence 0.85) against The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 requires manual verification to confirm or dismiss as a true positive.
Severity · high
Partial name match (confidence 0.85) against the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda (UN Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 must be reviewed and resolved before engagement proceeds.
Severity · high
44 director resignations against 11 currently active directors indicates historically elevated churn, which may signal governance instability.
Severity · medium
Six directors served fewer than 12 months, raising the possibility of nominee arrangements or structural instability within the board.
Severity · medium
Ownership pattern
What we can't see
Trust beneficial owners are recorded on HMRC's Trust Registration Service, which is not publicly accessible. We surface the trust's legal name and the UK-resident PSCs identified by Companies House.
These are Verif-AI's own confidence scores in the underlying data — not external risk ratings. Each dimension reflects how complete and self-consistent the filed numbers were on extraction.
04 · Market
Industry classification
Professional, scientific & technical
Companies House records the SIC2007 classification for this entity under 1 code: 70100.
Peer cohort · Division 70 · Head Offices & Consultancy · 35 peers
Sector cohort · 35 peers · Head Offices & Consultancy
| Metric | This filing | Peer median | Percentile | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Ratio | 0.11 | 0.26 | 34th | below median |
| Profit Margin (%) | 19.9% | 7.3% | 94th | strong |
| Quick Ratio | 0.50 | 0.59 | 45th | below median |
| Current Ratio | 0.50 | 0.87 | 22th | weak |
| Cash-to-Assets | 0.01 | 0.06 | 18th | weak |
| Debt-to-Assets | 0.71 | 0.71 | 50th | above median |
| Debt-to-Equity | 1.82 | 1.14 | 65th | below median |
| Net Assets Growth (%) | 26.5% | -0.6% | 92th | strong |
05 · People
Every named director was cross-checked against the full UK Companies House appointments dataset (27.8 million records). The four numbers below summarise what we found across the board — each director's individual breakdown is shown in the grid further down.
Each director, individually
| Role | Director | Career boards | Concurrent | Prior-failure rate | Joined | Other UK boards |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Director · active |
MS Paula Rosput Reynolds
American · United States
|
1 | — | — | 2021-01-01 | — |
| Director · active |
MS Anne Robinson
American · United States
|
1 | — | — | 2022-01-19 | — |
| Director · active |
IAN Paul Livingston
British · England
|
1 | — | — | 2021-08-01 | — |
| Director · active |
Antony Wood
British · United Kingdom
|
1 | — | — | 2021-09-01 | — |
| Director · active |
MR Andrew Jonathan Agg
British · England
|
5 | 3 | 0.0% | 2010-04-28 | |
|
MR Andrew Jonathan Agg 3 other UK boards they sit onClick + Deep Dive to add a company to your basket. Bundle pricing: 1 = £9.99 · 2 = £15.99 · 3 = £20.99 · then +£4 each. National Grid Holdings One PLC No. 02367004 NGG Finance PLC No. 04220381 Weir Group PLC(The) No. SC002934 |
||||||
| Director |
MRS Jacqueline Patricia Christine Ferguson
British · England
|
5 | 4 | 0.0% | 2014-10-28 | |
|
MRS Jacqueline Patricia Christine Ferguson 4 other UK boards they sit onClick + Deep Dive to add a company to your basket. Bundle pricing: 1 = £9.99 · 2 = £15.99 · 3 = £20.99 · then +£4 each. Entserv UK Limited No. 00053419 F&F Holdings Ltd No. 09668415 Croda International Public Limited Company No. 00206132 Softcat PLC No. 02174990 |
||||||
| Director · active |
MS Zoe Yujnovich
Australian, British · United Kingdom
|
2 | 2 | — | 2025-03-01 | |
|
MS Zoe Yujnovich 1 other UK board they sit onClick + Deep Dive to add a company to your basket. Bundle pricing: 1 = £9.99 · 2 = £15.99 · 3 = £20.99 · then +£4 each. Unilever PLC No. 00041424 |
||||||
| Director · active |
MR Jonathan Silver
American · United States
|
1 | — | — | 2019-05-16 | — |
| Director · active |
MR Iain James Mackay
British · England
|
1 | — | — | 2022-07-11 | — |
Co-director network
People who share at least one other UK directorship with someone on this board. Sorted by overlap count. Click any shared boards chip to reveal the companies they overlap on.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Historical board
Every officer who has left the company, newest-resignation first. Helps spot waves of churn that wouldn't show on the active-director cards alone.
