integrated oil and gas / energy transition · global · high complexity
Deep-Dive · Company Intelligence
BP made $210 billion in revenue in 2023 and still ended 2024 with $1.2 billion left over.
Origin
BP p.l.c. is one of the world's largest integrated energy companies, exploring for and producing oil and gas, refining fuels, and selling energy products globally. It is the ultimate parent company of the entire bp group.
At a glance
Timeline
Big year-on-year change
Profit after tax more than doubled — from -£1.36bn to £15.88bn in a single year (+1270%).
Big year-on-year change
Operating profit more than doubled — from -£21.74bn to £18.08bn in a single year (+183%).
Big year-on-year change
Profit after tax collapsed 595% — from £4.19bn to -£20.73bn.
Where our data starts
Earliest analysed accounts: FY2017. 16 years of earlier trading history are not in scope — this report pulls the most recent filed accounts from Companies House.
Name changed
Previously incorporated as BP Amoco P.l.c..
Name changed
Previously incorporated as THE British Petroleum Company P.l.c..
Company founded
BP P.l.c. was registered at Companies House on 1909-04-14.
02 · Financials
Scene 01 · Revenue
From £240.21bn in FY2017 to £189.19bn in FY2024 — a 21% decline. The most dramatic acceleration came in FY2022, when turnover surged 53% in a single year.
FY2017 – FY2024 · Companies House
Scene 02 · Metrics
Financial health
Computed from · cash · net assets · current ratio · debt to equity · total liabilities
Scene 03 · Trends
Eight years of revenue, profit and operating performance side-by-side. Hover any dot for the full year cross-section.
Revenue, profitability and operating growth over time
Scene 05 · Full detail
All metrics across FY2017–FY2024, now fully contextualised by the story above.
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turnover | £240.21bn | £298.76bn | £278.40bn | £180.37bn | £157.74bn | £241.39bn | £210.13bn | £189.19bn | ▼ 10% |
| Cost of sales | -£179.72bn | -£229.88bn | -£209.67bn | -£132.10bn | -£118.77bn | -£169.65bn | -£119.31bn | -£113.94bn | ▲ 4% |
| Gross profit | £60.49bn | £68.88bn | — | — | £38.97bn | £71.74bn | — | — | — |
| Other operating income | £4.37bn | £4.98bn | £769.0m | £663.0m | £6.46bn | £7.50bn | £2.90bn | £5.44bn | ▲ 88% |
| Administrative expenses | -£10.51bn | -£12.18bn | -£11.06bn | -£10.40bn | -£11.93bn | -£13.45bn | -£16.77bn | -£16.42bn | ▲ 2% |
| Other operating costs derived | -£44.88bn | -£42.30bn | — | — | -£15.42bn | -£47.75bn | — | — | — |
| Operating profit | £9.47bn | £19.38bn | £11.71bn | -£21.74bn | £18.08bn | £18.04bn | £27.35bn | £11.30bn | ▼ 59% |
| Finance income | £657.0m | £773.0m | £441.0m | £258.0m | £2.0m | £69.0m | £241.0m | £168.0m | ▼ 30% |
| Finance costs | -£2.29bn | -£2.65bn | -£3.55bn | -£3.15bn | -£2.86bn | -£2.70bn | -£3.84bn | -£4.68bn | ▼ 22% |
| Profit before tax | £7.18bn | £16.72bn | £8.15bn | -£24.89bn | £15.23bn | £15.40bn | £23.75bn | £6.78bn | ▼ 71% |
| Tax | -£3.71bn | -£7.14bn | -£3.96bn | £4.16bn | -£6.74bn | -£16.76bn | -£7.87bn | -£5.55bn | ▲ 29% |
| Profit after tax | £3.47bn | £9.58bn | £4.19bn | -£20.73bn | £8.49bn | -£1.36bn | £15.88bn | £1.23bn | ▼ 92% |
