luxury fashion retail · global · high complexity
Deep-Dive · Company Intelligence
Turnover fell £507m and operating profit swung from +£418m to -£3m as the brand reset.
Origin
Burberry Group plc is a British luxury fashion house, founded in 1856 and listed on the London Stock Exchange since 2002. It designs, manufactures, and sells trench coats, leather goods, ready-to-wear, and accessories through its own stores and online globally.
At a glance
Timeline
Big year-on-year change
Profit after tax collapsed 128% — from £271.0m to -£75.0m.
Big year-on-year change
Profit after tax more than doubled — from £121.6m to £375.9m in a single year (+209%).
Big year-on-year change
Profit after tax collapsed 64% — from £339.1m to £121.6m.
Where our data starts
Earliest analysed accounts: FY2018. 16 years of earlier trading history are not in scope — this report pulls the most recent filed accounts from Companies House.
Name changed
Previously incorporated as Burberry Group Limited.
Name changed
Previously incorporated as Burberrys Group Limited.
Company founded
Burberry Group PLC was registered at Companies House on 1997-10-30.
02 · Financials
Scene 01 · Revenue
From £2.73bn in FY2018 to £2.46bn in FY2025 — a 10% decline. The most dramatic acceleration came in FY2022, when turnover surged 21% in a single year.
FY2018 – FY2025 · Companies House
Scene 02 · Metrics
Financial health
Computed from · cash · net assets · current ratio · debt to equity · total liabilities
Scene 03 · Trends
Eight years of revenue, profit and operating performance side-by-side. Hover any dot for the full year cross-section.
Revenue, profitability and operating growth over time
Scene 05 · Full detail
All metrics across FY2018–FY2025, now fully contextualised by the story above.
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turnover | £2.73bn | £2.72bn | £2.63bn | £2.34bn | £2.83bn | £3.09bn | £2.97bn | £2.46bn | ▼ 17% |
| Cost of sales | -£835.4m | -£859.4m | -£927.6m | -£681.4m | -£815.0m | -£911.0m | -£959.0m | -£923.0m | ▲ 4% |
| Gross profit | £1.90bn | £1.86bn | £1.71bn | £1.66bn | £2.01bn | £2.18bn | £2.01bn | £1.54bn | ▼ 23% |
| Other operating income | — | — | — | — | £30.0m | £46.0m | £13.0m | £23.0m | ▲ 77% |
| Administrative expenses | -£1.49bn | -£1.42bn | -£1.52bn | -£1.14bn | -£367.0m | -£353.0m | -£356.0m | -£363.0m | ▼ 2% |
| Other operating costs derived | — | — | — | — | -£1.13bn | -£1.22bn | -£1.25bn | -£1.20bn | — |
| Operating profit | £410.3m | £437.2m | £188.7m | £521.1m | £543.0m | £657.0m | £418.0m | -£3.0m | ▼ 101% |
| Finance income | £7.8m | £8.7m | £7.6m | £3.1m | £3.0m | £21.0m | £31.0m | £25.0m | ▼ 19% |
| Finance costs | -£5.5m | -£5.3m | -£27.8m | -£34.0m | -£35.0m | -£44.0m | -£66.0m | -£88.0m | ▼ 33% |
| Profit before tax | £412.6m | £440.6m | £168.5m | £490.2m | £511.0m | £634.0m | £383.0m | -£66.0m | ▼ 117% |
| Tax | -£119.0m | -£101.5m | -£46.9m | -£114.3m | -£114.0m | -£142.0m | -£112.0m | -£9.0m | ▲ 92% |
| Profit after tax | £293.6m | £339.1m | £121.6m | £375.9m | £397.0m | £492.0m | £271.0m | -£75.0m | ▼ 128% |
| EBITDA (memo) | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intangible assets | £180.1m | £221.0m | £247.0m | £237.0m | £240.0m | £248.0m | £267.0m | £229.0m | ▼ 14% |
| Tangible assets | £313.6m | £306.9m | £294.9m | £280.4m | £322.0m | £376.0m | £406.0m | £398.0m | ▼ 2% |
| Investments | £2.6m | £2.5m | — | — | — | — | £1.57bn | £1.63bn | ▲ 4% |
| Total fixed assets | £681.3m | £723.6m | £1.60bn | £1.52bn | £1.66bn | £1.82bn | £1.95bn | £1.77bn | ▼ 9% |
