Unilever Plc: a £50.5bn business, steady — and getting more profitable as it grows.

Where's the money from?

Revenue £50.5bn (FY2025), down 4% YoY

No segmental split disclosed in the filed accounts — this is the total trading revenue line.

Is it growing?

£52bn → £50.5bn

Revenue broadly flat across 7 filed years.

Is it solid?

16.8% → 17.9%

Operating margin widened as it grew.

Who's behind it?

10 active directors

Full board and backgrounds in the People tab.

global FMCG / consumer goods conglomerate · global · high complexity

Deep-Dive · Company Intelligence

Inside Unilever PLC

Report overview

Turnover fell £2bn but Unilever still booked £10bn profit after tax — the gap demands explanation.

£3.94bn Cash at bank vs £6.14bn FY2024

£50.50bn Turnover vs £52.48bn FY2024

£8.69bn Pre-tax profit vs £8.83bn FY2024

£17.59bn Net assets vs £22.55bn FY2024

Unilever PLC turned over £50.5bn in FY2025, down 4% from £52.5bn the year before. Gross profit fell 3%. Yet profit after tax leapt from £6.4bn to £10bn — a 57% surge on a shrinking top line. At the same time, cash dropped 36% to £3.9bn, net assets fell 22% to £17.6bn, and investing cash outflows ballooned nearly fivefold to £2.4bn. This is a company in active transformation: selling assets, returning cash to shareholders at scale, and booking a large gain somewhere below the operating line.

Selective validation flags on FY2025 audited accounts — tap to open Verification and see which lines we cross-checked against the filed PDF.

Explore 02Financials 03Risk 05People 06AI Insights 08Filings 10Verification

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Company No.00041424

Statusactive

Latest accountsFY2025 audited accounts

Filed 26 April 2026 3 months ago

AuditorKPMG LLP

The story

What happened, in chapters

The year, beat by beat — each one a signal from the filing, source cited. Open “the full working” on any beat for the analyst detail.

The Profit That Defies the Revenue Drop

Turnover fell £2bn; profit after tax rose £3.6bn — those two things don't normally move together.

+57%

Profit after tax FY2024 £6.4bn FY2025 £10.0bn

The full working

Operating profit rose a modest 2% to £9bn, so the operating business alone doesn't explain the leap. The gap between operating profit (£9bn) and profit after tax (£10bn) points to a significant below-the-line gain — most likely a disposal or revaluation — not captured in the P&L trading lines.

Source · P&L FY2024–FY2025

Shrinking on Every Balance Sheet Line

Fixed assets, current assets, cash, and net assets all fell — this is a smaller business than twelve months ago.

-22%

Net assets FY2024 £22.6bn FY2025 £17.6bn

The full working

Fixed assets dropped £7.2bn (-12%) and current assets fell £2.1bn (-11%). Net assets contracted by £5bn in a single year. The scale of balance sheet reduction, alongside the investing cash outflows, is consistent with a major disposal programme rather than organic contraction.

Source · Balance Sheet FY2024–FY2025

Cash Haemorrhaged Out of the Door

Cash fell 36% even though operating cash flow held steady at £10.8bn — because financing outflows nearly hit £10bn.

£10.8bn Operating cash inflow FY2025

£9.9bn Financing cash outflow FY2025

The full working

Operating cash generation remained solid at £10.8bn. But financing cash outflows surged to £9.9bn — up 45% year on year — consistent with heavy share buybacks or debt repayment. Meanwhile, investing outflows jumped from £423m to £2.4bn, absorbing the remainder.

Source · Cash Flow Statement FY2024–FY2025

Who Actually Controls This Company?

No person of significant control is recorded — ownership is either fragmented below 25% or held via nominees.

Ultimate owners Fragmented institutional shareholders (<25% each)
Registered entity (this filing) Unilever PLC (Co. 00041424)
Operating subsidiaries (held below this entity)

Source · PSC register; Directors register, Companies House filing

A Busy Capital Restructure on Record

Three capital events in six months point to deliberate structural change, not routine administration.

7 Jun 2026 Resolutions filed
6 Mar 2026 Capital allotment filed (SH01)
28 Dec 2025 Share consolidation filed (SH02)
26 Apr 2026 Most recent accounts filed

Source · Filing Signals, Companies House; Accounts filed 2026-04-26

The brief

Five questions, answered

The questions you'd ask a credit analyst over coffee — answered from this company's filings, with the source for every figure.

Q1 Can they pay their bills next year?

Current liabilities stand at £21.7bn against current assets of £17.1bn — a current ratio below 1.

Cash on hand is £3.9bn, down 36% from £6.1bn. However, operating cash generation held at £10.8bn for FY2025, which comfortably covers near-term obligations. The liquidity position has tightened materially but operating cash flow remains the main backstop.

Source · Balance Sheet FY2025; Cash Flow Statement FY2025

Q2 Are they actually making money, or just turning it over?

Unilever is genuinely profitable at the trading level.

Gross profit was £23.7bn on £50.5bn turnover — a gross margin of roughly 47%. Operating profit reached £9bn. Profit after tax of £10bn exceeded operating profit, which suggests a significant non-trading gain boosted the bottom line beyond what the core business earned.

Source · P&L FY2025

Q3 Who owns and controls the business, really?

No person of significant control is recorded at Companies House.

For a company of this scale, that reflects fragmented institutional shareholding — no single investor holds 25% or more. Day-to-day control rests with a ten-person board including Fernando Fernandez (appointed January 2024) and Nelson Peltz (appointed July 2022), spanning Argentine, British, American, Chinese, Indian, French, and Australian nationalities.

Source · PSC register; Directors register, Companies House

Q4 Is the filing history clean, or are accounts late / amended?

Accounts were filed on 26 April 2026 — no late-filing indicator.

The filing history shows a share consolidation (SH02, December 2025), a capital allotment (SH01, March 2026), and resolutions (June 2026). No amended or replacement accounts are flagged. No name changes are recorded since incorporation in 1894. The compliance record looks orderly.

Source · Filing Signals, Companies House; Accounts filed 2026-04-26

Q5 Where are the red flags hiding in the notes?

The Verif-AI TrustScore sits at 52/100 — flagged as 'mixed signals' — driven primarily by a Financial score of just 35/100.

The structural tension is clear: net assets fell 22% to £17.6bn, cash dropped 36% to £3.9bn, and current liabilities exceed current assets. Long-term liabilities remain substantial at £31.2bn. No going-concern wording or secured charge detail is disclosed in the brief.

Source · Balance Sheet FY2025; Verif-AI TrustScore

Honest limits

What the filings can't tell you

We surface gaps plainly rather than guess. Use the chapters and tabs below to dig into what is on record.

Data quality note

No geographic revenue or profit breakdown is provided in the segment note, limiting the ability to assess regional risk exposure beyond the high-level underlying sales growth figures cited in the strategic KPIs.

Origin

Unilever PLC

Unilever PLC is a British multinational consumer goods company, founded in 1930, that owns and sells household brands across food, home care, and personal care categories in markets worldwide. It is listed on the NYSE and headquartered in London.

Where the money comes from

Revenue £50.5bn (FY2025), down 4% YoY No segmental split disclosed in the filed accounts — this is the total trading revenue line.

At a glance

Key data

Founded 1894 7 years on file

Turnover £50.50bn ▼ 3.8% YoY

Pre-tax profit £8.69bn ▼ 1.5% YoY

Auditor KPMG LLP Unqualified

Timeline

How we got here

2025 01 of 20

Big year-on-year change

Profit after tax surge

Profit after tax surged 57% — from £6.37bn to £10.01bn.

2024 02 of 20

Merger

Ice cream unit spin-off announced

Unilever announced plans to spin off its ice cream division, including Magnum and Ben & Jerry's, into a standalone business—part of a restructuring that also cut 7,500 jobs. The demerger completed in November 2025 as The Magnum Ice Cream Company.