| EBITDA (memo) | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intangible assets | £29.91bn | £29.49bn | £15.54bn | £6.09bn | £18.82bn | £22.16bn | £9.99bn | £9.65bn | ▼ 3% |
| Tangible assets | £129.47bn | £135.26bn | £132.64bn | £114.84bn | £112.90bn | £106.04bn | £104.72bn | £100.24bn | ▼ 4% |
| Investments | £26.23bn | £27.66bn | £31.60bn | £29.08bn | £33.53bn | £23.27bn | £22.44bn | £21.32bn | ▼ 5% |
| Total fixed assets | £185.61bn | £192.41bn | £213.13bn | £194.67bn | £194.68bn | £180.43bn | £176.15bn | £179.39bn | ▲ 2% |
| Stocks | £19.01bn | £17.99bn | — | — | £23.71bn | £28.08bn | — | — | — |
| Debtors | £26.28bn | £26.31bn | £24.44bn | £17.95bn | £29.83bn | £35.10bn | £31.12bn | £27.13bn | ▼ 13% |
| Cash at bank | £25.59bn | £22.47bn | £22.47bn | £31.11bn | £30.68bn | £29.20bn | £33.03bn | £39.20bn | ▲ 19% |
| Total current assets | £74.97bn | £71.31bn | £82.06bn | £72.98bn | £92.59bn | £107.69bn | £104.15bn | £102.83bn | ▼ 1% |
| Trade creditors | -£44.21bn | -£46.27bn | -£46.83bn | -£36.01bn | -£52.61bn | -£63.98bn | -£61.16bn | -£58.41bn | ▲ 4% |
| Bank loans (current) | -£7.74bn | -£9.37bn | -£10.49bn | -£9.36bn | -£5.56bn | -£3.20bn | -£3.28bn | -£4.47bn | ▼ 36% |
| Total current liabilities | £64.73bn | £68.24bn | £73.59bn | £59.80bn | £80.29bn | £99.02bn | £86.08bn | £82.24bn | ▼ 4% |
| Net current assets | £10.24bn | £3.07bn | £8.46bn | £13.18bn | £12.30bn | £8.67bn | £18.07bn | £20.59bn | ▲ 14% |
| Total assets less current liabilities | £211.79bn | £213.94bn | £221.60bn | £207.85bn | £206.99bn | £189.10bn | £194.22bn | £199.99bn | ▲ 3% |
| Bank loans (non-current) | -£55.49bn | -£56.43bn | -£57.24bn | -£63.30bn | -£55.62bn | -£43.75bn | -£48.67bn | -£55.07bn | ▼ 13% |
| Long-term liabilities | £111.39bn | £112.39bn | £120.89bn | £122.29bn | £116.55bn | £106.11bn | £108.72bn | £121.67bn | ▲ 12% |
| Provisions | £23.94bn | £20.30bn | £18.50bn | £17.20bn | £24.83bn | £21.32bn | £19.14bn | £18.29bn | ▼ 4% |
| Net assets | £100.40bn | £101.55bn | £100.71bn | £85.57bn | £90.44bn | £82.99bn | £85.49bn | £78.32bn | ▼ 8% |
| Total equity | £100.40bn | £101.55bn | £100.71bn | £85.57bn | £90.44bn | £82.99bn | £85.49bn | £78.32bn | ▼ 8% |
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net cash from operating activities | £18.93bn | £22.87bn | £25.77bn | £12.16bn | £23.61bn | £40.93bn | £32.04bn | £27.30bn | ▼ 15% |
| Net cash used in investing activities | -£14.08bn | -£21.57bn | -£16.97bn | -£7.86bn | -£5.69bn | -£13.71bn | -£14.87bn | -£13.25bn | ▲ 11% |
| Net cash used in financing activities | -£3.30bn | -£4.08bn | -£8.82bn | £3.96bn | -£18.08bn | -£28.02bn | -£13.36bn | -£7.30bn | ▲ 45% |
| Net increase / (decrease) in cash | £2.10bn | -£3.11bn | £4.0m | £8.64bn | -£430.0m | -£1.49bn | £3.83bn | £6.24bn | ▲ 63% |
| Cash at end of year | £25.59bn | £22.47bn | £22.47bn | £31.11bn | £30.68bn | £29.20bn | £33.03bn | £39.27bn | ▲ 19% |
Scene 04 · Waterfall
How each cost layer eats into the top-line on the way down to profit after tax. Cascade chart coming in the next release — for now the table below shows the same flow.