| Stocks | £411.8m | £465.1m | £450.5m | £402.1m | £426.0m | £447.0m | £507.0m | £424.0m | ▼ 16% |
| Debtors | £275.5m | £321.2m | £305.8m | £321.9m | £328.0m | £359.0m | £392.0m | £357.0m | ▼ 9% |
| Cash at bank | £915.3m | £874.5m | £928.9m | £1.26bn | £1.22bn | £1.03bn | £441.0m | £813.0m | ▲ 84% |
| Total current assets | £1.54bn | £1.61bn | £1.69bn | £1.98bn | £2.04bn | £1.86bn | £1.42bn | £1.65bn | ▲ 16% |
| Trade creditors | -£153.2m | -£221.6m | -£197.3m | -£129.3m | -£181.0m | -£186.0m | -£180.0m | -£146.0m | ▲ 19% |
| Bank loans (current) | -£23.2m | -£37.2m | £0 | £0 | £0 | £0 | £0 | -£300.0m | — |
| Total current liabilities | £552.9m | £640.1m | £730.5m | £702.8m | £804.0m | £829.0m | £857.0m | £1.11bn | ▲ 30% |
| Net current assets | £988.8m | £968.5m | £958.1m | £1.28bn | £1.23bn | £1.03bn | £567.0m | £541.0m | ▼ 5% |
| Total assets less current liabilities | £1.67bn | £1.69bn | £2.56bn | £2.80bn | £2.89bn | £2.86bn | £2.51bn | £2.32bn | ▼ 8% |
| Bank loans (non-current) | — | — | -£300.0m | -£297.1m | -£298.0m | -£298.0m | -£299.0m | -£438.0m | ▼ 46% |
| Long-term liabilities | £244.7m | £232.1m | £1.34bn | £1.24bn | £1.28bn | £1.32bn | £1.36bn | £1.40bn | ▲ 3% |
| Provisions | £103.5m | £85.3m | £41.8m | £55.8m | £64.0m | £62.0m | £57.0m | £60.0m | ▲ 5% |
| Net assets | £1.43bn | £1.46bn | £1.22bn | £1.56bn | £1.62bn | £1.54bn | £1.15bn | £921.0m | ▼ 20% |
| Total equity | £1.43bn | £1.46bn | £1.22bn | £1.56bn | £1.62bn | £1.54bn | £1.15bn | £921.0m | ▼ 20% |
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Δ YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net cash from operating activities | £678.4m | £411.4m | £455.8m | £591.4m | £699.0m | £750.0m | £506.0m | £429.0m | ▼ 15% |
| Net cash used in investing activities | -£44.9m | -£124.5m | -£151.4m | -£90.5m | -£164.0m | -£147.0m | -£231.0m | -£127.0m | ▲ 45% |
| Net cash used in financing activities | -£536.1m | -£343.4m | -£262.9m | -£159.1m | -£581.0m | -£821.0m | -£865.0m | £48.0m | ▲ 106% |
| Net increase / (decrease) in cash | £97.4m | -£56.5m | £41.5m | £341.8m | -£46.0m | -£218.0m | -£590.0m | £350.0m | ▲ 159% |
| Cash at end of year | £892.1m | £837.3m | £887.3m | £1.22bn | £1.18bn | £961.0m | £362.0m | £708.0m | ▲ 96% |
Scene 04 · Waterfall
How each cost layer eats into the top-line on the way down to profit after tax. Cascade chart coming in the next release — for now the table below shows the same flow.
FY2025 accounts · cascade view
03 · Risk
Working capital + cash
Four numbers that tell you how stretched the balance sheet is today. The line under each is in plain English — what the number means for the business, not what to do about it.
Principal risks
The creative transition launched in 2023 failed to gain traction, leading to significant financial underperformance. Risk that the Burberry Forward transformation plan does not successfully reignite brand desire or deliver sustainable, profitable growth.
The global personal luxury goods market experienced its first slowdown in nearly 15 years in 2024, with ongoing macroeconomic headwinds and geopolitical uncertainty impacting consumer demand and Burberry's sales and operating costs.
Climate change is identified as a principal risk with potential physical and transition risks impacting Burberry's supply chain, raw material sourcing, operations and financial planning across short, medium and long term.
Withdrawal of VAT refunds for overseas visitors has made the UK the least competitive destination in Europe for tourist shopping, seriously impacting Burberry's home market business.