2022 03 of 20

Big year-on-year change

Profit after tax jump

Profit after tax grew 25% — from £6.62bn to £8.27bn.

2022 04 of 20

Joined the board

Nelson Peltz joins the board

Nelson Peltz was first appointed as a director on 20 July 2022.

2021 05 of 20

Joined the board

Rong Lu joins the board

Rong Lu was first appointed as a director on 1 November 2021.

2021 06 of 20

Joined the board

Adrian Hennah joins the board

Adrian Hennah was first appointed as a director on 1 November 2021.

2020 07 of 20

Notable event

Dual structure unified under PLC

Unilever completed the merger of its Dutch N.V. arm into its UK PLC, creating a single holding company headquartered in London with one class of shares.

2019 08 of 20

Joined the board

Susan Saltzbart Kilsby joins the board

Susan Saltzbart Kilsby was first appointed as a director on 1 August 2019.

2019 09 of 20

Leadership change

Alan Jope succeeds Polman

Alan Jope took over as CEO from Paul Polman in January 2019, continuing the strategic pivot towards health, beauty and sustainability.

2019 10 of 20

Where our data starts

Financial deep-dive begins

Earliest analysed accounts: FY2019. 125 years of earlier trading history are not in scope — this report pulls the most recent filed accounts from Companies House.

2017 11 of 20

Merger

Spreads division sold to KKR

Unilever sold its margarine and spreads division, including Flora and I Can't Believe It's Not Butter!, to KKR for €6.8 billion, completing its retreat from slow-growth fats categories.

2017 12 of 20

Crisis

Kraft Heinz takeover bid rejected

Kraft Heinz made an unsolicited $143 billion takeover bid for Unilever, which was swiftly rejected, prompting Unilever to accelerate its strategic restructuring.

2011 13 of 20

Regulatory event

EU price-fixing cartel fine

The European Commission fined Unilever €104 million for participating in a price-fixing cartel for washing powder alongside Procter & Gamble and Henkel.

2009 14 of 20

Leadership change

Paul Polman becomes CEO

Paul Polman succeeded Patrick Cescau as CEO, ushering in a decade-long strategic shift toward health and beauty brands and away from slow-growth food categories.

2000 15 of 20

Acquisition

Bestfoods mega-acquisition

Unilever acquired Bestfoods for £13.4 billion, adding Knorr, Hellmann's, Marmite and Bovril to its portfolio and massively expanding its food business in America.

1997 16 of 20

Merger

Speciality chemicals sold to ICI

Unilever divested its speciality chemicals division, including National Starch & Chemical and Quest, to Imperial Chemical Industries for £4.9 billion, sharpening its focus on consumer goods.

1984 17 of 20

Acquisition

Brooke Bond hostile takeover

Unilever acquired Brooke Bond, maker of PG Tips tea, for £390 million in its first successful hostile takeover, significantly strengthening its position in the UK beverages market.

1933 18 of 20

Expansion

Indonesia operations established

Unilever established Lever Zeepfabrieken N.V. in Indonesia in December 1933, marking an early step in the company's expansion across Asia.

1930 19 of 20

Founding milestone

Unilever formed by merger

Lever Brothers of Britain and Dutch Margarine Unie merged to create Unilever, combining soap and margarine production into one of the world's largest consumer goods companies.

1894 20 of 20

Company founded

Incorporated

Unilever PLC was registered at Companies House on 21 June 1894.

Go deeper

Explore the evidence

Explore 02Financials 03Risk 05People 06AI Insights 08Filings 09Summary 10Verification

02 · Financials

The numbers, year by year

FY2025 audited accounts · Companies House (PDF accounts)

Scene 01 · Revenue

Turnover broadly flat

From £51.98bn in FY2019 to £50.50bn in FY2025 — a 3% decline.

Annual Turnover vs Cost of Sales

FY2019 – FY2025 · Companies House (PDF accounts) · hover any point for the full year

Turnover Cost of Sales Gross Profit (shaded gap)

Latest turnover · FY2025 £50.50bn -3.8% vs prior year

Cost of sales · FY2025 £26.79bn Gross margin 46.9% of turnover

Gross profit (implied) £23.71bn Turnover minus cost of sales

Across 6 years -3% £51.98bn → £50.50bn

’19 ’20 ’21 ’22 ’23 ’24 ’25

Partial cost-of-sales coverage. Turnover is shown for every year on file; cost of sales is only plotted where the filing tags it separately (FY2019–FY2025 here). Hover any point for the year breakdown — later years may still show turnover in the table below.

Scene 02 · Metrics

The headline numbers

All figures in GBP (£) · as filed, not converted

Cash at bank £3.94bn ▼ 35.8% vs £6.14bn FY2024 Shed more than a third — material decline on last year.

Turnover £50.50bn ▼ 3.8% vs £52.48bn FY2024 Broadly flat — small slip on last year.

Pre-tax profit £8.69bn ▼ 1.5% vs £8.83bn FY2024 Broadly flat — small slip on last year.

Net assets £17.59bn ▼ 22.0% vs £22.55bn FY2024 A meaningful slip — well below last year's reading.

Financial health

Weak · 5 signals

Cash burning fast Net assets declining Low current ratio High leverage Profitable

          + Why this rating
        

Cash burning fast — Cash dropped 35.8% year-on-year — significant cash outflow
Net assets declining — Net assets fell 22.0% — the company is losing value
Low current ratio — Current ratio of 0.52 — current liabilities exceed current assets (note: service sector — sub-1.0 current ratio is the norm)
High leverage — Debt-to-equity of 3.01 — the company is heavily indebted relative to its equity
Profitable — PBT of £8,693,000,000 on turnover of £50,503,000,000

Computed from · cash · net assets · current ratio · debt to equity · total liabilities

Scene 03 · Trends

How the numbers moved

Eight years of revenue, profit and operating performance side-by-side. Hover any dot for the full year cross-section.

Financial performance trends

Revenue, profitability and operating growth over time

Turnover Gross profit Operating profit

’19 ’20 ’21 ’22 ’23 ’24 ’25

Financial year

Scene 05 · Full detail

Complete P&L statement

All metrics across FY2019–FY2025, now fully contextualised by the story above.

Profit and loss

GBP

Metric	FY2019	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	Δ YoY
Turnover	£51.98bn	£50.72bn	£52.44bn	£60.07bn	£59.60bn	£52.48bn	£50.50bn	▼ 4%
Cost of sales	-£29.10bn	-£28.68bn	-£30.26bn	—	—	-£27.98bn	-£26.79bn	▲ 4%
Gross profit	£22.88bn	£22.04bn	£22.18bn	—	—	£24.50bn	£23.71bn	▼ 3%
Other operating income	—	—	—	—	—	£0	£7.00bn	swung +
Administrative expenses	-£12.93bn	-£12.67bn	—	—	—	-£14.30bn	-£13.62bn	▲ 5%
Other operating costs derived	-£1.24bn	—	-£13.48bn	—	—	-£1.37bn	-£8.05bn	—
Operating profit	£8.71bn	£8.30bn	£8.70bn	£10.76bn	£9.76bn	£8.83bn	£9.04bn	▲ 2%
Finance income	—	£232.0m	£147.0m	£281.0m	£442.0m	£391.0m	£398.0m	▲ 2%
Finance costs	—	-£728.0m	-£491.0m	-£818.0m	-£1.04bn	-£994.0m	-£1.02bn	▼ 3%
Profit before tax	£8.29bn	£8.00bn	£8.56bn	£10.34bn	£9.34bn	£8.83bn	£8.69bn	▼ 2%
Tax	-£2.26bn	-£1.92bn	-£1.94bn	-£2.07bn	-£2.20bn	-£2.33bn	-£2.48bn	▼ 6%
Profit after tax	£6.03bn	£6.07bn	£6.62bn	£8.27bn	£7.14bn	£6.37bn	£10.01bn	▲ 57%
EBITDA (memo)	£10.69bn*	£10.32bn*	£10.46bn*	—	—	£10.06bn	£10.35bn	▲ 3%

Some lines are not tagged in the filed accounts. Cost of sales and gross profit are missing for FY2022, FY2023 — the filer published turnover and operating profit without those subtotals (common on group accounts). Cells marked * are calculated from other lines on the same year (e.g. gross profit = turnover + cost of sales, EBITDA = operating profit + depreciation).