FY2024 accounts · cascade view
03 · Risk
Working capital + cash
Four numbers that tell you how stretched the balance sheet is today. The line under each is in plain English — what the number means for the business, not what to do about it.
Principal risks
Financial performance is impacted by fluctuating oil, gas and refined product prices, technological change, climate policies, exchange rate fluctuations and the general macroeconomic outlook; strategy is designed to be resilient to energy market volatility through a diversified portfolio and strong balance sheet.
Inability to access and progress hydrocarbon resources and low carbon opportunities could adversely affect delivery of bp's strategy; managed through dedicated subsurface and gas & low carbon energy teams.
Failure to invest in the best opportunities or deliver major projects successfully could adversely affect financial performance; managed through a projects organisation with a common process for appraisal and execution.
Diverse global operations expose bp to a wide range of political developments; managed through geopolitical advisory councils, country-level monitoring and stakeholder relationship management.
External market conditions, supply and demand dynamics, interest rates and access to capital markets can impact financial performance; managed through a diversified portfolio, financial frame, liquidity stress testing and a significant cash buffer.
Screening status
Compliance signals
Partial name match (confidence 0.85) against the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 requires urgent manual verification to confirm or discount the match.
Severity · critical
INGLIS returned a partial sanctions match under ISIL/Al-Qaeda regulations and a 0.9 confidence PEP match as a sitting Liberal Democrat MP, presenting a dual-flag requiring immediate review.
Severity · critical
71 director resignations against 10 active directors represents a structurally elevated churn rate that may indicate governance instability.
Severity · medium
Three directors (HENRY, HOWLE, LOWRIE) served fewer than 12 months, raising the possibility of nominee arrangements or internal governance disruption.
Severity · medium
Ownership pattern
What we can't see
Trust beneficial owners are recorded on HMRC's Trust Registration Service, which is not publicly accessible. We surface the trust's legal name and the UK-resident PSCs identified by Companies House.
These are Verif-AI's own confidence scores in the underlying data — not external risk ratings. Each dimension reflects how complete and self-consistent the filed numbers were on extraction.
04 · Market
Industry classification
Professional, scientific & technical
Companies House records the SIC2007 classification for this entity under 1 code: 70100.
Peer cohort · Division 70 · Head Offices & Consultancy · 35 peers
Division revenue split
Revenue split by segment as the company itself reports it in the filed accounts.
Concentration + dependency
Oil and gas production, refining and trading are spread across multiple regions including the US, UK North Sea, Middle East, Azerbaijan, Indonesia and Brazil; the US and UK represent the largest individual operating presences.
bp sells to a very large and diverse range of customers — retail fuel buyers, airlines, industrial companies, trading counterparties and governments — across 61 countries; no single customer concentration is disclosed.
bp paid $146.6 billion to suppliers for goods and services in 2024; no single-supplier dependency is disclosed.
The power outage at bp's Whiting refinery in the US in early 2024 was significant enough to reduce group-level refining availability from 96.1% to 94.3% — demonstrating that a single large facility can materially affect group performance.
bp earns and reports in US dollars and operates across many currencies; its supply, trading and shipping business actively manages commodity price and currency risk through hedging, but specific quantitative currency exposures are not set out in the strategic report.
Strategic priorities
Directly from the management commentary in the filed accounts — descriptive of stated intent, not a forecast.
Grow oil and gas production by increasing annual investment to around $10 billion, targeting 2.3–2.5 million barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2030.
Reshape the downstream (refining, fuels, convenience) by cutting costs and focusing on markets where bp has strong integrated positions.
Sharply reduce investment in low-carbon transition businesses to $1.5–2.0 billion per year through 2027 — more than $5 billion per year less than previously planned.
Cut net debt to $14–18 billion by end of 2027, partly through a major divestment programme including a strategic review of Castrol.
Deliver over 20% compound annual growth in adjusted free cash flow from 2024 to 2027 and achieve a return on capital employed above 16% by 2027.