Risks across the upstream value chain including human rights, environmental due diligence, responsible raw material sourcing, water security, and biodiversity loss which could affect operations and brand reputation.
Screening status
Governance & subsequent events
Stella King joined the Board as an independent Non-Executive Director on 1 April 2025, bringing luxury industry and Asia Pacific expertise.
Burberry announced the retirement of Non-Executive Directors Fabiola Arredondo, Antoine de Saint-Affrique and Sam Fischer following the 2025 AGM.
Burberry announced a partnership with the Victoria and Albert Museum (V&A) for a multi-year collaboration to redevelop the Fashion Gallery, to be renamed The Burberry Gallery upon reopening in spring 2027.
Burberry's Winter 2025 runway show was held at Tate Britain; the collection will land in stores in September 2025.
Compliance signals
HACKWOOD DIRECTORS LIMITED returned a probable match against HELFORD DIRECTORS LIMITED on the IRAQ2 sanctions regime with a confidence score of 0.82, requiring manual verification to confirm or discount.
Severity · high
Two directors — BLAKE, Brian Edmund and HACKWOOD DIRECTORS LIMITED — served fewer than 12 months, raising the possibility of nominee arrangements.
Severity · medium
30 director resignations against 9 currently active directors represents an atypically high turnover ratio, which may indicate underlying governance instability.
Severity · medium
Ownership pattern
What we can't see
Trust beneficial owners are recorded on HMRC's Trust Registration Service, which is not publicly accessible. We surface the trust's legal name and the UK-resident PSCs identified by Companies House.
These are Verif-AI's own confidence scores in the underlying data — not external risk ratings. Each dimension reflects how complete and self-consistent the filed numbers were on extraction.
04 · Market
Industry classification
Professional, scientific & technical
Companies House records the SIC2007 classification for this entity under 1 code: 70100.
Peer cohort · Division 70 · Head Offices & Consultancy · 35 peers
Sector cohort · 35 peers · Head Offices & Consultancy
| Metric | This filing | Peer median | Percentile | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Ratio | 0.73 | 0.26 | 98th | strong |
| Profit Margin (%) | -2.7% | 7.3% | 1th | weak |
| Quick Ratio | 1.05 | 0.59 | 87th | strong |
| Gross Margin (%) | 62.5% | 32.1% | 92th | strong |
| Current Ratio | 1.05 | 0.87 | 58th | above median |
| Cash-to-Assets | 0.28 | 0.06 | 74th | above median |
| Debt-to-Assets | 0.85 | 0.71 | 71th | below median |
| Debt-to-Equity | 2.72 | 1.14 | 79th | weak |
| Net Assets Growth (%) | -20.2% | -0.6% | 19th | weak |
05 · People
Every named director was cross-checked against the full UK Companies House appointments dataset (27.8 million records). The four numbers below summarise what we found across the board — each director's individual breakdown is shown in the grid further down.
Each director, individually
| Role | Director | Career boards | Concurrent | Prior-failure rate | Joined | Other UK boards |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Director · active |
Joshua Gallay Schulman
American · England
|
1 | — | — | 2024-07-17 | — |
| Director · active |
MR Ronald Leroy Frasch
American · United States
|
1 | — | — | 2017-09-01 | — |
| Director · active |
Danuta Gray
British · United Kingdom
|
1 | — | — | 2021-12-01 | — |
| Director · active |
MR Alan Stewart
British · United Kingdom
|
1 | — | — | 2022-09-01 | — |
| Director · active |
Alessandra Cozzani
Italian · Italy
|
1 | — | — | 2023-09-01 | — |
| Director · active |
MRS Catherine Elizabeth Ferry
British · England
|
1 | — | — | 2023-07-17 | — |
| Director · active |
DR Gerard Martin Murphy
Irish · England
|
1 | — | — | 2018-05-17 | — |
| Director · active |
YI Jin
Italian · United Kingdom
|
1 | — | — | 2025-04-01 | — |
| Director · active |
MS Orna Nichionna
Irish · United Kingdom
|
1 | — | — | 2018-01-03 | — |
Co-director network
People who share at least one other UK directorship with someone on this board. Sorted by overlap count. Click any shared boards chip to reveal the companies they overlap on.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.
Corporate hierarchy
Subsidiaries pulled from Companies House cross-references — entities Burberry Group PLC directly controls.
Historical board
Every officer who has left the company, newest-resignation first. Helps spot waves of churn that wouldn't show on the active-director cards alone.
