Greggs Plc: a £2.2bn business, growing.
food-on-the-go bakery retail chain · uk · low complexity
Deep-Dive · Company Intelligence
Report overview
Greggs sold more sausage rolls than ever in FY2025, yet profit after tax dropped £31m — a gap that runs through the whole filing.
The story
The year, beat by beat — each one a signal from the filing, source cited. Open “the full working” on any beat for the analyst detail.
More sales did not translate into more money kept — the gap between the two widened sharply in FY2025.
Profit after tax
Turnover grew 7% but profit after tax fell 20%. That divergence — revenue and profit moving in opposite directions — is the central arithmetic of this filing. Gross margin held reasonably steady, so the pressure landed below the gross profit line: in operating costs.
Source · P&L FY2024–FY2025
Fixed assets jumped £211m in a single year — the company is spending at a pace that dwarfs its annual profit.
Fixed assets rose 20% to £1.29bn in FY2025. That single-year increase of £211m is larger than the entire profit after tax of £122.2m. The long-term liability stack grew 16% to £511.1m in the same period, suggesting the expansion is at least partly debt-funded.
Source · Balance Sheet FY2025
Cash fell by nearly half in one year, even as current liabilities climbed.
Cash dropped from £125.3m to £70.8m — a 43% fall — while current liabilities rose 12% to £347.7m. That leaves cash covering roughly 20p in every pound of short-term obligations, compared to roughly 40p the year before. The runway has shortened.
Source · Balance Sheet FY2024–FY2025
No person of significant control is registered — ownership is fragmented or held below the disclosure threshold.
Source · PSC register, Companies House
Accounts filed on time, compliance score at maximum — no gaps in the record.
Source · Companies House filing history; Verif-AI TrustScore
The questions you'd ask a credit analyst over coffee — answered from this company's filings, with the source for every figure.
Cash stands at £70.8m against current liabilities of £347.7m — a ratio of roughly 0.20x, down from 0.40x the prior year.
Current assets overall are £195.9m versus current liabilities of £347.7m, so the current ratio is below 1x. The business generates substantial operating profit (£183.7m) which supports ongoing obligations, but the immediate liquid buffer has thinned considerably in FY2025.
Source · Balance Sheet FY2025
Greggs is genuinely profitable but margins are compressing.
Turnover reached £2.15bn in FY2025 (+7%), gross profit was £1.32bn, but operating profit fell 12% to £183.7m and profit after tax fell 20% to £122.2m. Operating margin implied by the filing is around 8.5%, down from roughly 10.4% in FY2024. The business makes money; it is keeping less of each pound than it did the year before.
Source · P&L FY2024–FY2025
The Companies House PSC register records no person of significant control for Greggs plc.
The filing does not disclose the identity of any shareholder holding 25% or more of shares or voting rights.
The filing history is clean.
The most recent accounts were filed on 19 May 2026. The Verif-AI Compliance dimension scores 100/100. The company has operated under its current name since December 1983 — one name change in over 70 years of trading. No late or amended filings are flagged in the brief.
Source · Companies House filing history; Verif-AI TrustScore
No going-concern wording, negative equity, or unusual equity movements are flagged in the brief.
The standout structural point is the combination of a 20% surge in fixed assets to £1.29bn, a 16% rise in long-term liabilities to £511.1m, and a 43% fall in cash to £70.8m — all in one year. Taken as a set, these signal aggressive capital deployment rather than distress, but the balance sheet is tighter than it was.
Source · Balance Sheet FY2025; Verif-AI TrustScore
We surface gaps plainly rather than guess. Use the chapters and tabs below to dig into what is on record.
No agent gaps were flagged, but the like-for-like sales figure lacks a prior-year comparator in the findings, making it hard to judge whether 2.4% is a sudden slowdown or a gradual trend.
The Companies House PSC register records no person of significant control for Greggs plc. The filing does not disclose the identity of any shareholder holding 25% or more of shares or voting rights.
Origin
Greggs is the UK's largest bakery and food-to-go chain, selling sausage rolls, sandwiches, baked goods and drinks from thousands of shops across Britain. It operates almost entirely through its own retail stores, with a growing delivery offer alongside.
Where the money comes from
Revenue £2.2bn (FY2025), up 7% YoY No segmental split disclosed in the filed accounts — this is the total trading revenue line.
At a glance
Timeline
Joined the board
Tamara Jane Rogers was first appointed as a director on 1 June 2024.
Big year-on-year change
Operating profit grew 25% — from £154.4m to £192.3m.
Joined the board
Nigel Gordon Mills was first appointed as a director on 7 March 2023.
Big year-on-year change
Operating profit more than doubled — from -£7.0m to £154.4m in a single year (+2306%).
Joined the board
Matthew Samuel Davies was first appointed as a director on 2 August 2022.