Sector cohort · 35 peers · Head Offices & Consultancy
| Metric | This filing | Peer median | Percentile | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Ratio | 0.48 | 0.26 | 79th | strong |
| Profit Margin (%) | 3.6% | 7.3% | 36th | below median |
| Quick Ratio | 0.81 | 0.59 | 79th | strong |
| Current Ratio | 1.09 | 0.87 | 59th | above median |
| Cash-to-Assets | 0.15 | 0.06 | 60th | above median |
| Debt-to-Assets | 0.76 | 0.71 | 57th | below median |
| Debt-to-Equity | 2.60 | 1.14 | 78th | weak |
| Net Assets Growth (%) | -8.4% | -0.6% | 29th | below median |
05 · People
Every named director was cross-checked against the full UK Companies House appointments dataset (27.8 million records). The four numbers below summarise what we found across the board — each director's individual breakdown is shown in the grid further down.
Each director, individually
| Role | Director | Career boards | Concurrent | Prior-failure rate | Joined | Other UK boards |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Director · active |
MR David Alan Hager
American · United States
|
1 | — | — | 2025-06-02 | — |
| Director · active |
MR Satish Pai
Indian · India
|
1 | — | — | 2023-03-01 | — |
| Director · active |
Tushar Morzaria
British · England
|
1 | — | — | 2020-09-01 | — |
| Director · active |
MR Simon Peter Henry
British · England
|
1 | — | — | 2025-09-01 | — |
| Director · active |
MS Melody Boone Meyer
American · United States
|
1 | — | — | 2017-05-17 | — |
| Director · active |
MRS Katherine Anne Thomson
British · England
|
1 | — | — | 2024-02-02 | — |
| Director |
MRS Amanda Jayne Blanc
British · England
|
7 | 5 busy | 0.0% | 2011-02-28 | |
|
MRS Amanda Jayne Blanc 5 other UK boards they sit onClick + Deep Dive to add a company to your basket. Bundle pricing: 1 = £9.99 · 2 = £15.99 · 3 = £20.99 · then +£4 each. AXA Insurance UK PLC No. 00078950 AXA Insurance Dac No. NF004201 Iadvisory Ltd No. 12359468 Aviva PLC No. 02468686 Aviva Group Holdings Limited No. 01555746 |
||||||
| Director · active |
MR Albert Jude Manifold
Irish · Ireland
|
1 | — | — | 2025-09-01 | — |
| Director · active |
MR Ian Paul Tyler
British · England
|
1 | — | — | 2025-04-01 | — |
Co-director network
People who share at least one other UK directorship with someone on this board. Sorted by overlap count. Click any shared boards chip to reveal the companies they overlap on.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Corporate hierarchy
Subsidiaries pulled from Companies House cross-references — entities BP P.l.c. directly controls.
Historical board
Every officer who has left the company, newest-resignation first. Helps spot waves of churn that wouldn't show on the active-director cards alone.
06 · AI Investigation
AI forensic pass across 100 Companies House filings. 31 page-cited signals from three specialist agents, 3 cross-signal correlations, and 4 verification questions for management — every claim traces back to a filing reference.
AI Analyst commentary
Narrator-written context blocks — what an analyst would read in 90 seconds and walk away with the picture.
BP's balance sheet is one of the largest in UK corporate history — $179.4bn in fixed assets and $39.2bn cash — but net assets slipped to $78.3bn as long-term liabilities rose $13bn in a single year. The business is not in distress; it is carrying more debt into a lower-profit environment.
15 directors currently registered at Companies House — typical for a FTSE-listed plc with a large non-executive board. Amanda Blanc also serves on Aviva boards — cross-directorship with a major UK insurer, standard for non-executive roles at this level.
BP p.l.c. is itself the ultimate parent — no single controlling shareholder; institutional ownership typical of listed plcs. Norges Bank, Fisher Asset Management, and State Street among top shareholders — no PSC registration required or applicable for a widely-held listed company.
Case files · Chapter dossier
Each chapter resolves one signal cluster. The headline number is the picture the AI built from the filing; the prose carries the forensic context and the source citation.
Revenues fell 10% but profits fell far faster — a sign that costs did not move with income.
Revenue dropped $21 billion in a single year, but profit after tax fell by $14.7 billion — roughly seven times the proportional hit. That gap between a modest revenue decline and a near-total profit wipeout is the central arithmetic of this filing. The tax bill shrank too, from $7.9 billion to $5.6 billion, but not nearly enough to cushion the fall.