06 · AI Investigation
AI forensic pass across 100 Companies House filings. 31 page-cited signals from three specialist agents, 3 cross-signal correlations, and 4 verification questions for management — every claim traces back to a filing reference.
AI Analyst commentary
Narrator-written context blocks — what an analyst would read in 90 seconds and walk away with the picture.
Fixed assets fell to £1.78bn and net assets dropped to £921m as the loss year eroded equity. Cash recovered to £813m — but with £1.11bn of current liabilities, the balance sheet is tighter than at any point since FY2020.
15 officers registered at Companies House, including 14 individual directors and one corporate secretary (Hackwood Secretaries Limited). Board includes Joshua Schulman (CEO) and a full independent non-executive structure typical of a FTSE-listed plc.
Burberry Group plc is a listed plc — no single controlling shareholder; institutional ownership typical of FTSE companies. No PSC registered, consistent with widely dispersed institutional shareholding following the 2002 London Stock Exchange IPO.
Case files · Chapter dossier
Each chapter resolves one signal cluster. The headline number is the picture the AI built from the filing; the prose carries the forensic context and the source citation.
Operating profit went from solidly positive to essentially zero — and pretax swung into the red.
Profit before tax
The swing from £418m operating profit in FY2024 to -£3m in FY2025 is a near-total reversal in one reporting period. Turnover fell by £507m to £2.46bn, and because gross margin compressed faster than revenue — gross profit down 23% against revenue down 17% — cost absorption worsened sharply. The pretax loss of £66m follows a £383m profit the prior year.
Source · P&L, FY2024 and FY2025 filed accounts.
While the P&L bled, the cash balance nearly doubled — a contrast that needs unpacking.
Financing cash swung from -£865m in FY2024 to +£48m in FY2025, meaning the prior year saw heavy outflows — likely dividends or debt repayment — that simply stopped this year. Combined with a £429m operating cash inflow, cash on hand rose from £441m to £813m. The P&L loss and the cash build are not contradictory; they reflect timing of distributions, not underlying cash generation.
Source · Cash flow statement and balance sheet, FY2024 and FY2025 filed accounts.
Net assets fell 20% and current liabilities rose 30%, tightening the liquidity cushion.
Current liabilities grew from £857m to £1.11bn while net assets fell from £1.15bn to £921m. Fixed assets declined 9% to £1.78bn, suggesting reduced capital investment or write-downs. The liability build against a shrinking equity base is the structural consequence of a loss year — not a crisis, but a measurable tightening.
Source · Balance sheet, FY2025 filed accounts.
No person of significant control is recorded — ownership is either fragmented or held via nominee.
Companies House shows no PSC for Burberry Group PLC. For a FTSE-listed group this is normal — shareholdings are typically spread across institutional investors, each below the 25% disclosure threshold. The nine-person board spans five nationalities, with a new CEO, Joshua Schulman, appointed July 2024, and a further director, Yi Jin, joining April 2025.
Source · PSC register and director appointments, Companies House filing.
A capital allotment in May 2026 and accounts filed September 2025 round out the compliance picture.
A SH01 (capital allotment) was filed 1 May 2026, indicating new shares were issued after the financial year end — the purpose is not stated in the brief. Accounts were filed 23 September 2025. The Verif-AI TrustScore sits at 63/100, with the Financial dimension scoring lowest at 55/100, consistent with the loss year and compressed margins.
Source · Companies House filing history; Verif-AI TrustScore dimensions.
Cross-signal intelligence
Pairs of facts from different chapters that — taken together — tell a story neither half does alone. This is where investigation outperforms summary.
The financing cash reversal in [chapter 2] — from -£865m outflow to +£48m inflow — explains most of the cash build, and sits in sharp contrast to the equity erosion visible in [chapter 3], where net assets fell £233m.
The gross margin compression in [chapter 1] (revenue -17%, gross profit -23%) hits the balance sheet directly in [chapter 3]: thinner profits mean less retained equity, which is the primary driver of net assets falling from £1.15bn to £921m.
↔ Cross-reference
The new CEO appointment in [chapter 4] (Schulman, July 2024) lands at the precise moment the financial year that produced the loss was under way, making the FY2025 numbers a read on the trading environment he inherited rather than one he set.
Deep signals
Specifics most readers would miss — surfaced by the AI for the analyst who wants to know.