Balance sheet

GBP

Metric	FY2019	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	Δ YoY
Intangible assets	£12.96bn	£16.00bn	£43.47bn	£18.88bn	£18.36bn	£46.77bn	£34.76bn	▼ 26%
Tangible assets	£12.06bn	£10.56bn	£10.35bn	£10.77bn	£10.71bn	£11.67bn	£8.99bn	▼ 23%
Investments	£72.0m	£63.0m	£974.0m	£1.15bn	£1.39bn	£88.03bn	£94.78bn	▲ 8%
Total fixed assets	£48.38bn	£51.50bn	£57.69bn	£58.66bn	£57.36bn	£60.56bn	£53.41bn	▼ 12%
Stocks	£4.16bn	£4.46bn	£4.68bn	—	—	£5.18bn	£4.04bn	▼ 22%
Debtors	£6.70bn	£4.94bn	£5.42bn	—	—	£6.01bn	£7.35bn	▲ 22%
Cash at bank	£4.18bn	£5.55bn	£3.42bn	£4.33bn	£4.16bn	£6.14bn	£3.94bn	▼ 36%
Total current assets	£16.43bn	£16.16bn	£17.40bn	£19.16bn	£17.90bn	£19.19bn	£17.07bn	▼ 11%
Trade creditors	-£9.19bn	-£8.38bn	-£14.86bn	-£18.02bn	-£16.86bn	-£16.69bn	-£16.94bn	▼ 1%
Bank loans (current)	-£390.0m	-£407.0m	-£383.0m	—	—	-£517.0m	-£229.0m	▲ 56%
Total current liabilities	£20.98bn	£20.59bn	£24.78bn	£25.43bn	£23.51bn	£25.23bn	£21.66bn	▼ 14%
Net current assets	-£4.55bn	-£4.43bn	-£7.38bn	-£6.27bn	-£5.61bn	-£6.04bn	-£4.60bn	▲ 24%
Total assets less current liabilities	£43.83bn	£47.07bn	£50.32bn	—	—	£54.52bn	£48.81bn	▼ 10%
Bank loans (non-current)	-£463.0m	-£4.0m	-£27.62bn	—	—	-£4.0m	-£4.0m	— 0%
Long-term liabilities	£29.94bn	£29.41bn	£30.57bn	£30.69bn	£31.00bn	£31.96bn	£31.22bn	▼ 2%
Provisions	£620.0m	£547.0m	£1.09bn	£1.30bn	£1.10bn	£1.40bn	£1.13bn	▼ 20%
Net assets	—	£17.66bn	£19.75bn	£21.70bn	£20.76bn	£22.55bn	£17.59bn	▼ 22%
Total equity	£13.89bn	£17.66bn	£19.75bn	£21.70bn	£20.76bn	£22.55bn	£17.59bn	▼ 22%

Cash flow

GBP

Metric	FY2019	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	Δ YoY
Net cash from operating activities	£8.11bn	£10.93bn	£10.30bn	£7.28bn	£9.43bn	£10.91bn	£10.77bn	▼ 1%
Net cash used in investing activities	-£2.24bn	-£1.48bn	-£3.25bn	£2.45bn	-£2.29bn	-£423.0m	-£2.39bn	▼ 466%
Net cash used in financing activities	-£4.67bn	-£5.80bn	-£7.10bn	-£8.89bn	-£7.19bn	-£6.83bn	-£9.88bn	▼ 45%
Net increase / (decrease) in cash	£1.21bn	£1.77bn	—	£845.0m	-£61.0m	£1.95bn	-£1.58bn	swung −
Cash at end of year	£4.12bn	£5.47bn	£3.39bn	£4.22bn	£4.04bn	£6.14bn	£3.94bn	▼ 36%

Scene 04 · Waterfall

From revenue to profit

How each cost layer eats into the top-line on the way down to profit after tax. Cascade chart coming in the next release — for now the table below shows the same flow.

Revenue£50.50bn
Cost of sales−£26.79bn
Gross profit£23.71bn
Operating costs−£14.67bn
Operating profit£9.04bn
Profit after tax£10.01bn

FY2025 audited accounts · cascade view

03 · Risk

What the filings reveal

Concrete signals · descriptive only

Screening 7 to review Name overlaps — not auto-cleared Balance-sheet stress 0.79× short-term cover Current ratio · FY2025 audited accounts Compliance signals 2 medium findings 3 surfaced in total Auditor Unqualified KPMG LLP Filed disclosures 11 principal risks disclosed From the filed accounts

Working capital + cash

Where the money sits

Four numbers that tell you how stretched the balance sheet is today. The line under each is in plain English — what the number means for the business, not what to do about it.

Short-term cover Current ratio · liquidity 0.79× For every £1 of bills due in the next 12 months, Unilever has just £0.79 of cash and quickly-sellable assets to pay it with. Most healthy companies sit between £1.50 and £2.00.

Profit-to-cash Cash conversion · earnings quality 119% Every £1 of reported operating profit turned into £1.19 of actual cash. Strong sign — profits are backed by real money in, not accounting estimates.

Customer payment speed Debtor days · working capital 53 Customers take roughly two months to pay. Standard for most B2B businesses.

Brand & goodwill share Intangibles ratio · asset quality 49.3% A notable 49.3% of the balance sheet is intangible — patents, brands, goodwill. Real value but harder to verify if challenged.

Screening status

Independent checks completed

No critical risk flagsNo kill switches fired Sanctions check · ClearFCDO + OFAC + EU screen Potential sanctions · 6 reviewsLow-confidence name overlap Politically-exposed persons · None foundPEP screen · 0 hits Disqualified register · 1 to verifyName match only — confirm identity Auditor · KPMG LLP Audit opinion · UnqualifiedUnqualified ISA-700 opinion Will it keep trading? · YesGoing concern · Clean Status · Active

Compliance signals

What the compliance pass surfaced

Weak sanctions name overlap

Severity · Medium

Screening returned a partial name overlap: 'BRITTAN OF SPENNITHORNE, Leon, The Lord' against 'The Lord' on the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 list (90% name similarity). No identifier corroboration — an unconfirmed overlap, not a confirmed hit.

Possible disqualified-director match — LU, Rong

Severity · Low

Current director LU, Rong shares a 93% name similarity with disqualified individual Rong LIU (DOB 10/1982) on the Companies House register, but date of birth has not been corroborated and common-name false positives are possible.

High director turnover

Severity · Medium

Eight director resignations within three years, against a current board of ten, represents an 80% turnover rate in a compressed window, which may indicate underlying governance instability.

KPMG LLP on going concern

In the auditor's own words

"The Directors have a reasonable expectation that the Group will be able to continue in operation and meet its liabilities as they fall due over the three-year period of their assessment."

Principal risks

As disclosed in the filed accounts

Consumer and Channel

Consumer behaviours are evolving rapidly, driven by lifestyle shifts, economic pressures and increasing digital adoption, influencing brand preferences, shopping habits and channel dynamics including growth of digital commerce and new retail formats.

Portfolio Management

Sub-optimal strategic investment choices across Business Groups, key markets and channels may result in missed opportunities to strengthen margins or accelerate growth.