Source · Profit & Loss Account, FY2023–FY2024
While the P&L deteriorated sharply, the cash position moved in the opposite direction.
Cash on the balance sheet rose $6.2 billion to $39.2 billion despite operating cash flow falling $4.7 billion to $27.3 billion. Financing activity consumed far less cash in 2024 ($7.3 billion) than in 2023 ($13.4 billion), which partly explains why cash grew even as earnings collapsed. The company spent less returning money to lenders and shareholders than the year before.
Source · Balance Sheet and Cash Flow Statement, FY2023–FY2024
Long-term liabilities rose $13 billion even as short-term obligations fell.
Long-term liabilities
Current liabilities fell by $3.8 billion, giving a surface impression of a tidier balance sheet. But long-term liabilities grew from $108.7 billion to $121.7 billion — a $13 billion increase in obligations due beyond the next twelve months. Net assets fell from $85.5 billion to $78.3 billion as a result.
Source · Balance Sheet, FY2023–FY2024
The drop from revenues to operating profit was far steeper than the revenue line alone suggests.
Operating profit fell from $27.3 billion to $11.3 billion — a 59% decline on a 10% revenue fall. By the time finance charges and other items were applied, profit before tax dropped 71% to $6.8 billion. The wedge between revenue performance and operating performance points to rising costs or impairments absorbed inside the operating line.
Source · Profit & Loss Account, FY2023–FY2024
Five of the ten current directors were appointed in 2024 or later — the company at the top looks different from a year ago.
David Hager joined in June 2025, Albert Manifold in September 2025, Ian Tyler in April 2025, and Marguerite O'Neill is listed with an April 2026 appointment date. Katherine Thomson joined in February 2024. No single shareholder holds 25% or more — or does so via a route that requires PSC registration — so formal ownership accountability sits with the board itself.
Source · Directors Register and PSC Register, Companies House filing
Cross-signal intelligence
Pairs of facts from different chapters that — taken together — tell a story neither half does alone. This is where investigation outperforms summary.
The $6.2 billion rise in cash visible in [chapter 2] coincides with the $6.1 billion reduction in financing outflows — not with stronger trading, which deteriorated sharply as shown in [chapter 1].
The $13 billion increase in long-term liabilities in [chapter 3] sits alongside the 59% operating profit fall in [chapter 4], meaning the company is carrying more long-dated debt at the same time its ability to service it from operations has roughly halved.
The near-complete turnover of board composition since 2024, shown in [chapter 5], arrives precisely as the profit collapse in [chapter 1] reaches its steepest point — five new directors inheriting a balance sheet under visible strain.
Deep signals
Specifics most readers would miss — surfaced by the AI for the analyst who wants to know.
Consistent with a capital-intensive business carrying very large depreciation and impairment charges — these reduce accounting profit without affecting cash. The 'true' earnings power of BP's operations is significantly larger than the reported profit line suggests.
This appears consistent with BP's large intercompany and commodity trading payables structure, where settlement timing and netting arrangements distort simple creditor-day calculations. The figure should be read with caution rather than at face value.
Consistent with a listed-plc governance structure where major institutional investors hold board seats. This is standard for large public companies and reflects institutional oversight rather than a conflict of interest in isolation.
Forensic investigation · 31 signals
Segmental revenue · capital structure · strategic KPIs. Each agent cites the exact filing page for every claim, with an AI confidence score derived from cross-citation strength.
Segmental Analysis
Customers & Products replacement cost profit (loss) before interest and tax was -$1,560m in 2024, compared to +$4,230m in 2023 — a swing of $5,790m. The segment also recorded inventory holding losses of -$479m, giving a total profit/(loss) before interest and tax of -$2,039m.
p.168, p.169 · 7 more from this specialist
Strategic KPIs
Underlying RC profit dropped from $13.8bn in 2023 to $8.9bn in 2024 — a fall of roughly 35%.
p.15 · 9 more from this specialist
Capital Structure & Borrowings
Total finance debt (borrowings) at 31 December 2024 was $59,547m, up from $51,954m at end-2023.
p.193 · 12 more from this specialist
Customers & Products replacement cost profit (loss) before interest and tax was -$1,560m in 2024, compared to +$4,230m in 2023 — a swing of $5,790m. The segment also recorded inventory holding losses of -$479m, giving a total profit/(loss) before interest and tax of -$2,039m.