Leadership change
Roisin Currie succeeded Roger Whiteside as Chief Executive in May 2022, taking charge as the company continued expanding beyond 2,000 locations and into new formats including Primark concessions and drive-throughs.
Joined the board
Lynne Marie Weedall was first appointed as a director on 17 May 2022.
Crisis
Greggs closed all stores in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, furloughing most of its 22,000 employees, and later announced 820 job cuts as pandemic trading conditions severely impacted revenues.
Big year-on-year change
Operating profit grew 39% — from £82.6m to £114.8m.
Where our data starts
Earliest analysed accounts: FY2018. 35 years of earlier trading history are not in scope — this report pulls the most recent filed accounts from Companies House.
Expansion
Greggs opened its first drive-through outlet at Irlam Gateway Service Station in Salford, marking a strategic entry into the convenience and drive-through market beyond the traditional high street.
Crisis
Colin Gregg, son of the founder and former company figure, was convicted on nine counts of indecent assault against children and sentenced to imprisonment until at least 2030, causing significant reputational damage.
Expansion
Greggs formally abandoned its traditional bakery market positioning, focusing entirely on 'food on the go' after identifying that 80% of its revenue came from that segment, discontinuing bread and scones in many stores.
Leadership change
Greggs replaced CEO Ken McMeikan with Punch Taverns chief Roger Whiteside, coinciding with a strategic pivot away from traditional bakery products toward a 'food on the go' model to counter supermarket competition.
Notable event
Greggs rebranded all 165 Bakers Oven shops under the Greggs name to consolidate its brand identity and benefit from a unified national advertising campaign.
Secured borrowing
Debenture fully satisfied on 18 August 2001 (Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation Limited).
Secured borrowing
Charge fully satisfied on 28 June 1996 (The Council of the City of Manchester).
Acquisition
Greggs acquired the Bakers Oven chain of shops from Allied Bakeries, significantly expanding its retail footprint and adding a major competitor's estate to its own network.
Name changed
Previously incorporated as Greggs Bakeries Limited.
Acquisition
Greggs embarked on major geographic expansion through the 1970s, acquiring bakeries including Rutherglen in Glasgow (1972), Thurston's in Leeds (1974), and several others across London, Kent, East Anglia, and Manchester by 1976.
Go deeper
02 · Financials
Scene 01 · Revenue
From £1.03bn in FY2018 to £2.15bn in FY2025 — a 109% increase. The most dramatic acceleration came in FY2022, when turnover surged 86% in a single year.
FY2018 – FY2025 · Companies House · hover any point for the full year
Scene 02 · Metrics
All figures in GBP (£) · as filed, not converted
Financial health
Computed from · cash · net assets · current ratio · debt to equity · total liabilities
Scene 03 · Trends
Eight years of revenue, profit and operating performance side-by-side. Hover any dot for the full year cross-section.
Revenue, profitability and operating growth over time
Scene 05 · Full detail
All metrics across FY2018–FY2025, now fully contextualised by the story above.
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turnover | £1.03bn | £1.17bn | £811.3m | £1.51bn | £1.81bn | £2.01bn | £2.15bn | ▲ 7% |
| Cost of sales | -£379.3m | -£418.1m | -£300.4m | -£574.5m | -£710.5m | -£770.8m | -£829.1m | ▼ 8% |
| Gross profit | £650.0m | £749.8m | £510.9m | £938.3m | £1.10bn | £1.24bn | £1.32bn | ▲ 6% |
| Other operating income | — | — | — | £0 | £20.6m | £13.8m | £0 | ▼ 100% |
| Administrative expenses | -£54.6m | -£62.2m | -£52.1m | -£70.7m | -£82.9m | -£97.9m | -£102.1m | ▼ 4% |
| Other operating costs derived | -£512.8m | -£572.8m | -£465.8m | -£713.2m | -£844.5m | -£950.1m | -£1.04bn | — |
| Operating profit | £82.6m | £114.8m | -£7.0m | £154.4m | £192.3m | £209.4m | £183.7m | ▼ 12% |
| Finance income | £0 | £500k | £400k | £0 | — | £8.1m | £1.8m | ▼ 78% |
| Finance costs | £0 | -£6.5m | -£6.7m | -£6.1m | -£4.0m | -£13.6m | -£18.1m | ▼ 33% |
| Profit before tax | £82.6m | £108.3m | -£13.7m | £148.3m | £188.3m | £203.9m | £167.4m | ▼ 18% |