Consistent with a business where product cost commitments (manufacturing contracts, raw materials, wholesale minimums) are fixed well in advance. When volume drops, those costs don't fall immediately, compressing margin. Until supply-chain and product commitments are renegotiated to match the new revenue level, the structural cost overhang will persist.
A loss year that also produces a large cash increase is unusual. The most likely explanation is a combination of: (1) significant reduction in dividends and share buybacks versus FY2024, and (2) reduced capital expenditure. The £171m fall in fixed assets also suggests lease expiries or possible store disposals. The cash build is a deliberate defensive move, not organic generation.
The company is paying suppliers slightly faster (or buying less) while other short-term obligations — likely lease liabilities falling within 12 months, accruals, or short-term debt maturities — have grown significantly. This is worth monitoring: it suggests debt or lease maturities are clustering in the near term, increasing the cash call on the business in FY2026.
Forensic investigation · 31 signals
Segmental revenue · capital structure · strategic KPIs. Each agent cites the exact filing page for every claim, with an AI confidence score derived from cross-citation strength.
Segmental Analysis
Retail/Wholesale revenue dropped from £2,906m to £2,395m, a fall of £511m or 17.6% in the 52 weeks to 29 March 2025.
p.189 · 6 more from this specialist
Strategic KPIs
Total revenue dropped from £2,968m to £2,461m, a 15% fall at constant exchange rates.
p.6, p.30 · 11 more from this specialist
Capital Structure & Borrowings
At 29 March 2025: bank overdrafts £105m, £300m sustainability-linked bond (due Sep 2025), £438m fixed rate bond (due Jun 2030). Total carrying value £843m.
p.206 · 11 more from this specialist
Retail/Wholesale revenue dropped from £2,906m to £2,395m, a fall of £511m or 17.6% in the 52 weeks to 29 March 2025.
Why it matters: This is the engine of the business — nearly all group revenue comes from this segment — so a drop this big means the group is selling far less than it was a year ago.
p.189 critical conf 99%
Adjusted operating profit for Retail/Wholesale went from +£359m in FY2024 to -£36m in FY2025, a swing of £395m.
Why it matters: The main business went from highly profitable to loss-making in one year, which is a serious warning sign about whether the company can keep trading profitably at current sales levels.
p.189 critical conf 99%
Asia Pacific revenue fell from £1,286m to £1,043m (down £243m, or 18.9%), making it still the largest region at 42% of Retail/Wholesale revenue.
Why it matters: Asia Pacific accounts for the largest share of sales, so continued weakness there — particularly in Mainland China — puts the whole group's recovery at risk.
p.190 critical conf 98%
Americas revenue grew from £603m to £510m... wait — Americas fell from £603m to £510m (down 15.8%). EMEIA fell from £1,017m to £842m (down 17.2%). All three regions declined by roughly 15-19%.
Why it matters: Revenue declined across every region, so the weakness is not limited to one market — it is a global problem for the business.
p.190 critical conf 97%
Total group adjusted operating profit fell from £418m to £26m (down £392m, or 93.8%) in the 52 weeks to 29 March 2025.
Why it matters: The group barely broke even on an adjusted basis, meaning almost all of last year's profit has been wiped out in a single year.
p.189 critical conf 99%
Accessories revenue fell from £1,055m to £841m (down £214m, 20.3%). It remains the top product category but its share of Retail/Wholesale revenue fell from 36% to 35%.
Why it matters: Accessories are typically a core driver of luxury brand revenue; a 20% drop suggests customers are pulling back on the brand's most popular products.
p.190 important conf 98%
Licensing revenue grew slightly from £62m to £66m, and adjusted operating profit held at £62m (vs £59m prior year), giving a near-100% operating margin.
Why it matters: Licensing is a tiny part of revenue (under 3%) but is highly profitable and growing slightly, providing a small but reliable income stream.
p.189 useful conf 99%
Total revenue dropped from £2,968m to £2,461m, a 15% fall at constant exchange rates.
Why it matters: A 15% fall in sales is a serious warning sign — it means far fewer customers are buying Burberry products, which puts pressure on the whole business.
p.6, p.30 critical conf 99%
Comparable store sales (stores open more than 12 months) fell 12% at constant exchange rates in FY 2024/25.
Why it matters: This shows existing stores are selling less than before, not just that Burberry closed shops — meaning the brand is losing pulling power with shoppers.
p.28 critical conf 98%
Gross margin fell from 67.7% to 62.5%, a drop of 520 basis points at reported exchange rates (470 basis points at constant rates).