Why it matters: A segment that made over $4bn profit last year is now losing money, which drags down the whole group and signals serious problems in the refining and retail business that investors and lenders need to understand.
p.168, p.169 critical conf 98%
Gas & Low Carbon Energy third-party sales and other operating revenues fell from $48,489m in 2023 to $31,043m in 2024 — a drop of $17,446m or approximately 36%. This is the largest absolute revenue fall of any segment.
Why it matters: A 36% revenue drop in one year in a key segment is a very big change that suggests either major asset disposals, much lower energy prices, or lost volumes — and it significantly changes how strong the group's top line looks.
p.168, p.169 critical conf 97%
Oil Production & Operations generated replacement cost profit of $10,789m in 2024, representing approximately 91% of total group replacement cost profit of $11,785m. In 2023 it contributed $11,191m out of $28,584m total (39%).
Why it matters: When nearly all the group's profit comes from one segment, the whole business is exposed to oil price swings — if oil prices fall, there is very little cushion from other parts of the business.
p.168, p.169 critical conf 97%
Group replacement cost profit before interest and tax fell from $28,584m in 2023 to $11,785m in 2024 — a fall of $16,799m or 59%. After inventory holding losses of -$488m, profit before interest and tax was $11,297m versus $27,348m in 2023.
Why it matters: The group's underlying profitability has dropped by more than half in a single year, which is a very large change that may affect dividend capacity, debt ratings, and investor confidence.
p.168, p.169 critical conf 98%
Gas & Low Carbon Energy replacement cost profit before interest and tax fell from $14,080m in 2023 to $3,569m in 2024 — a fall of $10,511m or 75%.
Why it matters: The gas and renewables business, which is central to bp's strategy, is now contributing far less profit, raising questions about whether the energy transition strategy is delivering financial returns.
p.168, p.169 critical conf 97%
In 2024, US third-party revenues were $58,804m out of total $189,185m (31%). US non-current assets were $63,415m versus Non-US $81,937m, giving a total of $145,352m. In 2023, US revenues were $60,577m out of $210,130m (29%).
Why it matters: The US is a very large single-country exposure for assets and revenues, so changes in US tax, regulation, or energy policy have an outsized effect on the group.
p.170 important conf 95%
Customers & Products third-party revenues were $155,084m in 2024 (82% of group total of $189,185m) versus $159,848m in 2023 (76% of $210,130m). The segment's share of group revenue rose by approximately 6 percentage points despite lower absolute revenues.
Why it matters: Customers & Products now dominates group revenues even more, but is loss-making — meaning the biggest revenue segment is actually destroying value at the operating level.
p.168, p.169 important conf 93%
Other Businesses & Corporate reported a replacement cost loss before interest and tax of -$988m in 2024, slightly worse than -$903m in 2023.
Why it matters: Corporate overhead and other activities continue to be a consistent drag on group profits, though the scale is relatively stable year-on-year.
p.168, p.169 useful conf 92%
Underlying RC profit dropped from $13.8bn in 2023 to $8.9bn in 2024 — a fall of roughly 35%.
Why it matters: This is the key profit measure BP management uses; a drop of this size signals that the business is earning much less from its operations than a year ago, mainly due to lower refining margins and weaker trading results.
p.15 critical conf 95%
ROACE (non-IFRS) fell from 17.8% in 2023 to just 14.2% in 2024; the statutory profit figure shows only 0.5% return.
Why it matters: Return on capital shows how well BP turns its assets into profit; falling to near zero on a statutory basis, largely due to $5.1bn of write-downs, suggests parts of the business are no longer worth what BP paid for them.
p.15 critical conf 92%
Upstream production rose from 2.3 to 2.4 mmboe/d in 2024, but unit production costs rose from $5.78/boe to $6.17/boe — a 6.7% increase.
Why it matters: BP is pumping more oil and gas, which is good, but it costs more to do so each year, which squeezes the profit made on each barrel.
p.9, p.15 important conf 95%
Operating cash flow fell from $32.0bn in 2023 to $27.3bn in 2024.