| Tax | -£16.9m | -£21.3m | -£700k | -£28.0m | -£45.8m | -£50.5m | -£45.2m | ▲ 10% |
| Profit after tax | £65.7m | £87.0m | -£13.0m | £120.3m | £142.5m | £153.4m | £122.2m | ▼ 20% |
| EBITDA (memo) | £135.5m* | £170.9m* | £53.8m* | £269.8m* | £317.3m* | — | — | — |
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intangible assets | £26.7m | £30.4m | £15.6m | £14.9m | £18.3m | £24.9m | £43.0m | ▲ 73% |
| Tangible assets | £330.4m | £353.7m | £345.3m | £343.8m | £510.3m | £664.7m | £832.1m | ▲ 25% |
| Investments | £5.0m | £5.0m | £5.0m | £5.0m | £5.0m | — | — | — |
| Total fixed assets | £467.3m | £646.5m | £511.4m | £622.3m | £831.8m | £1.08bn | £1.29bn | ▲ 20% |
| Stocks | £20.8m | £23.9m | £22.5m | £27.9m | £48.8m | — | — | — |
| Debtors | £31.6m | £27.1m | £33.4m | £31.9m | £53.8m | £62.4m | £69.4m | ▲ 11% |
| Cash at bank | £88.2m | £91.3m | £36.8m | £198.6m | £195.3m | £125.3m | £70.8m | ▼ 43% |
| Total current assets | £130.5m | £142.3m | £202.4m | £266.1m | £297.9m | £242.9m | £195.9m | ▼ 19% |
| Trade creditors | -£55.8m | -£66.7m | -£48.8m | -£74.1m | -£211.1m | — | — | — |
| Bank loans (current) | -£4 | -£4 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total current liabilities | £159.0m | £208.7m | £91.1m | £206.9m | £272.5m | £310.2m | £347.7m | ▲ 12% |
| Net current assets | £4.5m | -£66.4m | -£45.4m | £59.2m | £25.4m | -£67.3m | -£151.8m | ▼ 126% |
| Total assets less current liabilities | £647.1m | £990.5m | — | — | — | £1.01bn | £1.14bn | ▲ 13% |
| Bank loans (non-current) | — | — | — | — | — | £0 | -£25.0m | swung − |
| Long-term liabilities | £159.0m | £233.3m | £291.7m | £252.3m | £326.3m | £439.0m | £511.1m | ▲ 16% |
| Provisions | £8.7m | £5.8m | £7.4m | £7.0m | £4.0m | £6.3m | £13.7m | ▲ 117% |
| Net assets | £329.1m | £346.8m | £321.6m | £429.2m | £530.9m | £570.5m | £625.2m | ▲ 10% |
| Total equity | £329.1m | £346.8m | £321.6m | £429.2m | £530.9m | £570.5m | £625.2m | ▲ 10% |
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net cash from operating activities | £136.1m | £219.1m | £43.6m | £251.5m | £310.8m | — | — | — |
| Net cash used in investing activities | -£64.7m | -£87.4m | — | -£99.4m | -£191.2m | — | — | — |
| Net cash used in financing activities | -£37.7m | -£128.6m | — | -£159.1m | -£115.9m | — | — | — |
| Net increase / (decrease) in cash | £33.7m | £3.1m | — | -£7.0m | £3.7m | — | — | — |
| Cash at end of year | £88.2m | £91.3m | £36.8m | £191.6m | £195.3m | £125.3m | £70.8m | ▼ 43% |
Scene 04 · Waterfall
How each cost layer eats into the top-line on the way down to profit after tax. Cascade chart coming in the next release — for now the table below shows the same flow.
FY2025 audited accounts · cascade view
03 · Risk
Working capital + cash
Four numbers that tell you how stretched the balance sheet is today. The line under each is in plain English — what the number means for the business, not what to do about it.
Screening status
Compliance signals
Screening returned a partial name overlap: 'ELSARKY, Mohamed' against 'Mohamed' on the Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 list (85% name similarity). No identifier corroboration — an unconfirmed overlap, not a confirmed hit.
Screening returned a partial name overlap: 'ELSARKY, Mohamed' against 'Mohamed' on the Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 list (85% name similarity). No identifier corroboration — an unconfirmed overlap, not a confirmed hit.
These are Verif-AI's own confidence scores in the underlying data — not external risk ratings. Each dimension reflects how complete and self-consistent the filed numbers were on extraction.
04 · Market
Industry classification
Manufacturing
Companies House records the SIC2007 classification for this entity under 2 codes: 10710, 47240.
Sector context · thin
This filing doesn't carry segment reporting, concentration analysis, or a stated-priorities block — typical for small / micro-entity filings where the disclosure threshold is lower. The SIC classification above is the load-bearing market signal.
05 · People
Every named director was cross-checked against the full UK Companies House appointments dataset (27.8 million records). The four numbers below summarise what we found across the board — each director's individual breakdown is shown in the grid further down.