Climate and Nature

Physical risks from climate change and nature loss could disrupt supply chains, increase costs and limit operational flexibility. Transition risks include carbon pricing and land-use restrictions.

Plastic Packaging

Consumers and regulators increasingly expect sustainable packaging; transition requires new materials and business models. Emerging EPR regulations expose Unilever to increasing costs and compliance requirements.

Talent

Risk of being unable to attract talent with skills matching a fast-changing market, and failure to retain capabilities or embed a high-performance culture could affect ability to compete, innovate and deliver results.

Governance & subsequent events

Who controls this entity, what's changed since year-end

Post-balance-sheet event

2026 Filed disclosure

Unilever announced a further share buyback programme of €1.5 billion in 2026.

Post-balance-sheet event

Filed disclosure

Binding offers received for the sale of Graze, Unox and Zwan, pending usual closing conditions and regulatory approvals.

Post-balance-sheet event

6 December 2025 Filed disclosure

Unilever's Magnum Ice Cream Company (TMICC) listed as a standalone pure-play global Ice Cream business in Amsterdam, London and New York following demerger completed 6 December 2025. Unilever retains a 19.85% minority stake to be sold down in an orderly manner.

        Internal data-quality signals · expand
      

These are Verif-AI's own confidence scores in the underlying data — not external risk ratings. Each dimension reflects how complete and self-consistent the filed numbers were on extraction.

Financial completeness 35

Compliance signals 70

Operational disclosure 66

Data confidence 70

04 · Market

Sector and benchmarks

SIC2007 · cohort metrics

Industry classification

Professional, scientific & technical

Companies House records the SIC2007 classification for this entity under 1 code: 70100.

Peer cohort · Division 70 · Head Offices & Consultancy · 46 peers

Sector cohort · 46 peers · Head Offices & Consultancy

How this filing compares

Metric	This filing	Peer median	Percentile	Assessment
Cash Ratio	0.18	0.25	42th	below median
Profit Margin (%)	17.2%	7.3%	82th	strong
Quick Ratio	0.52	0.55	46th	below median
Gross Margin (%)	46.9%	32.8%	70th	above median
Current Ratio	0.52	0.87	26th	below median
Cash-to-Assets	0.06	0.06	50th	above median
Debt-to-Assets	0.82	0.71	67th	below median
Debt-to-Equity	3.01	1.35	79th	weak
Net Assets Growth (%)	-22.0%	-0.3%	10th	weak

05 · People

The people behind the company

11 directors · 0 PSCs · 27.8m UK appointments cross-referenced

Every named director was cross-checked against the full UK Companies House appointments dataset (27.8 million records). The four numbers below summarise what we found across the board — each director's individual breakdown is shown in the grid further down.

Directors analysed 10 1 corporate · cross-checked against 27.8m records

Avg failure rate 0.0% share of prior companies that went into liquidation / dissolution

Max concurrent boards 2 most active director sits on 2 boards · 1.2 avg

Phoenix signals 0 no director linked to dissolved-and-restarted companies

Each director, individually

Career history + cross-references

Role	Director	Career boards	Concurrent	Prior-failure rate	Joined	Other UK boards
Director · active	Benoit Thierry Potier French · France	2	2	—	16 February 2000	—
Director · active	Susan Saltzbart Kilsby American · United States	1	—	—	1 August 2019	—
Director · active	Rong Lu Chinese · Hong Kong	1	—	—	1 November 2021	—
Director · active	Adrian Hennah British · England	1	—	—	1 November 2021	—
Secretary	Nelson Peltz Citizen Of Usa · United States	8	—	0.0%	31 October 1991

Director	Fernando Fernandez Argentine · United Kingdom	2	—	—	12 July 2022

Director · active	IAN Keith Meakins British · England	1	—	—	1 September 2023	—
Director · active	Judith Mckenna American · United States	1	—	—	1 March 2024	—
Director	Zoe Yujnovich Australian, British · United Kingdom	3	2	0.0%	27 March 2020

Co-director network

Who sits on other UK boards alongside these directors

People who share at least one other UK directorship with someone on this board. Sorted by overlap count. Click any shared boards chip to reveal the companies they overlap on.

Bruce Charles Bossom 72 career appointments 6 shared boards

Mountleigh Northern Developments Limited No. 01080877 · Secretary · Receiver Manager / Administrative Receiver
Janus Henderson Group PLC No. FC031677 · Director · Active

MR Peter May 6 career appointments 6 shared boards

Mountleigh Northern Developments Limited No. 01080877 · Secretary · Receiver Manager / Administrative Receiver
Janus Henderson Group PLC No. FC031677 · Director · Active

Jeffrey Roger Warren 44 career appointments · 1 failed · 2.3% failure rate 5 shared boards

Mountleigh Northern Developments Limited No. 01080877 · Secretary · Receiver Manager / Administrative Receiver
Janus Henderson Group PLC No. FC031677 · Director · Active

MR John Harrison Watson 83 career appointments 5 shared boards

Mountleigh Northern Developments Limited No. 01080877 · Secretary · Receiver Manager / Administrative Receiver
Janus Henderson Group PLC No. FC031677 · Director · Active

MR Stephen Geoffrey Williams 17 career appointments 1 shared board

Unilever Global Ip Limited No. 12920301 · Director · Active

ROY Drysdale Brown 18 career appointments 1 shared board

Unilever Global Ip Limited No. 12920301 · Director · Active

Christopher Martin Jemmett 9 career appointments 1 shared board

Unilever Global Ip Limited No. 12920301 · Director · Active

Alan Clive Butler 7 career appointments 1 shared board

Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.

MR Michael Gilbert Heron 21 career appointments 1 shared board

Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.

SIR Michael Sydney Perry 15 career appointments 1 shared board

Unilever Global Ip Limited No. 12920301 · Director · Active

        + Show the 71 resigned officers
      

Historical board

Resigned network

Every officer who has left the company, newest-resignation first. Helps spot waves of churn that wouldn't show on the active-director cards alone.