06 · AI Investigation
AI forensic pass across 100 Companies House filings. 32 page-cited signals from three specialist agents, 3 cross-signal correlations, and 4 verification questions for management — every claim traces back to a filing reference.
AI Analyst commentary
Narrator-written context blocks — what an analyst would read in 90 seconds and walk away with the picture.
Net assets hit a record £37.83bn in FY2025 — up from £18.8bn in FY2018 — driven by relentless infrastructure investment now totalling £92.4bn in fixed assets. The flip side: £58.3bn of long-term debt finances most of that investment, meaning the balance sheet is large and leveraged by design.
15 directors currently registered at Companies House — a large board consistent with a FTSE 100 listed company with UK and US regulatory responsibilities. CFO Andrew Agg holds concurrent directorships at Ngg Finance Plc and National Grid Holdings One Plc — consistent with group treasury and financing entity oversight.
Listed plc — no single controlling shareholder; institutional ownership typical of a FTSE 100 utility. No PSC registered — correct for a widely-held listed company where no individual holds 25%+ of shares or voting rights.
Case files · Chapter dossier
Each chapter resolves one signal cluster. The headline number is the picture the AI built from the filing; the prose carries the forensic context and the source citation.
Turnover fell by £1.47bn yet the business kept more of every pound it earned.
Operating profit rose to £4.93bn on lower turnover because regulated infrastructure businesses can strip out commodity pass-through costs without losing margin. The gap between revenue movement and profit movement is the structural point here. Profit before tax climbed 20% to £3.65bn on the same dynamic.
Source · Profit & Loss Account FY2024–FY2025
Cash on the balance sheet went from £559m to £1.18bn in a single year.
The cash doubling sits against operating cash flow that barely moved — £6.81bn versus £6.94bn the prior year. The source of the extra liquidity is the financing line: net inflows from debt and equity markets reached £4.53bn, a 359% swing year-on-year. This is a business deliberately building a war chest ahead of a capex programme.
Source · Balance Sheet & Cash Flow Statement FY2025
Capital expenditure outstripped operating cash flow by nearly £4bn.
Investing outflows hit £10.59bn — up 39% from £7.60bn — meaning the business spent roughly £1.56 for every £1 it generated from operations. That gap was funded from the capital markets. Fixed assets grew 5% to £92.41bn as a result, confirming the spend is landing on the balance sheet rather than disappearing into working capital.
Source · Cash Flow Statement & Balance Sheet FY2025
Net assets rose from £29.89bn to £37.83bn — a 27% jump in a single financial year.
The equity build is driven by retained profits and, critically, the January 2026 share allotment filing (SH01) confirms fresh capital was raised after the year end. Long-term liabilities edged up only 2% to £58.30bn, so the leverage ratio improved even as total debt stayed large in absolute terms.
Source · Balance Sheet FY2025; Companies House filing SH01 dated 2026-01-13
No person with significant control is registered — ownership is either fragmented or held via nominees.
National Grid PLC is listed, so fragmented institutional ownership below the 25% PSC threshold is the expected explanation. The board spans eleven directors across British, American, and Australian nationalities, with five Americans and five British nationals. A new director, Yujnovich, joins in September 2025.
Source · PSC Register; Directors Register, Companies House
Net financing cash flow swung from £987m to £4.53bn — a 359% increase.
A 359% jump in financing inflows in one year is the mechanism that funds a £10.59bn investment programme while keeping cash rising. The share allotment filed in January 2026 suggests the equity tap was still open after the year-end balance sheet was struck. Long-term liabilities rose only modestly to £58.30bn, implying equity rather than new debt is the dominant instrument.