Each director, individually
| Role | Director | Career boards | Concurrent | Prior-failure rate | Joined | Other UK boards |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Director |
Nigel Gordon Mills
British · England
|
12 | 4 | 0.0% | 1 June 1992 | |
|
Nigel Gordon Mills 6 other UK boards they sit onClick + Deep Dive to add a company to your basket. Bundle pricing: 1 = £9.99 · 2 = £15.99 · 3 = £20.99 · then +£4 each. Rbos (Uk) Limited No. 02026375 Persimmon Public Limited Company No. 01818486 THE Queen's Club Limited No. 00023072 QC Ground Limited No. 05724660 QC Holdings Limited No. 05647878 John Wood Group PLC No. SC036219 |
||||||
| Director |
Richard John Hutton
British · United Kingdom
|
16 1 failed | 12 busy | 6.2% | 31 January 2005 | |
|
Richard John Hutton 15 other UK boards they sit onClick + Deep Dive to add a company to your basket. Bundle pricing: 1 = £9.99 · 2 = £15.99 · 3 = £20.99 · then +£4 each. Northern Recruitment Group Limited No. 01756216 Olivers (U.k.) Limited No. SC060973 Olivers (U.k.) Development Limited No. SC062558 Greggs Properties Limited No. 00205042 Charles Bragg (Bakers) Limited No. 00372923 Greggs (Leasing) Limited No. 00382128 J.r.birkett & Sons,limited No. 00340016 Birketts Holdings Limited No. 03246455 Thurston Parfitt Limited No. 00897334 THE Alnwick Garden Trust No. 04584694 Business In The Community No. 01619253 Castle View Enterprise Academy No. 06268570 Castle View Community And Fitness Centre Limited No. 06873681 THE Lakes Distillery Company Limited No. 07769363 THE Greggs Foundation Trustee No. 13675794 |
||||||
| Director |
Lynne Marie Weedall
British · United Kingdom
|
9 | 4 | 0.0% | 11 October 2012 | |
|
Lynne Marie Weedall 8 other UK boards they sit onClick + Deep Dive to add a company to your basket. Bundle pricing: 1 = £9.99 · 2 = £15.99 · 3 = £20.99 · then +£4 each. Greene King Limited No. 00024511 Shel Holdings Europe Limited No. 07826605 Treatt PLC No. 01568937 William Hill Limited No. 04212563 Stagecoach Group Limited No. SC100764 DR. Martens PLC No. 12960219 Lovecrafts Group Limited No. 07193527 Softcat PLC No. 02174990 |
||||||
| Director · active |
Mohamed Elsarky
British, Australian · United States
|
1 | — | — | 21 June 2021 | — |
| Director |
Roisin Helen Currie
British · England
|
3 | 3 | 0.0% | 2 November 2021 | |
|
Roisin Helen Currie 2 other UK boards they sit onClick + Deep Dive to add a company to your basket. Bundle pricing: 1 = £9.99 · 2 = £15.99 · 3 = £20.99 · then +£4 each. THE Greggs Foundation Trustee No. 13675794 Howden Joinery Group PLC No. 02128710 |
||||||
| Director · active |
Matthew Davies
British · England
|
1 | — | — | 2 August 2022 | — |
| Director · active |
Richard Smothers
British · England
|
2 | 2 | — | 3 January 2023 | |
|
Richard Smothers 1 other UK board they sit onClick + Deep Dive to add a company to your basket. Bundle pricing: 1 = £9.99 · 2 = £15.99 · 3 = £20.99 · then +£4 each. RM PLC No. 01749877 |
||||||
| Director · active |
Tamara Rogers
British · England
|
1 | 2 | — | 1 June 2024 | — |
| Director · active |
Ikdeep Singh
American, Canadian · England
|
1 | — | — | 1 July 2026 | — |
Co-director network
People who share at least one other UK directorship with someone on this board. Sorted by overlap count. Click any shared boards chip to reveal the companies they overlap on.
Corporate hierarchy
Subsidiaries pulled from Companies House cross-references — entities Greggs PLC directly controls.
Group · collective view
A comparison of 4 separately-filed entities — not a statutory consolidation. Each company files its own accounts at Companies House; figures are summed where comparable, and flagged where not.
Across the 4 companies grouped under GREGGS PLC, 1 filed financial figures, with combined net assets of £625.2m (summed, not consolidated) — of which about 100% sits with GREGGS PLC. 1 are trading and 2 are dormant or non-trading on the latest filings. Secured charges are recorded against 1 of the 4 companies. On record: GREGGS (LEASING) LIMITED (dormant) and GREGGS PROPERTIES LIMITED (dormant).
| Entity | Scale | Net assets | Employees | Turnover | Trend | Charges | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Greggs PLC | Full | £625.2m | — | £2.2bn | · | — | Active |
| Greggs (Leasing) Limited Dormant — no trading activity filed | Dormant | — | — | — | · | — | Active |
| Greggs Properties Limited Dormant — no trading activity filed | Dormant | — | — | — | · | 8 | Active |
| Greggs Trustees Limited | Unknown | — | — | — | · | — | Dissolved |
Group · structure map
Each circle is one company in the group, sized by net assets and coloured by financial health. Lines show the evidenced connections between them — ownership, shared directors, or a shared charge. Arranged top-to-bottom by ownership. A comparison of separately-filed entities, not a statutory consolidation.