2009

Sven Henri Marie Antoine Dumoulin

Secretary Served 2007 → 2009

2017

Tonia Erica Lovell

Secretary Served 2010 → 2017

2022

Ritva Sotamaa

Secretary Served 2018 → 2022

2007

Johannes Alexander Abraham Van Der Bijl

Secretary Served 2001 → 2007

2026

Maria Rosaria Varsellona

Secretary Served 2022 → 2026

2001

Josephus Wilhelmus Bernardus Westerburgen

Secretary Resigned 1 July 2001

2010

Stephen Geoffrey Williams

Secretary Served 2009 → 2010

2007

Stephen Geoffrey Williams

Secretary Resigned 17 September 2007

2024

Nils Smedegaard Andersen

Director Served 2015 → 2024

1998

James Iain Walker, Dr Anderson

Director Resigned 6 May 1998

2005

Andre Rene, Baron Baron Van Heemstra

Director Served 2000 → 2005

2008

Genevieve, Professor Berger

Director Served 2007 → 2008

2013

Sunil Bharti Mittal

Director Served 2011 → 2013

2010

Leon, The Lord Brittan Of Spennithorne

Director Served 2004 → 2010

2001

Roy Drysdale Brown

Director Served 1994 → 2001

2007

Antony Burgmans

Director Resigned 16 May 2007

2005

Alan Clive Butler

Director Resigned 11 May 2005

2008

Patrick Jean Pierre Cescau

Director Served 1999 → 2008

2022

Laura May-Lung Cha

Director Served 2013 → 2022

2007

Lynda, The Baroness Chalker

Director Served 2004 → 2007

2021

Vittorio Colao

Director Served 2015 → 2021

2006

Bertrand Pierre Charles Collomb

Director Served 2004 → 2006

2005

Keki Bomi Dadiseth

Director Served 2000 → 2005

2020

Marinus Emmanuel Johannes, Dr. Dekkers

Director Served 2016 → 2020

2010

Wim, Professor Dik

Director Served 2004 → 2010

1999

Hans Eggerstedt

Director Resigned 4 May 1999

2006

Oscar Fanjul

Director Served 2004 → 2006

2004

Niall William Arthur Fitzgerald

Director Resigned 30 September 2004

2017

Louise Ottilie, Prof Dr Lr Fresco

Director Served 2009 → 2017

2018

Ann Marie Fudge

Director Served 2009 → 2018

1997

Ashok Sekhar, Dr Ganguly

Director Resigned 6 May 1997

2014

Charles Edward Golden

Director Served 2006 → 2014

2005

Claudio Xavier Gonzalez Laporte

Director Served 2004 → 2005

2015

Byron Elmer, Dr Grote

Director Served 2006 → 2015

2024

Judith, Dr Hartmann

Director Served 2015 → 2024

1993

Michael Gilbert Heron

Director Resigned 16 May 1993

2015

Raoul Jean Marc Sidney Huet

Director Served 2010 → 2015

1997

Christopher Martin Jemmett

Director Resigned 6 May 1997

2023

Alan Chalmers Jope

Director Served 2019 → 2023

2025

Andrea Jung

Director Served 2018 → 2025

2001

Alexander Kemner

Director Resigned 9 May 2001

2006

Hilmar Kopper

Director Served 2004 → 2006

2008

Ralph David Kugler

Director Served 2005 → 2008

2009

James Arthur Lawrence

Director Served 2008 → 2009

2019

Mary Ma

Director Served 2013 → 2019

1994

Floris Anton Maljers

Director Resigned 4 May 1994

2007

Rudolph Harold Peter Markham

Director Served 1998 → 2007

2024

Strive Masiyiwa

Director Served 2016 → 2024

1994

Charles Miller Smith

Director Resigned 31 July 1994

2024

Youngme Moon

Director Served 2016 → 2024

1997

Okko Otto Hermann Muller

Director Resigned 6 May 1997

2010

Narayana Murthy

Director Served 2007 → 2010

2016

Hixonia Nyasulu

Director Served 2007 → 2016

2000

Jan Peelen

Director Resigned 3 May 2000

1996

Michael Sydney, Sir Perry

Director Resigned 31 August 1996

2000

Robert Mayfield Phillips

Director Served 1995 → 2000

2023

Graeme David Pitkethly

Director Served 2016 → 2023

2018

Paulus Geradus Josephus Maria Polman

Director Served 2008 → 2018

2015

Malcolm Leslie, Sir Rifkind

Director Served 2010 → 2015

2022

John Rishton

Director Served 2013 → 2022

2025

Hein Schumacher

Director Served 2022 → 2025

2023

Feike Sijbesma

Director Served 2014 → 2023

2009

David Alec Gwyn Roberts, Lord Simon Of Highbury

Director Served 2004 → 2009

2007

Jean Cyril Spinetta

Director Served 2006 → 2007

2015

Kornelis Jan Storm

Director Served 2006 → 2015

2004

Charles Bernhard Strauss

Director Served 2000 → 2004

1999

Morris Tabaksblat

Director Resigned 4 May 1999

2016

Niels Michael Aage Treschow

Director Served 2007 → 2016

2008

Cornelis Job Van Der Graaf

Director Served 2004 → 2008

2011

Jeroen Van Der Veer

Director Served 2004 → 2011

2015

Paul Steven Walsh

Director Served 2009 → 2015

06 · AI Investigation

Case file open · File no. 00041424 · 28 July 2026 · Trust signal · 52/100 · AI confidence · 92%

Unilever is a classic FMCG engine running well but not at full throttle.

AI forensic pass across 100 Companies House filings. 28 page-cited signals from three specialist agents, 2 cross-signal correlations, and 4 verification questions for management — every claim traces back to a filing reference.

Critical

Load-bearing signals

Warning

Context to the summary

Structural

Supporting facts

Evidence

Distinct pages cited

AI Analyst commentary

What the numbers, the board, and the ownership say

Narrator-written context blocks — what an analyst would read in 90 seconds and walk away with the picture.

Balance sheet

Net assets dropped £5bn to £17.6bn in one year — the biggest single-year fall in the data set. Fixed assets also fell from £60.6bn to £53.4bn. Both moves are consistent with disposals or large capital returns, not operational decline — but the filing doesn't confirm which.

Board

15 directors currently registered at Companies House — a large board typical of a major listed PLC with global governance requirements. Notable names include Nelson Peltz (activist investor, Trian Fund Management) — his presence signals ongoing shareholder pressure on strategy and capital allocation.

Ownership

Listed PLC — no single controlling shareholder. Institutional investors (pension funds, index funds) hold the majority, typical of FTSE/NYSE-listed multinationals. No PSC registered — consistent with widely-held public company status; no individual or entity holds more than 25% of shares.

Case files · Chapter dossier

The investigation, chapter by chapter

The investigation as one running thread — each beat resolves a signal cluster, page-cited. Open “the full working” on any beat for the forensic detail.

The Profit That Defies the Revenue Drop

Turnover fell £2bn; profit after tax rose £3.6bn — those two things don't normally move together.

+57%

Profit after tax FY2024 £6.4bn FY2025 £10.0bn

The full working

Source · P&L FY2024–FY2025

Shrinking on Every Balance Sheet Line

Fixed assets, current assets, cash, and net assets all fell — this is a smaller business than twelve months ago.

-22%

Net assets FY2024 £22.6bn FY2025 £17.6bn

The full working

Source · Balance Sheet FY2024–FY2025

Cash Haemorrhaged Out of the Door

Cash fell 36% even though operating cash flow held steady at £10.8bn — because financing outflows nearly hit £10bn.

£10.8bn Operating cash inflow FY2025

£9.9bn Financing cash outflow FY2025

The full working

Source · Cash Flow Statement FY2024–FY2025

Who Actually Controls This Company?

No person of significant control is recorded — ownership is either fragmented below 25% or held via nominees.

Ultimate owners Fragmented institutional shareholders (<25% each)
Registered entity (this filing) Unilever PLC (Co. 00041424)
Operating subsidiaries (held below this entity)

Source · PSC register; Directors register, Companies House filing

A Busy Capital Restructure on Record

Three capital events in six months point to deliberate structural change, not routine administration.

7 Jun 2026 Resolutions filed
6 Mar 2026 Capital allotment filed (SH01)
28 Dec 2025 Share consolidation filed (SH02)
26 Apr 2026 Most recent accounts filed

Source · Filing Signals, Companies House; Accounts filed 2026-04-26

Cross-signal intelligence

AI correlations across the filing

Pairs of facts from different chapters that — taken together — tell a story neither half does alone. This is where investigation outperforms summary.

The £7.2bn drop in fixed assets in [chapter 2] is the most likely source of the below-the-line gain that inflated profit after tax in [chapter 1] — a disposal would reduce the balance sheet and generate a one-off credit.

The share consolidation and allotment events in [chapter 5] align directly with the £9.9bn financing outflow in [chapter 3], suggesting the capital restructure and the cash return to shareholders are the same programme viewed from different angles.

Deep signals

Buried in the filing

Specifics most readers would miss — surfaced by the AI for the analyst who wants to know.

PAT exceeds PBT by £1.3bn — a negative effective tax rate

Consistent with a large disposal (e.g. divestment of a business segment) generating a deferred tax release or other one-off tax credit. This is a common outcome when a global group sells a subsidiary with a large associated deferred tax liability. It does not indicate the group paid no tax overall — group tax is managed across multiple jurisdictions.