Source · Cash Flow Statement FY2025; Companies House SH01 filing 2026-01-13
Cross-signal intelligence
Pairs of facts from different chapters that — taken together — tell a story neither half does alone. This is where investigation outperforms summary.
The £4.53bn financing inflow in [chapter 6] is the direct funding source for the £10.59bn capex gap visible in [chapter 3] — without it, the cash doubling in [chapter 2] could not have occurred simultaneously with record investment.
The 27% equity surge in [chapter 4] and the post-year-end share allotment (SH01) in [chapter 5] together suggest the balance sheet rebuild is deliberate and ongoing, not a one-year windfall.
↔ Cross-reference
Revenue falling 7% in [chapter 1] while current assets rose 38% (from £10.38bn to £14.33bn, per the balance sheet) points to a significant build-up of receivables or short-term financial assets — a connection that the profit story alone would obscure.
Deep signals
Specifics most readers would miss — surfaced by the AI for the analyst who wants to know.
Consistent with a regulated utility where allowed revenues can be reset by the regulator independently of underlying costs. When Ofgem adjusts the price control, revenue can fall at the same time as profitability improves — because the cost base is largely fixed and the regulated return on the growing asset base drives profit, not the revenue headline.
A figure this far above 100% typically reflects large non-cash depreciation charges being added back in the cash flow statement. National Grid depreciates £92.4bn of infrastructure over decades — those non-cash charges reduce accounting profit but not cash. The real cash the business generates is substantially larger than the PBT line suggests.
The pattern is consistent with short-term acquisition bridge financing — typically, a company uses short-dated facilities to fund a large deal, then refinances into long-dated bonds. National Grid's Western Power Distribution acquisition completed in FY2022, and long-term liabilities grew from £38bn to £46bn the same year. By FY2023 the current spike had unwound, confirming this was temporary financing, not a structural deterioration.
Forensic investigation · 32 signals
Segmental revenue · capital structure · strategic KPIs. Each agent cites the exact filing page for every claim, with an AI confidence score derived from cross-citation strength.
Segmental Analysis
UK Electricity Distribution operating profit (before exceptional items) rose from £993m in 2024 to £1,610m in 2025, a 62% increase. After exceptionals it rose from £975m to £1,598m.
p.173 · 9 more from this specialist
Strategic KPIs
Group capital investment rose to £9,847m in 2024/25, up 20% from £8,235m in 2023/24.
p.1, p.18 · 10 more from this specialist
Capital Structure & Borrowings
Total borrowings at 31 March 2025 were £47,539m (2024: £47,072m), split £4,662m current and £42,877m non-current.
p.211 · 10 more from this specialist
UK Electricity Distribution operating profit (before exceptional items) rose from £993m in 2024 to £1,610m in 2025, a 62% increase. After exceptionals it rose from £975m to £1,598m.
Why it matters: This single segment drove most of the group's profit growth and now accounts for roughly 34% of total operating profit before exceptionals — investors need to understand what drove this jump to judge whether it is sustainable.
p.173 critical conf 92%
UK Electricity Transmission operating profit (before exceptionals) fell from £1,677m in 2024 to £1,277m in 2025, a drop of £400m or 24%.
Why it matters: This is the group's second-largest segment and a 24% drop is a big fall — it partly offsets gains elsewhere and signals potential pressure on the regulated UK transmission business.
p.173 critical conf 93%
National Grid Ventures operating profit before exceptionals fell from £469m (2024) to £380m (2025). After exceptional items of £375m, profit was just £5m in 2025 versus £558m in 2024.
Why it matters: A large exceptional charge wiped out nearly all profit from this segment, so the headline group number masks a very weak underlying performance in this part of the business this year.
p.173 critical conf 91%
New York operating profit after exceptionals swung from a loss of £(200)m in 2023 to £362m in 2024 to £1,269m in 2025 before exceptionals, and £246m exceptional charge still leaves after-exceptional profit of £1,269m less £246m = after exceptional £1,269 - £246 = £1,023m net; after exceptionals 2025: £541m in 2024 vs prior year loss of £200m.