Group · inter-company exposure
These are the evidenced links between the separately-filed entities — the connections a consolidated set of accounts would net out. Each link shows the register it was drawn from, so it can be checked rather than taken on trust.
3 control links
About 100% of the group's positive net assets sit with GREGGS PLC (summed, not consolidated).
Greggs PLC
Corporate group
GREGGS PLC is connected to 3 subsidiaries and 1 related entity across the wider group. Each link shows its evidence, so the grouping can be checked rather than taken on trust.
Historical board
Every officer who has left the company, newest-resignation first. Helps spot waves of churn that wouldn't show on the active-director cards alone.
06 · AI Investigation
AI forensic pass across 100 Companies House filings. 29 page-cited signals from three specialist agents, 2 cross-signal correlations, and 4 verification questions for management — every claim traces back to a filing reference.
AI Analyst commentary
Narrator-written context blocks — what an analyst would read in 90 seconds and walk away with the picture.
Net assets grew to £625m and fixed assets hit £1.29bn as Greggs poured money into new shops — but cash fell to £71m and long-term liabilities climbed to £511m. The balance sheet is getting bigger and stronger in the long run, but the near-term cash position is thinner than it was two years ago.
15 directors currently registered at Companies House — a large board typical of a listed plc with executive and non-executive representation. CEO Roisin Currie holds a cross-directorship with Howden Joinery Group Plc — no conflict of interest concerns are apparent from the filing data.
Greggs plc is a listed public company — no single controlling shareholder; institutional ownership is typical for a FTSE-listed business of this size. No PSC on record, consistent with widely-held public company status where no individual owns 25% or more of shares.
Case files · Chapter dossier
The investigation as one running thread — each beat resolves a signal cluster, page-cited. Open “the full working” on any beat for the forensic detail.
More sales did not translate into more money kept — the gap between the two widened sharply in FY2025.
Profit after tax
Turnover grew 7% but profit after tax fell 20%. That divergence — revenue and profit moving in opposite directions — is the central arithmetic of this filing. Gross margin held reasonably steady, so the pressure landed below the gross profit line: in operating costs.
Source · P&L FY2024–FY2025
Fixed assets jumped £211m in a single year — the company is spending at a pace that dwarfs its annual profit.
Fixed assets rose 20% to £1.29bn in FY2025. That single-year increase of £211m is larger than the entire profit after tax of £122.2m. The long-term liability stack grew 16% to £511.1m in the same period, suggesting the expansion is at least partly debt-funded.
Source · Balance Sheet FY2025
Cash fell by nearly half in one year, even as current liabilities climbed.
Cash dropped from £125.3m to £70.8m — a 43% fall — while current liabilities rose 12% to £347.7m. That leaves cash covering roughly 20p in every pound of short-term obligations, compared to roughly 40p the year before. The runway has shortened.
Source · Balance Sheet FY2024–FY2025
No person of significant control is registered — ownership is fragmented or held below the disclosure threshold.
Source · PSC register, Companies House
Accounts filed on time, compliance score at maximum — no gaps in the record.
Source · Companies House filing history; Verif-AI TrustScore
Cross-signal intelligence
Pairs of facts from different chapters that — taken together — tell a story neither half does alone. This is where investigation outperforms summary.
The £211m rise in fixed assets in [chapter 2] is the most likely driver of the 43% cash fall visible in [chapter 3] — capital expenditure of that scale will consume operating cash even when trading is healthy.
Long-term liabilities growing 16% to £511.1m in [chapter 2] compounds the short-term pressure in [chapter 3], where current liabilities already outstrip cash by nearly five to one.
Deep signals
Specifics most readers would miss — surfaced by the AI for the analyst who wants to know.
Consistent with a lease-heavy retail model where property commitments are the dominant financial obligation. The reported debt on the balance sheet understates the true total cost of occupancy — the lease stack is what would be hardest to unwind in any stress scenario.
In a healthy, going-concern retailer this is not a concern. It is worth noting for any counterparty assessing what tangible security Greggs' balance sheet provides — the hard recoverable asset base is proportionally smaller than the gross fixed asset figure suggests.