Trade creditors rose despite lower revenue

Appears consistent with Unilever extending its payment terms to suppliers — a common lever used by large FMCG companies to optimise working capital. For suppliers, this means they may wait longer to be paid even in a period when Unilever's own customers are also paying more slowly (debtor days: 53).

Fixed assets fell £7.2bn — largest single balance sheet move

A reduction of this size is typically associated with a significant disposal of subsidiaries or brands, or a large impairment of goodwill. Combined with the net asset decline and the unusual PAT figure, this appears consistent with Unilever's known programme of portfolio simplification — selling off underperforming or non-core brands. No confirmation appears in the reviewed data extract.

Forensic investigation · 28 signals

Three specialist agents, working in parallel

Segmental revenue · capital structure · strategic KPIs. Each agent cites the exact filing page for every claim, with an AI confidence score derived from cross-citation strength.

Segmental Analysis

Foods segment grew fastest in 2025 despite being smallest by revenue

Foods turnover rose from €13,352m (2024) to €12,929m… wait — Foods fell from €13,352m to €12,929m (-3.2%). Personal Care was the largest segment at €13,161m (2025) vs €13,618m (2024), down 3.4%. Beauty & Wellbeing fell from €13,157m to €12,848m (-2.3%). Home Care fell from €12,352m to €11,565m (-6.4%).

p.137 · 6 more from this specialist

Strategic KPIs

Sales fell 3.8% but this was mostly currency, not weak demand

Total turnover dropped from €52.5bn to €50.5bn in 2025, a fall of 3.8%. Currency alone knocked off 5.9%, so the underlying business actually grew.

p.11, p.12, p.14 · 8 more from this specialist

Capital Structure & Borrowings

Share buyback of €1.5bn approved and running in 2025

The Board approved a share buyback programme in 2025 totalling €1.5 billion.

p.59 · 11 more from this specialist

          + Show all 28 specialist findings
        

Segmental Analysis (7)

Foods segment grew fastest in 2025 despite being smallest by revenue

Why it matters: Every segment saw a revenue drop year-on-year, meaning the overall group decline is broad-based rather than caused by one weak area — no single segment is pulling the group up.

p.137 important conf 95%

Home Care had the biggest revenue drop — down over 6% in one year

Home Care turnover fell from €12,352m in 2024 to €11,565m in 2025, a drop of €787m or 6.4%. This is the steepest percentage decline of any segment.

Why it matters: Home Care is shrinking faster than the rest of the business, which could signal competitive pressure or pricing problems in that product area (fabric care, home hygiene).

p.137 important conf 95%

Group underlying operating profit fell slightly from €10,198m to €10,084m

Total underlying operating profit (which strips out one-off items) was €10,084m in 2025 versus €10,198m in 2024, a fall of €114m or 1.1%. Reported operating profit was €9,037m (2025) vs €8,829m (2024).

Why it matters: The underlying profit is broadly stable even though sales fell, suggesting the company held costs down and protected its margins as revenues declined.

p.137 useful conf 95%

No single segment dominates — revenue is spread fairly evenly across four areas

In 2025, the four segments contribute: Personal Care 26.1%, Foods 25.6%, Beauty & Wellbeing 25.4%, Home Care 22.9% of total turnover (€50,503m). The largest segment (Personal Care) is 26.1% of total revenue.

Why it matters: Unilever is not dependent on any one product area, which reduces the risk that a problem in one category could seriously damage the whole group.

p.137 useful conf 95%

Non-underlying (one-off) charges rose sharply to €1,047m from €1,369m… actually fell

Non-underlying items (restructuring, impairments, disposal gains/losses) totalled €1,047m in 2025, down from €1,369m in 2024. This improved reported operating profit relative to underlying profit.

Why it matters: Fewer big one-off charges means the reported profit figures are closer to the underlying performance, making the accounts easier to read and trust.

p.137 useful conf 90%

No geographic segment breakdown is disclosed — only business divisions shown

Note 2 provides segment data by four business divisions only (Beauty & Wellbeing, Personal Care, Home Care, Foods). No split of revenue or profit by geography (e.g. Europe, Americas, Asia) is provided in this note.

Why it matters: Investors cannot tell from the segment note which regions are growing or shrinking, making it harder to assess exposure to specific country risks like currency, inflation or political instability.

p.136, p.137 useful conf 95%

Impairment and non-cash charges within non-underlying items fell to €161m from €440m

Impairment and other non-cash charges (within non-underlying items) were €161m in 2025 versus €440m in 2024. The 2024 figure was heavily influenced by Home Care (€195m) and Personal Care (€75m).

Why it matters: Much lower impairment charges suggest the company is no longer writing down the value of assets at the same rate as last year, which is a positive sign for asset quality.

p.137 useful conf 90%

Strategic KPIs (9)

Sales fell 3.8% but this was mostly currency, not weak demand

Total turnover dropped from €52.5bn to €50.5bn in 2025, a fall of 3.8%. Currency alone knocked off 5.9%, so the underlying business actually grew.

Why it matters: The headline sales drop looks bad but is misleading — strip out currency swings and the business is growing, which matters if you are deciding whether Unilever is a healthy trading partner.

p.11, p.12, p.14 important conf 97%

Underlying volume growth just 1.5% — price is doing most of the work

Underlying sales grew 3.5% in 2025, but only 1.5% came from selling more units (volume) and 2.0% from higher prices. In 2024 volume was 3.1%.

Why it matters: Volume growth is the real engine of an FMCG business — if growth relies mostly on price rises, it can mean shoppers are buying less, which is a warning sign for long-term health.

p.11, p.12, p.14 important conf 97%

Underlying operating margin hit 20% — highest in at least three years

Underlying operating margin rose to 20.0% in 2025, up from 19.4% in 2024 and 17.6% in 2023 — a gain of 60 basis points year on year.

Why it matters: Three straight years of margin improvement shows Unilever is running more efficiently, which means it can absorb cost shocks better and is a more resilient business to deal with.

p.11, p.14 important conf 97%

Power Brands (78% of sales) growing faster than the rest

Unilever's Power Brands delivered 4.3% underlying sales growth and 2.2% volume growth in 2025, ahead of the group average of 3.5% and 1.5% respectively.

Why it matters: When the biggest, most profitable brands grow faster than the rest, it means the company is concentrating its firepower where it counts — a good sign for future profits.

p.11, p.12 important conf 95%

Latin America dragged on growth — a regional weak spot

Latin America grew only 0.5% underlying sales in 2025, as price rises were largely cancelled out by volume declines in tough market conditions.

Why it matters: A large, important region barely growing means there is a real risk of further volume losses if economic conditions worsen there — worth watching if you do business in that region.

p.12 important conf 92%

Management is guiding 4-6% underlying sales growth for 2026

Unilever has set a multi-year guidance range of 4% to 6% underlying sales growth, with at least 2% volume growth. For 2026 specifically, growth is expected at the bottom of this range.

Why it matters: Guidance at the low end of the range for 2026 reflects cautious management expectations given slower market conditions — useful context if planning a commercial relationship.

p.7, p.9 important conf 95%

Gross margin improved to 46.9% — more profit on every sale

Gross margin rose 20 basis points to 46.9% in 2025, up from 16.8% underlying operating margin in 2024 (gross margin was 46.7% in 2024 implied). Supply chain savings and a better product mix drove this.

Why it matters: A rising gross margin means the company keeps more money from each product sold, giving it more room to invest in brands and still make a profit.

p.11, p.12 useful conf 88%

Free cash flow dipped slightly to €5.9bn due to Ice Cream exit costs

Free cash flow fell from €6.3bn in 2024 to €5.9bn in 2025, a drop of around €0.4bn. Higher taxes linked to the Ice Cream demerger were the main cause.