Why it matters: The New York business has turned round strongly and is now a meaningful profit contributor, suggesting US regulatory and operational conditions have improved significantly.
p.173 important conf 85%
Total operating profit from continuing operations before exceptional items fell from £5,462m in 2024 to £4,765m in 2025, a decline of £697m or 13%.
Why it matters: Despite strong revenue growth, underlying operating profit dropped — mainly because of the Transmission fall and Ventures exceptionals — so the group's profit quality needs scrutiny.
p.173 important conf 95%
UK operating profit before exceptionals was £2,775m (58% of £4,765m total) in 2025 vs £3,923m (72%) in 2024. US was £1,990m (42%) vs £1,539m (28%) in 2024.
Why it matters: The profit mix has shifted noticeably toward the US, meaning the group is now more exposed to US regulatory and currency risks than a year ago.
p.173 important conf 90%
Total capital investment rose from £8,235m in 2024 to £9,847m in 2025. New York accounted for £3,289m (33%) and UK Electricity Transmission £2,999m (30%).
Why it matters: Very high capital spending means the group is borrowing and investing heavily for future growth, but it also puts pressure on near-term cash flows and debt levels.
p.174 important conf 93%
ESO contributed £880m operating profit in 2024 but was disposed of on 1 October 2024 for £673 million. Capital investment shows £nil for ESO in 2025 vs £85m in 2024.
Why it matters: The ESO is no longer part of the group so comparisons between years are distorted — future years will lack this profit stream entirely.
p.169, p.173, p.174 important conf 95%
UK non-current assets (excl. pensions/financials/derivatives) were £42,623m and US were £46,131m at March 2025, total £88,754m. In 2024 it was UK £40,065m vs US £44,270m.
Why it matters: The US asset base is now slightly larger than the UK base, meaning the group's long-term value is increasingly tied to US regulatory outcomes and the US dollar exchange rate.
p.174 useful conf 88%
Total revenue from continuing operations was £18,378m in 2025 vs £16,378m in 2024, a rise of £2,000m or 12%. UK contributed £6,707m and US £11,671m.
Why it matters: Revenue grew strongly, mostly in the US, confirming the group's growth story, though profit did not grow at the same rate which points to higher costs.
p.172 useful conf 90%
Group capital investment rose to £9,847m in 2024/25, up 20% from £8,235m in 2023/24.
Why it matters: National Grid is pouring record money into its networks, which means future allowed revenues should grow — good news for long-term stability as a supplier or investor.
p.1, p.18 important conf 98%
Scope 1 and 2 emissions were 7.4 thousand ktCO2e in 2024/25, up from 6.9 in 2023/24 — described as outside the range in the company's Climate Transition Plan.
Why it matters: The company admits this rise breaks its own emissions path, mainly because of a one-off gas burning obligation on Long Island; this could attract regulatory or reputational scrutiny.
p.1, p.20 important conf 95%
Green capital investment hit £7,667m in 2024/25, up 28% from £5,992m in 2023/24, aligned to EU Taxonomy.
Why it matters: A big jump in green-labelled spending shows National Grid is accelerating the energy transition, which matters for ESG-focused lenders, investors and regulators.
p.19 important conf 97%
Statutory operating profit was £4,934m in 2024/25, up 10% from £4,475m in 2023/24.
Why it matters: A double-digit rise in reported profit gives the company strong firepower to keep investing and paying dividends without taking on excessive extra debt.
p.1 important conf 98%
Asset (RAV/rate base) growth was 9.0% in 2024/25, down from 9.7% in 2023/24.
Why it matters: The size of the regulated asset base drives how much profit regulators allow the company to earn — a slight slowdown is normal given lower UK inflation, not a warning sign.
p.1, p.19 useful conf 95%
Group network reliability was 99.9% in 2024/25, matching the 99.9% achieved in 2023/24.