Why it matters: Cash from operations is what funds dividends and investment; a drop of this size means BP has less money coming in to cover both, which could put pressure on the balance sheet.
p.15 important conf 95%
BP-operated refining availability fell from 96.1% in 2023 to 94.3% in 2024.
Why it matters: When refineries run below capacity, BP earns less from turning crude oil into fuel; this drop was mainly caused by a power outage at the Whiting refinery.
p.9, p.14 important conf 90%
Installed renewables capacity (net) grew from 2.7GW in 2023 to 4.0GW in 2024; developed renewables to FID grew from 6.2GW to 8.2GW.
Why it matters: BP is building its clean energy business quickly, which matters for long-term investors watching the energy transition, though these assets are still small compared to its oil and gas earnings.
p.9, p.12 important conf 90%
Net debt increased from $20.9bn at end-2023 to $23.0bn at end-2024; finance debt rose from $52.0bn to $59.5bn.
Why it matters: Higher debt while cash flow is falling means BP has less room to invest or return cash to shareholders; the company is now targeting a net debt range of $14-18bn by end-2027, which will require significant asset sales or earnings recovery.
p.18 important conf 92%
Reported recordable injury frequency rose from 0.274 in 2023 to 0.297 in 2024 — an increase of about 8.5%.
Why it matters: A rising injury rate is a concern for a company operating complex industrial assets; BP says it has identified the causes and is working to reduce them.
p.14 important conf 90%
BP-operated upstream plant reliability ticked up from 95.0% in 2023 to 95.2% in 2024.
Why it matters: Reliability shows how well BP keeps its oil and gas assets running; staying above 95% is a healthy sign that production is not being lost to breakdowns.
p.9, p.14 useful conf 95%
Electric vehicle charge points grew from over 29,000 in 2023 to over 39,000 in 2024.
Why it matters: This shows BP is expanding its low-carbon customer services at pace, which is part of its long-term plan to stay relevant as more drivers switch to electric vehicles.
p.9 useful conf 85%
Total finance debt (borrowings) at 31 December 2024 was $59,547m, up from $51,954m at end-2023.
Why it matters: Debt has risen by about $7.6bn in one year, meaning the company owes more to lenders than it did before, which increases the risk if profits fall.
p.193 important conf 97%
Net debt at 31 December 2024 was $22,997m (2023: $20,912m). Gearing rose from 19.7% to 22.7%.
Why it matters: The company is funding a slightly bigger share of its business with borrowed money rather than equity, which means less cushion if trading conditions worsen.
p.194 important conf 98%
Operating profit was $11,297m and finance costs were $4,683m, giving interest cover of roughly 2.4x.
Why it matters: The company earns around $2.40 for every $1 of interest it owes; this is above the danger zone of 2x but leaves limited room if profits fall further.
p.193, p.194 important conf 85%
IFRS 16 lease liabilities at 31 December 2024 were $12,000m (2023: $11,121m), as shown in the financing activities table.
Why it matters: Lease obligations add another $12bn of debt-like commitments on top of the $59.5bn of borrowings, making total debt-like obligations over $71bn.
p.194 important conf 93%
During 2024 the company repurchased 1,238 million ordinary shares for $7,127m (2023: $7,918m for 1,263m shares).
Why it matters: Returning $7bn to shareholders via buybacks while net debt is rising means the company is spending heavily on capital returns, which could worry lenders if profits fall.
p.210 important conf 97%
Net debt moved from $20,912m to $22,997m during 2024, a rise of $2,085m, even though cash on hand grew from $33,030m to $39,204m.
Why it matters: New borrowings and buybacks exceeded cash generation in net terms, so leverage is drifting upward, which is something to watch over the next year.
p.194, p.193 important conf 95%
Current (short-term) borrowings at 31 December 2024 were $4,474m, including $3,793m maturing long-term debt and $500m commercial paper.
Why it matters: The company needs to repay or roll over $4.5bn of debt in the coming year; for a company of this size that is routine, but it still needs to happen.
p.193 useful conf 93%
Non-current borrowings at 31 December 2024 were $55,073m versus $48,670m in 2023.
Why it matters: Having most debt as long-term reduces short-term repayment pressure and gives the company time to manage its balance sheet.
p.193 useful conf 95%
US dollar fixed-rate debt was $41,145m at a weighted average interest rate of 4%, with floating-rate dollar debt of $17,847m at 5%.