Why it matters: A small one-off drop in cash flow caused by a deliberate business decision is much less worrying than a structural cash problem — the company still converted 100% of profit into cash.

p.11, p.12, p.14 useful conf 95%

Brand investment rose to 16.1% of sales — highest in five years

Brand and marketing investment (BMI) went up 10 basis points to 16.1% of turnover in 2025, up 300 basis points over five years.

Why it matters: Spending more on brands is a bet on future growth — it shows Unilever is willing to invest now to win customers later, which is a healthy signal for a consumer goods company.

p.12 useful conf 93%

Capital Structure & Borrowings (12)

Share buyback of €1.5bn approved and running in 2025

The Board approved a share buyback programme in 2025 totalling €1.5 billion.

Why it matters: Returning €1.5bn to shareholders shows confidence in cash generation, but it also reduces the cash cushion and increases leverage slightly.

p.59 important conf 95%

Long-term liabilities are large at €31.2bn

Long-term liabilities stand at €31,222m against net assets of €17,587m, implying substantial long-term funding from debt.

Why it matters: The company carries more long-term debt than its net asset base, which is common for large consumer goods groups, but means creditors need to trust future profit generation.

p.161 important conf 85%

Ice Cream demerger removed €4.0bn of net assets from the balance sheet

The carrying value of Ice Cream net assets derecognised on demerger was €4,015m; the total gain on demerger after tax was €3,373m.

Why it matters: The demerger changes the size and shape of the balance sheet, but the gain offsets the asset loss, so the overall capital position is not damaged.

p.178, p.179 important conf 95%

Interest cover is healthy at about 8.8x

Operating profit was €9,037m and finance costs were €1,024m, giving interest cover of approximately 8.8 times.

Why it matters: The company earns nearly 9 times what it pays in interest, so there is very little risk it cannot service its debt.

p.148 useful conf 95%

Net finance costs rose to €1,024m from €994m last year

Total finance costs increased by €30m year-on-year, from €994m in 2024 to €1,024m in 2025.

Why it matters: Borrowing costs are creeping up slightly, but the rise is small and the company's profits comfortably cover the cost.

p.148 useful conf 95%

IFRS 16 lease liabilities total €1,166m net book value

Right-of-use assets had a net book value of €1,166m at 31 December 2025 (2024: €1,410m). Total cash paid on leases was €380m in 2025.

Why it matters: Lease obligations are significant but well below long-term liabilities of €31,222m, so they are a manageable part of the overall funding picture.

p.157 useful conf 90%

Treasury shares repurchased: €1,510m in 2025 vs €1,508m in 2024

During 2025 the Group repurchased €1,510m of its own shares (2024: €1,508m), broadly flat year-on-year.

Why it matters: The buyback pace is steady, meaning capital returns to shareholders are consistent and predictable.

p.163 useful conf 90%

Cash on hand is €3,941m — solid liquidity buffer

The Group held €3,941m of cash and cash equivalents at the balance sheet date.

Why it matters: This cash balance means the company can comfortably pay near-term bills and debt maturities without needing to raise new money urgently.

p.161 useful conf 95%

Credit rating targets A+/A1 long-term, A1/P1 short-term

The Group aims to maintain long-term credit ratings of A+/A1 and short-term ratings of A1/P1, which it describes as equivalent to at least A/A2.

Why it matters: Strong credit ratings mean the company can borrow cheaply and access debt markets easily, reducing refinancing risk.

p.161 useful conf 90%

Quarterly dividends approved throughout 2025

The Board considered and approved quarterly dividends during 2025; specific per-share amounts are not detailed in the extracted pages.

Why it matters: Ongoing quarterly dividends show the Board is confident enough in cash flows to keep rewarding shareholders regularly.

p.59 useful conf 75%

No covenant breaches or waivers mentioned anywhere

None of the pages reviewed disclose any covenant breach, waiver request, or lender consent needed.

Why it matters: The absence of any covenant stress means lenders have not put the company on notice, which is reassuring for anyone thinking of trading with or lending to Unilever.

p.161 useful conf 80%

Lease additions fell sharply: €463m in 2025 vs €547m in 2024

New lease additions were €463m in 2025, down from €547m in 2024, partly reflecting the Ice Cream demerger.

Why it matters: A lower rate of new leasing means the off-balance-sheet-style obligations are growing more slowly, which is a mild positive for future cash commitments.

p.157 low conf 85%

Specialist deep panels · Structured price capture

Every figure the specialists extracted

Below the prose findings, each agent publishes a structured numeric metrics block. Segmental revenue, named KPIs with YoY %, and capital-structure metrics — direct from the source filings.

Segmental analysis

Revenue & operating profit by business division

Segment Revenue (latest) Operating profit Rev YoY

Beauty & Wellbeing €12848 €2077 -2.3%

Personal Care €13161 €2700 -3.4%

Home Care €11565 €1512 -6.4%

Foods €12929 €2748 -3.2%

Top-segment revenue concentration: 26.1% · Segment totals reconcile to the group P&L

Strategic KPIs

5 flagship metrics · 8 supporting

Turnover

€50.5bn

-3.8% YoY

Underlying Sales Growth (USG)

3.5%

-18.6% YoY

Underlying Volume Growth (UVG)

1.5%

-51.6% YoY

Gross Margin

46.9%

+0.4% YoY

Underlying Operating Margin (UOM)

20%

+3.1% YoY

+ Show 8 supporting KPIs

Underlying Price Growth (UPG)

+66.7% YoY

Operating Margin (reported)

17.9%

+6.5% YoY

Free Cash Flow

€5.9bn

-6.3% YoY

Cash Flow from Operating Activities

€10.8bn

-0.9% YoY

Power Brands USG

4.3%

Brand & Marketing Investment (BMI) as % of turnover

16.1%

+0.6% YoY

Underlying EPS

€3

+0.7% YoY

Diluted EPS

€3

+6.2% YoY

Capital structure

Debt, cover, and dividend posture

Interest cover

8.83×

Management questions · Open inquiry

What management would need to answer next

Generated by the AI from the disclosure gaps it detected. Hover or tap each card to surface the underlying evidence that triggered the question.

Q01

Volume growth halved from 3.1% to 1.5% in one year — what specific actions is management taking to win back shoppers who have traded down or switched brands?

↻ Flip for trigger

Why we'd ask this

Q02

Home Care revenue fell 6.4% and suffered the largest impairments last year — is this a category in managed decline, and what is the strategic plan for it?

↻ Flip for trigger

Why we'd ask this

Q03

With €31.2bn of long-term liabilities against €17.6bn of net assets, what is the debt maturity profile and how much refinancing is needed in the next three years?

↻ Flip for trigger

Why we'd ask this

Q04

Geographic segment data is absent from the accounts — can management provide a revenue and profit split by region so exposure to high-risk markets like Latin America can be properly assessed?

↻ Flip for trigger

Why we'd ask this

Verification gaps

What the filings don't disclose

High-trust analysis names its own blind spots. These are metrics the AI looked for and couldn't find — anything material to the summary needs management or independent verification.

08 · Documents

The filing trail

100 filings · Companies House

Filing distribution

SH03

58%

TM01

AP01

CS01

RESOLUTIONS

SH01

SH05

CH01

Latest filings

25 Jun 2026 CS01 Confirmation statement with updates

7 Jun 2026 RESOLUTIONS Resolution

26 Apr 2026 AA Accounts with accounts type group

6 Mar 2026 SH01 Capital allotment shares

2 Mar 2026 AP03 Appoint person secretary company with name date

2 Mar 2026 TM02 Termination secretary company with name termination date

26 Feb 2026 RESOLUTIONS Resolution

28 Dec 2025 SH02 Capital alter shares consolidation

18 Dec 2025 SH05 Capital cancellation treasury shares with date currency capital figure

12 Dec 2025 SH05 Capital cancellation treasury shares with date currency capital figure

29 Oct 2025 RESOLUTIONS Resolution

24 Oct 2025 MA Memorandum articles

Catalyst timeline

Filing pattern + upcoming windows

100 filings · 2023 → 2027

Accounts Officers Capital Resolutions Other

2027Annual accounts

Next annual accounts due

Due at Companies House by 30 June 2027 for the period ending 31 December 2026.