Why it matters: Keeping the lights on is the core job; no drop in reliability means the heavy investment programme is not causing disruption to customers or regulators.
p.1, p.21 useful conf 97%
Lost time injury frequency rate (LTIFR) was 0.10 in 2024/25, up from 0.08 in 2023/24, but equal to the stated target of 0.10 or below.
Why it matters: The rate ticked up due to more reporting of trips and falls; it has not breached the safety target, but the trend is worth watching as contractor workloads grow.
p.1, p.20 useful conf 95%
Group RoE dropped to 9.0% in 2024/25 from 10.5% in 2023/24, driven by a bigger equity base after the Rights Issue.
Why it matters: Lower RoE means shareholders are earning less on each pound invested, but the main cause is the new shares issued — the underlying business earnings are actually growing.
p.19 useful conf 93%
Underlying EPS was 73.3p in 2024/25, up 2% from 72.1p (restated) in 2023/24.
Why it matters: Per-share profit is growing, even after new shares were issued, showing the business is generating enough extra earnings to cover the dilution from fundraising.
p.1, p.18 useful conf 97%
Employee engagement index was 80% in 2024/25, down from 81% in 2023/24; three points below the high-performing companies benchmark.
Why it matters: Engagement is broadly stable but slightly below sector leaders; with a major infrastructure build underway, keeping staff motivated is key to delivery.
p.1, p.20 useful conf 92%
IFA interconnector availability dropped to 79.4% in 2024/25 from 82.0% in 2023/24, due to increased planned and unplanned outages.
Why it matters: Lower cross-Channel interconnector availability reduces the UK's ability to import or export electricity cheaply, which can affect wholesale power prices and National Grid Ventures revenue.
p.21 useful conf 88%
Total borrowings at 31 March 2025 were £47,539m (2024: £47,072m), split £4,662m current and £42,877m non-current.
Why it matters: This is a huge amount of debt relative to the £37,826m net assets — the company owes more than it owns in net terms, which is common for regulated utilities but means lenders are key stakeholders.
p.211 important conf 98%
Cash and cash equivalents were £1,178m at 31 March 2025. Subtracting from total borrowings of £47,539m gives net debt of approximately £46,361m.
Why it matters: The company has very little cash relative to its debt, so it relies on its ability to borrow new money or generate cash from operations to meet obligations.
p.210, p.211 important conf 95%
Borrowings repayable in less than 1 year total £4,662m (2024: £4,859m), including £2,226m commercial paper, £1,828m bonds, and £488m bank loans.
Why it matters: The company needs to repay or refinance nearly £4.7bn in the next year — that is a large near-term funding need, though utilities routinely roll this over.
p.211 important conf 97%
Beyond 1 year: £3,283m in 1-2 years, £2,458m in 2-3 years, £4,281m in 3-4 years, £2,261m in 4-5 years, and £30,594m more than 5 years (£337m by instalments + £30,257m other).
Why it matters: Most debt is long-dated, which reduces the risk of a sudden funding crisis — the company does not need to refinance everything at once.
p.211 useful conf 97%
Operating profit is £4,934m and finance costs are £1,807m, giving interest cover of approximately 2.7x.
Why it matters: Cover of 2.7x means operating profit is nearly three times the interest bill — this is on the lower end for a big borrower, but normal for a capital-heavy regulated utility.
p.211 useful conf 85%
Total lease liabilities (present value) are £829m (2024: £779m): £120m due within 1 year, £347m in 1-5 years, £362m over 5 years. Gross lease payments before finance charges are £1,062m.
Why it matters: Lease liabilities add to total debt obligations but are modest relative to the overall debt pile — they are not a stress point on their own.
p.212 useful conf 99%
The borrowings note and related sections in the provided pages do not disclose specific covenant thresholds, test results, or headroom figures.