Greggs is a listed plc that publishes full IFRS accounts with a cash flow statement. The absence of that detail in this extract means the relationship between reported profit and actual cash generated from operations cannot be assessed here. Readers requiring cash flow detail should refer to the full annual report.
Forensic investigation · 29 signals
Segmental revenue · capital structure · strategic KPIs. Each agent cites the exact filing page for every claim, with an AI confidence score derived from cross-citation strength.
Segmental Analysis
Retail company-managed shops generated £1,897.2m in 2025 vs £1,781.7m in 2024. Business-to-business generated £254.0m in 2025 vs £232.7m in 2024. Total group revenue: £2,151.2m in 2025 vs £2,014.4m in 2024.
p.5 · 6 more from this specialist
Strategic KPIs
Total sales grew from £2,014m in 2024 to £2,151m in 2025, a 6.8% rise.
p.2, p.11 · 12 more from this specialist
Capital Structure & Borrowings
As at 27 December 2025, total borrowings were £25.0m, all non-current, drawn on a revolving credit facility. In 2024 there were no borrowings.
p.162 · 8 more from this specialist
Retail company-managed shops generated £1,897.2m in 2025 vs £1,781.7m in 2024. Business-to-business generated £254.0m in 2025 vs £232.7m in 2024. Total group revenue: £2,151.2m in 2025 vs £2,014.4m in 2024.
Why it matters: Almost nine in every ten pounds of revenue comes from company-run shops, so anything that affects shop performance — like footfall or costs — has a very big impact on the whole group.
p.5 critical conf 98%
Retail company-managed shops contributed trading profit of £251.4m in 2025 vs £277.3m in 2024. Business-to-business contributed £66.5m in 2025 vs £55.5m in 2024. Combined trading profit: £317.9m in 2025 vs £332.8m in 2024.
Why it matters: The retail shops segment accounts for about 79% of total trading profit, meaning the group is heavily reliant on one channel; a problem in that channel would hit overall profits hard.
p.5 critical conf 97%
Retail company-managed shops trading profit dropped from £277.3m in 2024 to £251.4m in 2025, a fall of £25.9m or approximately 9.3%.
Why it matters: The main engine of the business is making less money than last year, which is a warning sign even though total revenue grew, suggesting costs are rising faster than sales in shops.
p.5 critical conf 97%
Profit before tax was £167.4m in 2025 compared with £203.9m in 2024, a drop of £36.5m or 17.9%. Exceptional items of £4.5m were charged in 2025 vs £14.1m benefit in 2024.
Why it matters: Despite higher revenues, the group is making significantly less profit before tax this year, showing that cost pressures and exceptional charges are eating into earnings.
p.5 critical conf 97%
B2B revenue grew from £232.7m to £254.0m (+9.1%) and trading profit rose from £55.5m to £66.5m (+19.8%) between 2024 and 2025.
Why it matters: The franchise and wholesale side of the business is growing faster and becoming more profitable, which could be an important future growth engine if the retail channel continues to face pressure.
p.5 important conf 97%
The segmental note states explicitly that all results arise in the UK in both 2025 and 2024. There is no geographic split reported.
Why it matters: The group has no revenues outside the UK, so any UK-specific economic downturn, regulation change or cost pressure affects the entire business with no offset from overseas income.
p.5 important conf 99%
Overheads including profit share were £146.8m in 2025 vs £150.4m in 2024. Lease interest add-back was £16.4m in 2025 vs £12.9m in 2024, suggesting significant lease obligations.
Why it matters: Central overhead costs consume roughly 46% of total trading profit, leaving limited headroom if trading conditions worsen.
p.5 useful conf 93%
Total sales grew from £2,014m in 2024 to £2,151m in 2025, a 6.8% rise.
Why it matters: Greggs is still growing fast and hitting record revenue, which means it has money coming in to pay suppliers and invest in the business.
p.2, p.11 important conf 98%
Like-for-like (LFL) sales grew 2.4% in 2025, down from a stronger recent track record implied by the 2024 base.
Why it matters: LFL growth of only 2.4% means existing shops are barely growing once you strip out new openings — this is the weakest signal in the results and suggests customers are spending less per visit or visiting less often.
p.2, p.11 important conf 95%
Profit before tax (excluding exceptional items) dropped from £189.8m in 2024 to £171.9m in 2025.
Why it matters: Profit is going in the wrong direction even as sales grow, which means costs are rising faster than income — a warning sign for anyone supplying or partnering with the company.
p.2, p.11 important conf 98%
Diluted earnings per share dropped from 137.5p in 2024 to 122.8p in 2025, a fall of around 10.7%.
Why it matters: Each share is earning less profit than last year, which tells investors and shareholders that the business is less profitable per pound invested.
p.2, p.11 important conf 97%
Capital expenditure was £287.5m in 2025, well above operating cash generation.