Why it matters: The company has locked in most of its borrowing cost at 4%, which protects it if interest rates rise further.
p.193 useful conf 95%
Fair value of total finance debt was $54,966m versus a carrying amount of $59,547m at 31 December 2024.
Why it matters: If the company had to buy back or settle its debt today it would cost less than the balance sheet figure, which is a modest positive for lenders and bondholders.
p.193 useful conf 93%
The company designates cross-currency interest rate swaps with nominal amount of $15,887m as fair value hedges on finance debt at 31 December 2024.
Why it matters: The company actively manages the cost and currency of its debt using financial instruments, which reduces exposure to sudden rises in rates or exchange rate moves.
p.207, p.208 useful conf 92%
The notes state that certain subsidiaries have externally imposed capital requirements and have been in compliance throughout the year. No waiver or breach is mentioned.
Why it matters: There is no sign the company has broken any loan limits or had to ask lenders for special permission, which means the debt is being managed normally.
p.194 useful conf 80%
Cash and cash equivalents at 31 December 2024 include $4,844m (2023: $5,282m) that is restricted, mainly for trading margin and exchange controls.
Why it matters: The usable cash pile is effectively $34.4bn rather than the headline $39.2bn, which is still very large but slightly less than it first appears.
p.193 useful conf 95%
Specialist deep panels · Structured price capture
Below the prose findings, each agent publishes a structured numeric metrics block. Segmental revenue, named KPIs with YoY %, and capital-structure metrics — direct from the source filings.
Segmental analysis
Top-segment revenue concentration: 81.97% · Segment totals reconcile to the group P&L
Strategic KPIs
Capital structure
Management questions · Open inquiry
Generated by the AI from the disclosure gaps it detected. Hover or tap each card to surface the underlying evidence that triggered the question.
Verification gaps
High-trust analysis names its own blind spots. These are metrics the AI looked for and couldn't find — anything material to the verdict needs management or independent verification.
All findings are drawn from reported and non-IFRS BP figures; no independent verification of non-IFRS adjustments (replacement cost profit, underlying RC profit) has been possible, and the gap between statutory profit before tax ($6.8bn) and replacement cost profit ($11.8bn) warrants scrutiny of the adjustment items.
07 · Documents
Filing pattern + upcoming windows
Due at Companies House by 2026-06-30 for the period ending 2025-12-31.
Annual confirmation due by 2026-05-19 (made up to 2026-05-05).
Final chapter — The verdict
Good Trust
Cash is growing while profits fall — the machine still runs; the question is whether the rising debt load will eventually slow it down.
FY2024 accounts
Signal Radar
Decisive findings
The hard-hit facts that drove the score. Full breakdown — chapters, between-the-lines, all specialist findings — sits on AI Insights.
Customers & Products replacement cost profit (loss) before interest and tax was -$1,560m in 2024, compared to +$4,230m in 2023 — a swing of $5,790m. The segment also recorded inventory holding losses of -$479m, giving a total profit/(loss) before interest and tax of -$2,039m.
Why it matters: A segment that made over $4bn profit last year is now losing money, which drags down the whole group and signals serious problems in the refining and retail business that investors and lenders need to understand.
p.168, p.169
Group replacement cost profit before interest and tax fell from $28,584m in 2023 to $11,785m in 2024 — a fall of $16,799m or 59%. After inventory holding losses of -$488m, profit before interest and tax was $11,297m versus $27,348m in 2023.
Why it matters: The group's underlying profitability has dropped by more than half in a single year, which is a very large change that may affect dividend capacity, debt ratings, and investor confidence.
p.168, p.169
Underlying RC profit dropped from $13.8bn in 2023 to $8.9bn in 2024 — a fall of roughly 35%.
Why it matters: This is the key profit measure BP management uses; a drop of this size signals that the business is earning much less from its operations than a year ago, mainly due to lower refining margins and weaker trading results.
p.15
09 · Verification
What we read
Who we cross-checked
Screening status
Steps we ran
Each step in detail
Limits and caveats
No PSCs are recorded against this entity — typical for listed PLCs (widely held by institutional investors) and for dormant / micro-entity filings.
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