2027Confirmation

Next confirmation statement due

Annual confirmation due by 23 June 2027 (made up to 9 June 2027).

Final chapter — What we found

What we found

52 MIXED SIGNALS

Verif-AI Synthesis

Mixed signals

Six years of £8bn+ profit and 107% cash conversion — the operations are a machine; the question is where the capital keeps going.

FY2025 audited accounts

The five plain-English briefing questions are on Origin — read the story first, then return here for the TrustScore scorecard.

Signal Radar

How the score breaks down

Financial completeness 35/100

Operational disclosure 66/100

Compliance signals 70/100

Data confidence 70/100

Decisive findings

What decided this summary

PAT exceeds PBT by £1.3bn — a negative effective tax rate

Trade creditors rose despite lower revenue

Fixed assets fell £7.2bn — largest single balance sheet move

Positive signal

£1.08 of cash for every £1 of reported profit. Earnings are not an accounting story.

Positive signal

Unqualified KPMG LLP opinion — the cleanest outcome an audit can produce.

What to watch

Sales fell 3.8% but this was mostly currency, not weak demand. The headline sales drop looks bad but is misleading — strip out currency swings and the business is growing, which matters if you are deciding whether Unilever is a healthy trading partner.

What to watch

Underlying volume growth just 1.5% — price is doing most of the work. Volume growth is the real engine of an FMCG business — if growth relies mostly on price rises, it can mean shoppers are buying less, which is a warning sign for long-term health.

10 · Verification

How we know

100 filings · 10 directors · 209 pages

This report reads the full filing package — digital iXBRL where available, the filed PDF (including notes), and the Companies House register — not a single uploaded document.

Figures are as filed by the company — Companies House does not verify the accuracy of information filed. Verif-AI checks internal consistency and flags anomalies, but cannot confirm the underlying figures are correct.

Reconciliation

All 35 reconciled lines tie exactly to the audited iXBRL filing

Every balance-sheet and profit & loss line traced to where we read it in the filing. iXBRL — read straight from the company's audited machine-readable tags, so it ties exactly. PDF — read from the filed accounts document, with the supporting note cited so you can check it. Flagged — our consistency check marked it for a closer look.

Line Our figure Source in filing Reconciliation

Profit & loss · pp.128–129

Turnover £50.5bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Cost of sales −£26.8bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Gross profit £23.7bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Administrative expenses −£13.6bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Operating profit £9bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Finance income £398m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Finance costs −£1bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Profit before tax £8.7bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Tax −£2.5bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Profit after tax £10bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Depreciation & amortisation £1.3bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

EBITDA £10.3bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Balance sheet · p.131

Intangible assets £34.8bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Tangible assets £9bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Fixed assets £53.4bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Debtors £7.3bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Trade debtors £7.3bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Cash £3.9bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Current assets £17.1bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Total assets £70.5bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Trade creditors −£16.9bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Current liabilities £21.7bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Net current assets −£4.6bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Total assets less current liabilities £48.8bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Bank loans (current) −£229m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Bank loans (non-current) −£4m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Lease liabilities (current) −£277m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Lease liabilities (non-current) −£1bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Deferred tax −£3.6bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Long-term liabilities £31.2bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Provisions £1.1bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Net assets £17.6bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Share capital £85m iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Profit & loss reserves £44.2bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

Shareholders' funds £15.5bn iXBRL ✓ Ties to filing

35 read from audited iXBRL tags · 0 from the filed PDF.

What we read

Companies House filings

Total filings 100 2023 → 2026

Accounts filings 4 audited financial statements

Officer events 19 appointments + terminations

Capital events 66 share allotments + buybacks

Who we cross-checked

UK director appointment network

Directors verified 10 incl. 1 corporate officer

Records cross-referenced 27.8m UK appointments dataset

Avg failure rate 0.0% across prior appointments

Phoenix scan 0 directors flagged

Screening status

Independent checks completed

No critical risk flagsNo kill switches fired Sanctions check · ClearFCDO + OFAC + EU screen Potential sanctions · 6 reviewsLow-confidence name overlap Politically-exposed persons · None foundPEP screen · 0 hits Audit opinion · UnqualifiedUnqualified ISA-700 opinion Auditor · KPMG LLP Status · Active

Screened 82 names (registered company + officers/PSCs) against live lists: FCDO Consolidated UK Sanctions List — 57503 entries, refreshed 04 July 2026 · OFAC SDN (US Treasury) + akaName aliases + relationship graph — 39437 entries, refreshed 04 July 2026 · EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions — 29880 entries, refreshed 04 July 2026 · UK Parliament — current Members of Commons & Lords — 1441 entries, refreshed 04 July 2026 · Companies House — Disqualified Directors register, checked 04 July 2026.

Steps we ran

How the report was assembled

Pages read 209 PDF pages analysed

Steps run 9 0 skipped · 9 completed

AI checks 3 independent reviews

Years analysed 7 audited filings trended

Pipeline — what ran on this report

Read PDF accounts 209 pages Classify filing Extract audit notes Compliance screening Cross-check directors Build company timeline Plain-English analysis Capital structure review Processing filing

Limits and caveats

What this report doesn't claim

Persons with significant control

No PSCs are recorded against this entity — typical for listed PLCs (widely held by institutional investors) and for dormant / micro-entity filings.

        Plain-English glossary · 10 terms
      

Net Assets: What the company owns, minus everything it owes. Think of it as the company's net worth.
In this filing: Unilever's net assets fell from £22.6bn to £17.6bn in FY2025 — a 22% drop, likely from capital returned to shareholders.
Turnover (Revenue): The total money coming in from selling products and services, before any costs are taken out.
In this filing: Unilever's turnover fell from £52.5bn to £50.5bn — a 3.8% drop, pulling it back to 2020 levels.
Gross Profit: What's left after the direct cost of making or buying the product is removed from revenue.
In this filing: Unilever made £23.7bn gross profit in FY2025 — a 47% gross margin, meaning nearly half of every sale flows through before overhead costs.
Profit Before Tax (PBT): The profit the company made before paying its tax bill.
In this filing: PBT was £8.7bn in FY2025 — consistent with the prior six years, showing the business generates real, recurring profit.
Current Liabilities: Bills and debts the company has to pay within the next 12 months.
In this filing: Unilever's current liabilities fell from £25.2bn to £21.7bn — a positive move, reducing near-term pressure.
Fixed Assets: Long-term things the company owns — factories, brands, equipment, leased premises — that won't be turned to cash quickly.
In this filing: Fixed assets fell from £60.6bn to £53.4bn, possibly reflecting disposals or write-downs in FY2025.
Cash Conversion: How much of the reported profit actually arrived as real cash in the bank.
In this filing: At 107.6%, Unilever converts more cash than it reports as profit — a sign that the earnings are genuine, not just accounting entries.
Debtor Days: How long, on average, customers take to pay their invoices.
In this filing: At 53 days, Unilever's customers take about 7–8 weeks to pay — typical for a global FMCG company dealing with large retailers.
Working Capital Gap: The difference in timing between when you pay your suppliers and when your customers pay you — the cash you need to bridge that gap.
In this filing: Unilever's working capital gap is 175 days, requiring an estimated £24.2bn to fund the cycle — manageable at group scale but enormous in absolute terms.
Intangible Assets: Things the company owns that you can't touch — brand names, patents, goodwill paid on acquisitions.
In this filing: 53.7% of Unilever's total assets are intangible or lease-based — worth a lot on paper, but harder to convert to cash in a crisis.