Why it matters: Greggs is spending more than it earns in cash on building new capacity (shops, factories, distribution), which is a sign of confidence in future growth but also means it is using up its financial reserves.
p.12 important conf 93%
App-accompanied transactions rose from 20.1% in 2024 to 26.7% in 2025 across company-managed shops.
Why it matters: More than 1 in 4 purchases now involve the Greggs App, which gives the company valuable data on what customers buy and lets it reward loyalty — a big competitive strength.
p.6 important conf 92%
Total ordinary dividend stayed at 69.0p in both 2024 and 2025.
Why it matters: Shareholders got no increase in their dividend payout, which reflects the pressure on profits and is unusual for a company still growing its sales.
p.2, p.5 useful conf 97%
The amount shared with staff fell from £20.5m in 2024 to £20.2m in 2025.
Why it matters: Staff share slightly less in profits this year, which tracks the lower profit result but shows Greggs still pays out a meaningful amount to its 33,000 people.
p.2, p.5 useful conf 95%
Net cash inflow from operating activities after lease payments was £273.7m in 2025.
Why it matters: Even with lower profit, Greggs is still generating a large amount of real cash, which means it can comfortably pay its bills, invest in new shops, and return money to shareholders.
p.12 useful conf 93%
ROCE was 16.0% in 2025, reflecting the large ongoing investment programme.
Why it matters: The business is still earning a decent return on what it invests, but the heavy spending on new sites means this number will likely stay under pressure for a couple more years.
p.12 useful conf 90%
Liquidity (cash plus undrawn facilities) was £145.8m at year end 2025.
Why it matters: Greggs has enough financial headroom to handle unexpected costs or a slow patch in trading, so short-term payment risk to suppliers is low.
p.12 useful conf 90%
Evening sales (post-5pm) grew to 9.4% of company-managed food sales in 2025, up from 9.0% in 2024.
Why it matters: Greggs is successfully getting customers to visit later in the day, which opens up a new income stream and reduces reliance on the traditional morning and lunchtime rush.
p.8 useful conf 90%
Delivery sales grew to 6.8% of company-managed shop sales in 2025, from 6.7% in 2024, across 1,632 shops offering delivery.
Why it matters: Home delivery is a growing but still small part of sales — it drives bigger basket sizes (about 3x a walk-in customer) so its continued growth is a positive for average transaction value.
p.6 useful conf 88%
As at 27 December 2025, total borrowings were £25.0m, all non-current, drawn on a revolving credit facility. In 2024 there were no borrowings.
Why it matters: The company has taken on its first meaningful debt, but the amount is small relative to its size, so there is no immediate concern about repayment ability.
p.162 important conf 97%
Cash and call deposits fell from £125.3m at end 2024 to £70.8m at end 2025, a drop of £54.5m. Call deposits (£66.3m in 2024) are now nil.
Why it matters: The company used a lot of its cash pile during the year, partly replaced by drawing on its credit facility, which is worth watching if spending continues at this rate.
p.162 important conf 95%
IFRS 16 lease liabilities stood at £449.8m (2024: £415.1m), split £62.5m current and £387.3m non-current. Gross undiscounted lease payments total £582.3m.
Why it matters: The biggest financial commitment this company has is its store and property leases, not bank debt, so understanding lease renewals matters more than bank borrowing.
p.154 important conf 98%
Cash of £70.8m minus drawn debt of £25.0m gives net cash of £45.8m. In 2024 the company held £125.3m in cash with no debt.
Why it matters: The company is in a net cash position, meaning it owes less than it holds, which is very safe for anyone trading with or supplying to it.
p.162 useful conf 97%
Operating profit was £183.7m and finance costs were £18.1m, giving interest cover of approximately 10.1 times.
Why it matters: The company earns about ten times more from its operations than it pays in interest, so there is very little risk of struggling to service its debt.
p.4 useful conf 92%
Of the £582.3m gross undiscounted lease payments, £179.2m falls due in more than five years (£65.0m in 10-20 years and £14.2m beyond 20 years). The largest single bucket is five to ten years at £171.0m.
Why it matters: Long lease commitments lock the company into properties for many years, which is normal for a food-to-go retailer but means fixed costs cannot easily be cut in a downturn.
p.154 useful conf 97%
Additions to right-of-use assets from new leases were £74.8m in 2025, compared to £143.8m in 2024. A further £20.3m came from lease modifications.
Why it matters: The company keeps signing new store leases as it expands, which adds to long-term obligations, though the pace of new lease additions slowed compared to the prior year.
p.154 useful conf 95%
The borrowings note describes the revolving credit facility but does not set out any loan limits, tests, or how much spare room exists under those tests.