Why it matters: Each pound of sales is now bringing in noticeably less profit after the cost of making goods — largely because Burberry had to discount products to clear excess stock.
p.30 critical conf 99%
Adjusted operating profit fell from £418m to £26m, a drop of 88% at constant exchange rates. Reported operating result was a £3m loss.
Why it matters: Burberry went from a healthy profit to barely breaking even in one year — this means the company has very little financial cushion if trading stays tough.
p.7, p.30 critical conf 99%
Retail channel (stores and online) revenue dropped from £2,400m to £2,076m, a fall of £324m or roughly 13.5%.
Why it matters: Retail is by far the biggest channel (84% of sales), so a big drop here drives the whole group's revenue decline.
p.6 critical conf 97%
Wholesale revenue fell from £506m to £319m, a drop of £187m (roughly 37%).
Why it matters: Burberry is deliberately pulling back from wholesale to protect its luxury positioning, but the scale of the drop also shows reduced demand from retail partners.
p.6 critical conf 97%
Asia Pacific revenue dropped from £1,286m to £1,043m, a fall of £243m or about 19%.
Why it matters: Asia Pacific is Burberry's largest market, so a near-20% drop there is the single biggest drag on the company's total sales.
p.6 critical conf 97%
Accessories revenue dropped from £1,055m to £841m, a fall of £214m or roughly 20%.
Why it matters: Accessories like bags and scarves are usually a luxury brand's most profitable and reliable products, so a 20% drop signals the brand is losing ground in its most important area.
p.6 critical conf 96%
Adjusted operating profit margin fell from 14.1% to 1.0%, a drop of 1,210 basis points at constant exchange rates.
Why it matters: For every £100 of sales, Burberry now only keeps about £1 as operating profit — down from £14 last year — which leaves almost no room for any further bad news.
p.29, p.30 critical conf 99%
Burberry suspended dividend payments in respect of FY 2024/25, announced in July 2024.
Why it matters: No dividend means shareholders get no income this year — the company is keeping cash to fund its turnaround instead.
p.2 important conf 98%
Cash net of overdrafts rose from £362m to £708m, though the group also had borrowings of £738m at 29 March 2025 (up from £299m).
Why it matters: The higher cash balance gives Burberry breathing room to fund its turnaround plan, but rising borrowings mean the overall debt picture is more complex.
p.7 important conf 95%
Asia Pacific 237 stores, EMEIA 100 stores, Americas 85 stores — total 422 stores. Two outlet locations were closed during FY 2024/25.
Why it matters: The store network is broadly stable, so the sales decline is coming from weaker customer spending per store, not from closing shops.
p.6 useful conf 95%
At 29 March 2025: bank overdrafts £105m, £300m sustainability-linked bond (due Sep 2025), £438m fixed rate bond (due Jun 2030). Total carrying value £843m.
Why it matters: The company owes £843m in borrowings. A £300m bond matures in just a few months (Sep 2025), which means a big chunk of debt needs to be repaid or refinanced very soon.
p.206 critical conf 95%
The 1.125% £300m MTN sustainability-linked bond matures September 2025. No refinancing plan is explicitly disclosed in the notes.
Why it matters: This company must find £300m within months. If it cannot refinance on good terms, it could face serious cash pressure, even though it currently holds £813m in cash.
p.206 critical conf 90%
Operating profit is -£3m and finance costs are £88m, giving interest cover of approximately -0.03x.
Why it matters: The company is not earning enough from its operations to cover its interest bills. That means it is eating into cash reserves to pay interest, which is a warning sign for anyone extending credit.
p.192 critical conf 90%
The Group states net cash of £708m at 29 March 2025 (prior year: £362m). Cash of £813m offsets gross borrowings of £843m (excluding leases).
Why it matters: Despite large debts, the company holds more cash than it owes on its bonds, so the near-term £300m bond repayment can likely be covered from existing cash without needing new loans.
p.211 important conf 92%
The Group has a £300m RCF maturing November 2027 and a new £75m RCF maturing March 2027. No drawdowns were made in the current or prior year.
Why it matters: These undrawn credit lines act as a safety net. Even if cash runs low, the company can draw on these facilities, reducing the risk of a cash crunch.
p.206 important conf 92%
The Group states it 'is in compliance with the financial and other covenants within the facilities' and has been throughout the period. No specific loan limits or numbers are disclosed.