Why it matters: Without covenant details it is not possible to check how close the company is to breaching any loan limits — investors and suppliers cannot fully assess this risk from the available pages.
p.211, p.212 useful conf 90%
Fair value of borrowings excluding lease liabilities at 31 March 2025 was £43,137m (book value approximately £46,710m). Level 1 fair value was £34,639m; Level 2 was £8,498m.
Why it matters: Fair value is a little below book value, suggesting the market prices this debt at broadly normal levels — no sign of distress pricing.
p.211 useful conf 95%
The borrowings note states there have been no new issuances since the year end (31 March 2025).
Why it matters: This means the £4.7bn short-term debt has not yet been refinanced as at the reporting date — the company will need to act on this soon.
p.211 useful conf 95%
Cash and cash equivalents more than doubled year-on-year, rising from £559m in 2024 to £1,178m in 2025. Cash at bank was £625m and short-term deposits £553m.
Why it matters: A bigger cash buffer gives the company more breathing room to cover near-term debt repayments without immediately going back to the debt markets.
p.210 useful conf 99%
The 2017 US Tax Cuts and Jobs Act provisions expire end of 2025. Congress is considering changes but nothing is enacted at the balance sheet date, so US deferred tax balances are held at current rates.
Why it matters: If US tax rules change, the company's after-tax cash flows — which service its debt — could be affected, though no specific impact is quantified yet.
p.188 useful conf 80%
Specialist deep panels · Structured price capture
Below the prose findings, each agent publishes a structured numeric metrics block. Segmental revenue, named KPIs with YoY %, and capital-structure metrics — direct from the source filings.
Segmental analysis
Top-segment revenue concentration: 63.5% · Segment totals reconcile to the group P&L
Strategic KPIs
Capital structure
Management questions · Open inquiry
Generated by the AI from the disclosure gaps it detected. Hover or tap each card to surface the underlying evidence that triggered the question.
Verification gaps
High-trust analysis names its own blind spots. These are metrics the AI looked for and couldn't find — anything material to the verdict needs management or independent verification.
Year-on-year segment comparisons are distorted by the disposal of the UK Electricity System Operator in October 2024, which contributed £880m operating profit in 2024 but nil in 2025; readers should treat like-for-like profit growth figures with care until a restated continuing-operations basis is published.
07 · Documents
Filing pattern + upcoming windows
Due at Companies House by 2026-09-30 for the period ending 2026-03-31.
Annual confirmation due by 2027-04-20 (made up to 2027-04-06).
Final chapter — The verdict
Good Trust
A £92bn infrastructure machine generating regulated returns — the debt is the price of owning the pipes and pylons, and the cash backs it up.
FY2025 accounts
Signal Radar
Decisive findings
The hard-hit facts that drove the score. Full breakdown — chapters, between-the-lines, all specialist findings — sits on AI Insights.
UK Electricity Transmission operating profit (before exceptionals) fell from £1,677m in 2024 to £1,277m in 2025, a drop of £400m or 24%.
Why it matters: This is the group's second-largest segment and a 24% drop is a big fall — it partly offsets gains elsewhere and signals potential pressure on the regulated UK transmission business.
p.173
UK Electricity Distribution operating profit (before exceptional items) rose from £993m in 2024 to £1,610m in 2025, a 62% increase. After exceptionals it rose from £975m to £1,598m.
Why it matters: This single segment drove most of the group's profit growth and now accounts for roughly 34% of total operating profit before exceptionals — investors need to understand what drove this jump to judge whether it is sustainable.
p.173
National Grid Ventures operating profit before exceptionals fell from £469m (2024) to £380m (2025). After exceptional items of £375m, profit was just £5m in 2025 versus £558m in 2024.
Why it matters: A large exceptional charge wiped out nearly all profit from this segment, so the headline group number masks a very weak underlying performance in this part of the business this year.
p.173
09 · Verification
What we read
Who we cross-checked
Screening status
Steps we ran
Each step in detail
Limits and caveats
No PSCs are recorded against this entity — typical for listed PLCs (widely held by institutional investors) and for dormant / micro-entity filings.
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