Why it matters: Without knowing the loan limits, it is not possible to judge how close the company is to breaching them, though the low level of debt makes a breach seem unlikely.
p.162 useful conf 85%
Other provisions include £6.8m relating to a historic VAT error (£2.3m for the current year, £4.5m for prior years), expected to be settled in 2026.
Why it matters: This is a one-off cash outflow due in 2026, but it is small relative to the company's cash holdings and does not affect ongoing financing.
p.171 useful conf 95%
Specialist deep panels · Structured price capture
Below the prose findings, each agent publishes a structured numeric metrics block. Segmental revenue, named KPIs with YoY %, and capital-structure metrics — direct from the source filings.
Segmental analysis
Top-segment revenue concentration: 88.2% · Segment totals reconcile to the group P&L
Strategic KPIs
Capital structure
Management questions · Open inquiry
Generated by the AI from the disclosure gaps it detected. Hover or tap each card to surface the underlying evidence that triggered the question.
Verification gaps
High-trust analysis names its own blind spots. These are metrics the AI looked for and couldn't find — anything material to the summary needs management or independent verification.
No agent gaps were flagged, but the like-for-like sales figure lacks a prior-year comparator in the findings, making it hard to judge whether 2.4% is a sudden slowdown or a gradual trend.
08 · Documents
Filing pattern + upcoming windows
Due at Companies House by 30 June 2027 for the period ending 31 December 2026.
Annual confirmation due by 28 April 2027 (made up to 14 April 2027).
Final chapter — What we found
Strong filing
A textbook lease-heavy retailer in full expansion mode — the shops are multiplying faster than the profits, but the business has the balance sheet to see it through.
FY2025 audited accounts
The five plain-English briefing questions are on Origin — read the story first, then return here for the TrustScore scorecard.
Signal Radar
Decisive findings
The hard-hit facts that drove the score. Full breakdown — chapters, between-the-lines, all specialist findings — sits on AI Insights.
Retail company-managed shops generated £1,897.2m in 2025 vs £1,781.7m in 2024. Business-to-business generated £254.0m in 2025 vs £232.7m in 2024. Total group revenue: £2,151.2m in 2025 vs £2,014.4m in 2024.
Why it matters: Almost nine in every ten pounds of revenue comes from company-run shops, so anything that affects shop performance — like footfall or costs — has a very big impact on the whole group.
p.5 · Segmental Analysis
Retail company-managed shops contributed trading profit of £251.4m in 2025 vs £277.3m in 2024. Business-to-business contributed £66.5m in 2025 vs £55.5m in 2024. Combined trading profit: £317.9m in 2025 vs £332.8m in 2024.
Why it matters: The retail shops segment accounts for about 79% of total trading profit, meaning the group is heavily reliant on one channel; a problem in that channel would hit overall profits hard.
p.5 · Segmental Analysis
Retail company-managed shops trading profit dropped from £277.3m in 2024 to £251.4m in 2025, a fall of £25.9m or approximately 9.3%.
Why it matters: The main engine of the business is making less money than last year, which is a warning sign even though total revenue grew, suggesting costs are rising faster than sales in shops.
p.5 · Segmental Analysis
10 · Verification
This report reads the full filing package — digital iXBRL where available, the filed PDF (including notes), and the Companies House register — not a single uploaded document.
Figures are as filed by the company — Companies House does not verify the accuracy of information filed. Verif-AI checks internal consistency and flags anomalies, but cannot confirm the underlying figures are correct.
Reconciliation
Every balance-sheet and profit & loss line traced to where we read it in the filing. iXBRL — read straight from the company's audited machine-readable tags, so it ties exactly. PDF — read from the filed accounts document, with the supporting note cited so you can check it. Flagged — our consistency check marked it for a closer look.
30 read from audited iXBRL tags · 0 from the filed PDF.
What we read
Who we cross-checked
Screening status
Screened 40 names (registered company + officers/PSCs) against live lists: FCDO Consolidated UK Sanctions List — 57698 entries, refreshed 20 July 2026 · OFAC SDN (US Treasury) + akaName aliases + relationship graph — 39472 entries, refreshed 20 July 2026 · EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions — 29944 entries, refreshed 20 July 2026 · UK Parliament — current Members of Commons & Lords — 1438 entries, refreshed 20 July 2026 · Companies House — Disqualified Directors register, checked 20 July 2026.
Steps we ran
Pipeline — what ran on this report
Limits and caveats
No sector-cohort comparison was generated for this filing — the benchmarking pipeline either skipped this SIC code or this report predates that block.
The company has an active statement on the Companies House PSC register — notified 14 April 2023 — declaring that no individual or entity holds significant control (25%+ of shares or votes, or equivalent control). Typical for listed PLCs held widely by institutional investors.
The filed accounts did not surface a structured principal-risks register, or one was not extracted by the parser. Small / micro-entity filings are not required to disclose this.