Why it matters: Knowing the company is within its loan limits is reassuring, but without the actual limits we cannot tell how close to the edge it is — which matters when profits are falling.
p.206 important conf 80%
Total lease liabilities at 29 March 2025 are £1,081m (prior year £1,188m): £866m non-current and £215m current. Property leases account for £1,079m of this.
Why it matters: Lease debts are a big extra layer on top of the bond borrowings. Together, total debt including leases is around £1.9bn, which is large relative to the company's net assets of £921m.
p.204 important conf 95%
Current lease liabilities (due within 12 months) are £215m at 29 March 2025 (prior year £229m). Total cash paid on leases in the year was £394m.
Why it matters: The company must pay out at least £215m in lease costs in the coming year on top of its bond and interest obligations, which adds to cash pressure when operating profits are negative.
p.204, p.205 important conf 90%
After interest rate swaps, approximately 100% of the Group's long-term borrowings are at floating rate at 29 March 2025 (prior year: none).
Why it matters: Switching to floating rate means interest costs will rise if interest rates go up, adding more pressure on a business that is already not covering its interest payments from trading profits.
p.209 important conf 88%
£29m of restructuring costs were incurred in the 52 weeks to 29 March 2025 as part of the Burberry Forward programme. Total programme costs expected to reach £80m.
Why it matters: Cash is being spent on a major cost-cutting programme on top of interest and lease payments. This reduces the cash buffer available to repay the Sep 2025 bond.
p.192 important conf 92%
The maturity table shows £455m of non-lease non-current financial liabilities (the Jun 2030 fixed rate bond) all falling due in more than 5 years.
Why it matters: The long-dated bond is not a near-term problem. The main refinancing risk is the Sep 2025 bond, which appears manageable given the cash position.
p.211 useful conf 88%
No shares were cancelled in the 52 weeks to 29 March 2025 (prior year: 20.5 million shares cancelled via two £200m buyback programmes).
Why it matters: The company has stopped buying back its own shares, which suggests it is holding onto cash rather than returning it to shareholders — a sign of caution given the tough trading environment.
p.206 useful conf 95%
Specialist deep panels · Structured price capture
Below the prose findings, each agent publishes a structured numeric metrics block. Segmental revenue, named KPIs with YoY %, and capital-structure metrics — direct from the source filings.
Segmental analysis
Top-segment revenue concentration: 97.3% · Segment totals reconcile to the group P&L
Strategic KPIs
Capital structure
Management questions · Open inquiry
Generated by the AI from the disclosure gaps it detected. Hover or tap each card to surface the underlying evidence that triggered the question.
Verification gaps
High-trust analysis names its own blind spots. These are metrics the AI looked for and couldn't find — anything material to the verdict needs management or independent verification.
No agent flagged missing data, but the £300m bond refinancing position is not disclosed in the notes reviewed, leaving a material near-term liquidity question unanswered in the source documents.
07 · Documents
Filing pattern + upcoming windows
Due at Companies House by 2026-09-30 for the period ending 2026-03-31.
Annual confirmation due by 2027-04-10 (made up to 2027-03-27).
Final chapter — The verdict
Good Trust
The balance sheet can absorb this loss — but it cannot absorb two or three more without something changing materially in the revenue line or the cost base.
FY2025 accounts
Signal Radar
Decisive findings
The hard-hit facts that drove the score. Full breakdown — chapters, between-the-lines, all specialist findings — sits on AI Insights.
Adjusted operating profit for Retail/Wholesale went from +£359m in FY2024 to -£36m in FY2025, a swing of £395m.
Why it matters: The main business went from highly profitable to loss-making in one year, which is a serious warning sign about whether the company can keep trading profitably at current sales levels.
p.189
Total group adjusted operating profit fell from £418m to £26m (down £392m, or 93.8%) in the 52 weeks to 29 March 2025.
Why it matters: The group barely broke even on an adjusted basis, meaning almost all of last year's profit has been wiped out in a single year.
p.189
Adjusted operating profit fell from £418m to £26m, a drop of 88% at constant exchange rates. Reported operating result was a £3m loss.
Why it matters: Burberry went from a healthy profit to barely breaking even in one year — this means the company has very little financial cushion if trading stays tough.
p.7, p.30
09 · Verification
What we read
Who we cross-checked
Screening status
Steps we ran
Each step in detail
Limits and caveats
No PSCs are recorded against this entity — typical for listed PLCs (widely held by institutional investors) and for dormant / micro-entity filings.
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